THE UNIVERSITY
of EDINBURGH

Darwinian Social Evolution as a Theory of Social Change

by William Kerr

Word count: 97,995 words

PhD in Sociology

The University of Edinburgh

2018

Acknowledgements

I would first like to thank my supervisors, Jonathan Hearn and Stephen Kemp. Their advice, suggestions and patience (in the face of numerous missed deadlines) has helped this thesis enormously, making it much sharper and better argued (and making me seem much smarter and more knowledgeable than I actually am). Thanks also to Dr James Kennedy and Professor Geoffrey Hodgson, whose incisive viva comments have helped clarify and conceptualize further the arguments in this thesis.

Thanks to my parents, for their love, support and encouragement (and providing me with a place to live). Without that I wouldn't have been able to do this PhD.

Lastly, I'd like to thank my fiancée Nini. Without her love, support and encouragement, making me smile and brightening up the world when I struggled, I would not have been able to take on the challenge of doing the thesis and see it through to its conclusion. This thesis is for her.

Table of Contents

Abstract

This thesis investigates the use of a reconceptualised social evolutionary theory for understanding and explaining how and why societies change, specifically looking at this question through the frame of nationalism. The thesis is split into three parts: in the first part I first examine older forms of social evolutionary theory (conceptions from Marx, Spencer and generalized evolutionary accounts) and critique them on the grounds that they are too 'progressive' in character, suffer from teleology and have a notion that all societies change linearly, i.e. pass through the same set of stages. After this I elaborate on a reconstructed version of social evolutionary theory, taking it along more Darwinian lines: that the process should be understood as contingent and non-linear, where cultural variants and social intuitions change in response to selective pressures brought about by environmental conditions. To reconstruct social evolution I draw mainly on accounts from Runciman (2009), Hodgson and Knudsen (2010), Sperber (1996), Hull (1988) and Richerson and Boyd (2006).

In the second part of the thesis I look at four different theories of social change and utilize Darwinian social evolutionary theory to critique them. The four in question are: Immanuel Wallerstein (world-systems theory); Michael Hechter (rational-choice theory); Michael Mann (sources of social power); and Ernest Gellner (functionalism). These four theories were chosen as they either have, or represent, different theories of social change, and also because they are all concerned to some extent with the rise of the nation-state and nationalism. The main argument in this section is that Darwinian social evolutionary theory can incorporate elements of these theories whilst also going beyond them in explaining and understanding why societies undergo changes. In the case of Mann and Gellner I also note that they are, to a certain extent, implicitly relying on a social evolutionary account, and that drawing this out more explicitly helps provide greater theoretical solidity to their arguments.

In the final part of the thesis I apply the theory to two case-studies, looking at the rise of nationalism in Britain (with a focus on England) and Japan. In both cases I examine each development of nationalism historically, using Darwinian social evolution to assess why nationalism emerged at the point that it did in each case, and not before. A final synthesis chapter then looks comparatively at the two cases and applies Darwinian social evolutionary theory to address the question of why nationalism generated in England/Britain, but did not in Japan and why the nationalist movements took the forms that they did. The chapter centres on three main themes, the role of war in forming identities, the role of variation in generating institutions, and the role of lineages in creating continuity in discontinuity. Finally it address the question of why nationalism became the dominant movement and not something else. Together this demonstrates demonstrate the usefulness of the framework for addressing questions concerning social change, in providing a different perspective and insights from other theories of social change.

A final chapter summarizes and concludes the thesis, as well as pointing to new directions that research could develop.

Introduction

The Universal Acid

In his book, *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995), Daniel Dennett summons up the metaphor of the 'universal acid' to describe the idea of evolution by natural selection. The universal acid is a substance that will corrode and transform everything it touches. For Dennett natural selection is such an acid, as the idea is highly applicable to all disciplines, which deal with human science. Its universal influence guarantees that no areas of knowledge are safe from its influence.

Supporting evidence abounds. Natural selection obviously has the stronghold in biology but it is slowly transgressing into other areas of knowledge (Hull, 1988). For example, ethics (Ruse, 1986), literature (Boyd, Caroll & Gottschall 2010)), psychology (Cosmides, Tooby & Barkow, 1992) and many others. Even physics has started to find a use for the concept of natural selection as a mechanism for explaining the origins and set-up of the universe (Smolin, 1992, 2004) and quantum mechanical effects (Zurek, 2009).

What then does social science, and specifically sociology, have to say about the potential uses of evolutionary reasoning to understanding society? The initial reaction varied somewhat. Among the disciplines founders Marx was enthusiastic, admiring Darwin's work, and believing that the theory provided naturalistic evidence for his theory of advancement through class conflict (Gould, 2007: 175-176)[1]; and at

[1] Though Gould also notes that Marx's views lessened somewhat over time, and that in any case he likely didn't quite understand the science.

the other end of the scale Weber was sceptical, but not necessarily hostile, to the idea of using biology to understand society (Weber, 1924: 389-390), but disliked the idea of applying the concept of selection to the development of societies (Runciman, 1995). There were more enthusiastic proponents in economics and sociology, who actually attempted to generalize the work of Darwin towards understanding society, the most famous of which was probably Thorstein Veblen (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 6-7, 11-13; Veblen, 1898; 1899). However Darwin's concept of natural selection and social science have always been intertwined with one another. He was famously influenced by Thomas Malthus' book *Principles of Economics* with its idea of population growth and dwindling resources. Stephen Gould (1991) has also pointed to a similarity between the natural selection idea and Adam Smith's notion of how economies work.[2]

The notion, however was soon to fall out of favour. Taking biological concepts and using them in application to society soon came under fire as being an illegitimate notion, as well as being used to justify a raft of policies, such as laissez-faire, imperialism, racism and eugenics, under the heading of 'social Darwinism'. Figures like Herbert Spencer and William Graham Summner were seen as prominent figureheads of this movement. This was, however, largely mythological: virtually no-one self-identified as a social Darwinist and using the theory of natural selection to justify social policies was surprisingly rare (Bannister, 1979). Spencer would have certainly been baffled to be seen as a forefront proponent of social Darwinism, given

[2] Gould doesn't directly say that Darwin was influenced by Smith There is evidence that Darwin had read Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, but no known evidence that he had read The Wealth of Nations (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 6, fn. 7. However it would be odd if an educated Victorian like Darwin was completely unaware of Smith's theory, or the prevailing political economic attitudes. For a stronger, if slightly polemical, argument that Darwin was well aware of these arguments, and made use of them, see Weikart (2009).

that his own leanings were towards Lamarck and he criticized and downplayed the role of natural selection in evolution (Bannister, 1979: ch. 3). Most of Spencer's conceptions about evolution existed before Darwin's theory was published and Spencer was frequently annoyed by the constant conflation between his ideas and Darwin's (Becquemont, 2011: 14).

The term 'social Darwinist' was typically used as a way of bringing a lot of different notions under one heading and thus making them a focal point for people who opposed them, typically the left, to attack (Hodgson, 2004). In the aftermath of World War I, the notion of applying biology to society began to fall out of favour. The violence and imperialism of the great powers that had led to the war was criticised for being based on a notion of the biological struggle for existence. Related to this was the work of Talcott Parsons who, in attempting to craft a definable area for social science divorced from psychology or biological influences, used social Darwinism, and the fear of it, to argue that all applications of biological ideas to society were illegitimate (Hodgson: 2004: 441-444)[3]. The further death knell was provided by Richard Hofstadater's (1944) *Social Darwinism in American Thought,* which very strongly laid the charge of social Darwinism against many ideas of laissez-faire, imperialism, racism and eugenics and linked the ideas to Nazism (Leonard, 2007).

The possible exception to this notion that there were no social Darwinist movements is Japan, which has to do with the manner in which Darwinism came to Japan. When Darwinism arrived, in the Early Meiji times, the necessary biological and geological theory groundwork needed to fully understand Darwin's ideas was not yet

[3] Ironically, towards the end of his career, Talcott Parsons would attempt to create a theory of social evolution to understand societies development.

in place. Consequently, when Darwinism arrived, it was largely ignored by biologists and was instead taken up by social theorists and read as a social theory (Shimao, 1981; Unoura, 1999). The work of Herbert Spencer arrived contemporaneously and, during the early Meiji period, he was the most influential and widely translated Western philosopher (Nagai, 1954: 55). His ideas were taken as being Darwinian in character and were used for two purposes: to maintain the traditional social order in the Japan (in order to continue Japan's moral evolution[4] and so surpass the West, which was becoming decadent due to individualism), whilst also enabling Japan to write off the social consequences of modernization as being products of 'the laws of nature' (Unoura, 1999).[5] However, I can't certifiably say or confirm whether these theorists, such as Kato Hiroyuki, identified themselves as social Darwinists, or used that terminology, as I cannot read Japanese.

At the level of theoretical application, away from wider cultural and societal issues, using the concepts taken from evolution and applying them to understanding society suffered from problems to do with questions of progress: namely there appeared to be a suggestion in much of the work that societies could be placed on a scale, from worst to best, and societies progressed through successive stages in a similar manner (Noble, 2000: Ch. 3; Lewens, 2012a). This formulation was troubled both by historical problems, history just didn't seem to progress in that fashion, and

[4] To expand: the theorists agreed with what they saw as the Darwinian interpretation that the world was divided in superior and inferior races with Japan as one of the inferior ones. Being unable to overcome their biological failing, as they saw it, their only hope of succeeding was to be superior in the moral realm, their superiority here tying in with other seemingly Darwinian ideas of the possibility that societies could 'decline'. This Spencerian/Darwinian interpretation, however, fell out favour in later Meiji Japan as it was seen as anti-nationalistic, due to the idea that the Japanese were inferior.

[5] Spencer himself was called upon to provide advice to the Japanese government - contrary to expectations he urged them to take slow and gradual reforms (Unoura, 1999), though this was at the time when Spencer's stance on evolutionary impulses in society was softening (Bannister, 1979)

moral problems, as it suggested that some societies and social formations were 'better' than others on some objective scale of measurement.

In recent years, however, there have been new attempts to apply insights of evolution to social sciences. Most famously, in 1975, Edward Wilson published *Sociobiology: A New Synthesis*, which primarily outlined ways of understanding animal social behaviours but included a final chapter where he turned the same techniques to humans. A huge controversy erupted over it, with many of the same arguments about genetic determinism, racism etc. playing out again (for reviews, see Segestrale, 1986 & 2001; Dusek, 2005; Kitchner, 1987). Sociobiology as a research field has largely transformed into evolutionary psychology (Cosmides, Tooby & Barklow, 1992), where some of the more persistent criticisms of sociobiology are taken on-board to help reformulate the research programme. Sociobiological ideas are enjoying something of a rival, particularly in the fields of ethnicity and nationalism, where they are being used to understand why nationalism has such force (c.f. Gat, 2013).

Having located the history of using evolution to try and understand society, both from a biological and conceptual perspective, I am now going to move into a fuller discussion of the purpose of this thesis. The intent is to, mostly, leave aside biological accounts of human societies and instead focus on the conceptual tools of biological evolution by natural selection and their application to societies. Specifically this thesis seeks to examine how this theory can be applied to issues of macro change in societies. That is: can concepts derived from evolution by natural selection provide a means of understanding how and why societies change?

Social Evolution, Social Change and Nationalism

Social evolution seeks to apply the concepts gleaned from evolution by natural selection to society, broadly defined. The argument, as it will be advanced in this thesis, is that these concepts, of inheritance, selection, variation and adaptation in response to local environmental conditions can be applied equally well to society and social change as they can be to biological evolution. As seen, the earliest applications of evolutionary reasoning tended to locate societies on a ladder, with the 'better', more civilized societies at the top and the inferior societies at the bottom. It was then at the theorists discretion whether this was an impermeable barrier, or whether societies could climb it.

One of the earliest examples of this theory is that of August Comte, one of the founders of sociology. He developed an understanding of societies' development, focusing on the developing mental capacities of humans, that saw them pass through three stages: the Theological Stage (governed by supernatural and religious thought and politically ruled by priests and warriors); the Metaphysical Stage (governed by abstract philosophical principles and politically ruled by a centralized state and lawyers and theologians); and finally arriving at the Positive Stage (governed by factual, scientific knowledge and politically the state withers away and power is in the hands of engineers and scientists who eliminate conflict through the practical management of people's needs). This was a unilineal system, as all societies had to pass through these stages in this order (Noble, 2000: 44-5). Comte's system, and understanding of development of societies, is more Lamarckian[6] in character than it

[6] A fuller discussion of Lamarckism comes later in the thesis but, in brief, Lamarckism is the notion that organisms acquire characteristics in their life-time that they then pass on to their descendants.

is Darwinian though (ibid: 41). Future developments of social evolution in this vein generally followed the same model as laid down by Comte.

For example, Sahlins and Service (1960) developed a model whereby advancement through societies was measured by their ability to consume and use energy more efficiently, their complexity and freedom from environmental control. Their general approach was to synthesize two, contemporary, dominant strands in cultural evolution in anthropology, that of Leslie White, who argued that there could be a notion of progress from one society to another and that of Julian Steward, who was more multilinear, rejecting the notion of progress and concentrating purely on the adaptiveness of particular societies to particular environments. Sahlins and Service took these two approaches and put them under the headings of 'general evolution', representing overall progress, and 'specific evolution', representing the particular adaptations to environments among a particular group or lineage (Sahlins & Service, 1960: 16). Though more sophisticated, these ideas were still maintaining the notion that there was a particular upward direction of progress, and that specific adaptations could be treated separately from this overall gradation. As one of the theorists who will be engaged with in this thesis, Ernest Gellner, pointed out such a theory of evolution is problematic because placing successive stages and societies in a sequence is not an explanation of that sequence. What explains it are the mechanisms behind it (Gellner, 1964: 15-21).

This, however, is not the way it has to be. And in the last few decades there has been a growing literature that is looking at the question of social evolution and how

So, to use Lamarck's example, a metal worker will acquire big muscles through his work pounding and shaping the metal. He will then pass on that characteristic, the big muscles, to his children.

to reconceptualise it in order to incorporate the core insights that come from the notions developed in Darwinian evolution by natural selection. W. G. Runciman (2009) has taken the notion of adaptive selection and used it to understand how cultural ideas and behaviours spread, along with how social roles and practices change and adapt over time within societies and institutions. Richerson and Boyd (2006) have developed models and ways of understanding how and why certain ideas, behaviours and habits, or what they call cultural variants, spread successfully in particular environments. And Hodgson and Knudsen (2010) have made arguments for the need of a 'generalized Darwinism', as a framework for understanding cultural and institutional change and adaptation.

What all of these works represent is a reconceptualization of social evolution, away from how it has traditionally been understood in sociology, to a more Darwinian understanding. The main concepts being used are not those of stages or sequences, but rather the mechanisms of biological evolution: namely variation, inheritance and selection (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006a; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010). These are understood as operating, not according to a general, global process that effects everywhere (Mann, 1986: Ch. 2) but rather as being in response to local, environmental conditions. By placing these ideas in this kind of context, social evolution is also able to move away from the problem of unilinearity, seeing societies as having a set sequence, and rather move towards a multi-linear understanding, which sees societies and social orders as having different branching options from any one point. This, arguably, provides a better framework for understanding how one order gives way to another competing order (Spruyt, 1994a: 5).

Whilst these works are all case of reconceptualising social evolutionary theory, focusing on different areas and aspects, there has not been a specific focus on what is one of the defining changes of the modern world: namely the rise of the nation-state and nationalism. Spruyt (1994a) comes close, but his focus is on the political organization of the territorial state, necessary for nation-states but not quite the same thing having different ideological and cultural precepts. van den Berghe (1981) and Gat (2013) similarly use sociobiological reasoning to explore the concepts of ethnicity and the nation, but these are not social evolutionary accounts. This thesis then has a dual purpose in exploring Darwinian social evolutionary theory in relation to other theories of social change, testing out how well it works at the level of theoretical coherency; and a second purpose to examine how well it works as a framework for investigating comparative cases of social change, the focus here being on the nation-state and nationalism.

Nationalism as an ideology, it operates on all levels of society, being a socializing force at a micro-level, whilst also an organizational and institutional force at the macro-level. It is, therefore, interesting to study, not least because its rise as a political force coincided with a variety of other social, economic and political changes (e.g. rising democracy, the industrial revolution), and an interesting case for testing the use of social evolutionary theory for accounting for how and why social change occurs.

How might Darwinian social evolutionary theory help to better investigate and explain how and why societies change at the moment that they do, and go down one pathway rather than an alternate competing pathway? These are the questions that this thesis seeks to address, with an aim to make a case for social evolutionary theory

and justify its insights as providing a good framework for understanding questions of social change, demonstrating this potential by investigating two case-studies of the rise of nationalism.

Outline of the Thesis

This thesis is largely theoretical in character and approaches the subject matter from two directions: firstly there is a theoretical critique of theories of social change from the perspective of Darwinian social evolutionary theory; secondly there is an application of social evolutionary theory to two case-studies on nationalism, that of England/Britain and Japan.

The thesis is thus split into two major parts. In the first chapter I outline some of the key concepts that lie behind the general principles of Darwinism, discussed with reference to issues in biology but a generally applicable level. I then discuss Karl Marx's theory of historical materialism and use this to illustrate some of the contrasts between older versions of social evolutionary theory and Darwinian social evolutionary theory. This provides a springboard for outlining the reconceptualization of the theory, which is done by examining a range of different theorists who have contributed to understanding social evolutionary theory. The theorists in question are: Geoffrey Hodgson and Thornjbørn Knudsen (2010), David L Hull (1988), W G Runciman (2009), Peter J Richerson and Robert Boyd (2006), Dan Sperber (1996) and Hendrick Spruyt (1994a). Each of these theorists has a particular understanding of what social evolution in Darwinian terms means and elements of each of their theories are taken to assemble a 'tool-kit' of different

concepts. By doing so it is not my aim to produce a complete model. Rather it is to use elements of these theories under a general framework of social evolutionary theory in order to critique and understand social change, constructing a 'tool kit' of approaches that can be used to unpick particular cases.

Following this are four chapters devoted to examining different theories of social change from the perspective of Darwinian social evolutionary theory. Each theory is represented by a particular theorist, who is closely engaged with. The four chapters can be seen as being split into 'mini-groupings' around the particular duo in question. The first two are Immanuel Wallerstein, and world-systems theory; and Michael Hechter and rational-choice theory. They are paired together as they have a former relationship, Hechter was PhD student of Wallerstein, and Hechter also began by working in a similar tradition to Wallerstein: there's an extent to which his first work *Internal Colonialism* (1980) can be seen as an application of Wallerstein's ideas within a nation. However he later moved away from Wallerstein's structural theory and moved towards the opposite, of rational choice theory.

The second pairing is Michael Mann and Ernest Gellner. The grouping here is done as both were creators, alongside John Hall, of a seminar that ran for five years entitled "Patterns of History" (Hall, 1985: 2). Out of this Mann was to produce his large work, *The Sources of Social Power* (1985) and Gellner produced *Plough, Sword and Book* (1988). These works are both concerned with the key question of classical theories of social change, namely how and why modernization occurred. As they come out of the same seminar series, it makes sense to take them and pair them together.

In these discussions the focus is on the theorists theories of social change. Whilst they have all written on nationalism to varying degrees (Wallerstein, 2010; Hechter, 2009; Mann, 1986) it is not a main mechanism or force behind their theories, so the focus is to be applied to their theories of social change rather than specific theories that they have with regards to nationalism. The exception is with Gellner (2006[1983]), whose theory of nationalism plays a more significant role in his overall theory, and so some extra attention will be applied to it in discussions.

In all of these cases I not only seek to take issues with these theories through close examination of their conceptualizations, but I will also re-conceptualise their accounts in distilling from them the useful contributions and mechanisms they have within their theory. In this I am adopting the view from Hodgson and Knudsen (2010) that Darwinian social evolutionary theory should be understood as a general framework that can incorporate different mechanisms within it and, indeed, requires the incorporation of different mechanisms in order to improve the analysis of particular cases. For example, with Michael Mann's theory of the four sources of social power, the idea that there are four sources of power can be used under a social evolutionary framework, outside of the frame into which Mann originally puts it.

The second part of the thesis then switches to looking at the two case-studies. Hodgson and Knudsen (2010: 235) argued that more empirical case-studies are needed to understand how Darwinian concepts work over time in social entities. These case-studies can be seen as a contribution to this. In these case-studies I investigate the rise of nationalism in England (and later Britain) and Japan, tracing the long duree (Smith, 1989), which creates the environmental context and development for each one, before focussing on the periods when nationalism

eventually emerged in both. Japan and Britain were selected for two reasons: firstly, they share some surface similarities (e.g. they're both islands nearby a larger continental power) that represent some interesting possibilities for pulling out differences that lead to their different developmental pathways, using social evolutionary theory. Secondly, they can be seen as representing cases of a 'pristine' and 'secondary' (Hearn, 2006: 101) formulations of nationalism. That is in the case of England/Britain we can see an example of nationalism generating through spontaneous forces within the country, whereas Japan represents an example of an already existing ideology being imitated, but also adapted to fit their local environmental circumstances.

In both cases the Darwinian social evolutionary framework is being used to pick out elements of importance and frame the studies around the key information. A chapter is devoted to outlining the particular features of interest in each case, placing them in their historical context and applying Darwinian social evolutionary ideas, before a final third chapter then uses the two cases comparatively to ask the question of what Darwinian social evolution contributes to understanding the question of why nationalism arose at the specific time that it did, in the specific way that it did in both cases. This is then used as way of demonstrating the usefulness of social evolutionary theory and assessing what it adds to understanding that is not provided by other theories of social change.

Part One: Theoretical Outline and Critique

Darwinian Social Evolution

Evolution is to analogy as statues are to birdshit.
-Steven Jones (quoted in Brown, 1999)

Introduction

Ever since Darwin published *On the Origin of Speices*, and in some cases like that of Spencer even before the publication (Dickens, 2000: 19; Spencer, 1852), there has been an interest in attempting to apply the concept of natural selection towards the social world. Indeed, even before Darwin published *On the Origin of Species* there were several writers who came close to these concepts and used them in understanding both the natural world and the social world. David Hume is one example (Dennett, 1995) and Adam Ferguson wrote about the development of civil society in what would now be considered social evolutionary terms, referring to how social conflicts and unintended consequences can lead societies to develop along divergent paths (MacRae, 1959). Herbert Spencer's famous phrase 'survival of the fittest' was coined some ten years before *On the Origin of Species* was published (Dickens, 2000: 19) and Spencer himself published an essay (Spencer, 1852) that came close to Darwin's understanding of natural selection, a few years before Darwin and Wallace jointly published their paper.

After the publication of *On the Origin of Species* there was a flurry of interest in it with several sociologist looking to apply Darwin's insights to the understanding

of society. Among these was Auguste Comte[7], the founder (or at least the namer) of sociology, who developed an evolutionary vision of society. He argued that the developing mental capacities of humans meant that societies passed through three distinct stages. Comte's, and Spencer's, was a unilineal system, as all societies had to pass through these stages in this order (Noble, 2000: 44-45)[8]. Comte's system, and understanding of development of societies is Lamarckian[9] in character and did not incorporate Darwinian elements, on variation and selection (ibid: 41). Others who applied Darwinian insights to the social and cultural world include Thorstein Veblen (1898; 1899), who used the notions of variation and selection and applied it to institutional change, and laid out mechanisms by which variation could be produced within institutional settings. This interest continued, even after attempts to apply evolution to sociological problems became somewhat taboo following the First World War (Hodgson, 2004), with Donald T. Campbell (1951), writing on how general principles could be taken from Darwin's work that would be applicable beyond the biological domain (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 18-19).

So, despite the general disregard that Darwinism and evolution have been looked on in Sociology, there has been a long and continuing tradition of applying

[7] An interesting piece of trivia: there, is a connection between Comte and Herbert Spencer: namely Comte charging Spencer with plagiarising his work (Hofstadter, 1945: 7).
[8] One thing to note here; Comte was influenced as well by the socialist Henri Saint-Simon, hence a resemblance to Marx's vision of communism in the final stage (ironically Comte was also dissatisfied by the utopian socialists and sought a more scientific system).
[9] Lamarckism refers to the thought of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, who developed what was for a time (even after Darwin's theory was published) the leading theory of evolution. It's typically taken to mean the notion that organisms inherit acquired characteristics - that characteristics a parent develops or acquires in their lifetime will be passed onto their children (so the son of a metal worker will have strong muscles because his father had strong muscles developed by working the metal.) It's not strictly accurate to call this Lamarckism, as Lamarck's theory was more complex than this and inheritance of acquired characteristics was only one part of it (and not the major part of it), but the label has stuck so it serves as a short-hand (Gould, 1980).

Darwin's insights towards attempts to understand society and social processes. This thesis is part of that tradition.

Now, however, is the time towards getting towards more in-depth look at what the Darwinian concepts are, philosophically, biologically and socially, as well as make some distinctions between how the concepts work in biology and in sociology. Before diving into this, though, it's probably worth briefly covering one point of importance: the need to distinguish between 'evolution', 'progress' and what evolutionary thinking in sociology has typically consisted of. Evolution, in sociology, has traditionally been used to connote a descriptive theory that explains how societies pass through various stages from simpler to more complex societies, whereas progress is normally seen as being a term that implies a value judgement (i.e. more developed societies are better than less developed ones) (Noble: 40)[10]. Evolution, as the term is used here, parallels its use in biology, namely, it connotes a system that changes based on "the core Darwinian principles of variation, selection and replication" and that these principles can apply to any open-ended system (Hodgson, 2005: 899). Contrarily, Darwinism does not imply that selection processes or outcomes indicate anything relating to progress or morality (Runciman, 1989). As Hodgson and Knudsen (2010: 36) succinctly put it "Outcomes of a selection process are necessarily neither moral nor just. And there is no requirement that the outcomes of a selection process are necessarily optimal or improvements on their predecessors."

[10] Though see Ruse (1993) for an alternate take wherein we can meaningfully talk about progress

In this chapter the task is to lay out an understanding of what social evolution is, for this thesis, and how it will be used to address the substantive issue of social change. This section is split into three parts: the first part will take a quick look at how biological evolution works, focusing on the concepts of adaptation, fitness and population thinking. It will also make a case for why evolution can be generalized to understanding social change. In the second part a spectre whose presence haunts this thesis somewhat, and who had an early evolutionary theory, will be discussed: Karl Marx and historical materialism. This has a two-fold purpose: firstly, it will help to make the distinction between earlier evolutionary models and Darwinian social evolution clearer; and secondly there's an extent to which Marx is an influence on the four theorists under discussion in this thesis: all of them, to a degree, were either influence by Marx or responding to him in some way. This makes him an interesting figure for discussion in the context of this thesis.

The third part will then look at a variety of modern social evolutionary models (those attributable to Runciman, Boyd and Richerson, Hodgson and Knudsen, Hull, Spruyt and Sperber). Having laid them out I will then examine each one and pick out the useful concepts from each that are relevant to this thesis in order to construct a 'tool-kit', as opposed to a full-on model, that will be used for understanding how social change can be explained in social evolutionary terms. It's worth noting here that this thesis is going to be concerned largely with 'macro' events of social change. Discussions of biological nature, will not enter into it, except in minor areas for setting up a 'view of people' as Michael Mann, for instance, does. For this reason the thesis will largely skirt past the controversy surrounding sociobiology and evolutionary psychology.

What is Meant by Evolution by Natural Selection

In this section I will look at two aspects. Firstly there will be an explanation of how selection works in biology. This will concentrate on general aspects, or philosophical questions as it were, rather than getting into nitty-gritty detail about, e.g. genes, DNA and so on. The reason for this is that, given what this thesis is about, there would not be a great deal to be gained by doing so, as opposed to focusing on the elements that will be transferable. The reason for looking at biology at all, rather than skipping it, is to make apparent what are the similarities and differences between biological and Darwinian social evolution.

To this end the second part of the discussion will concentrate on looking at the idea of how far the analogy can go. It will look at memes (Dawkins, 19--) to make the argument that a direct analogue with biological evolution for social and cultural evolution, particularly in the need for the concept of a 'gene' for the social world, is unhelpful and inhibiting to a proper understanding of social and cultural evolution.

Population Thinking, Adaptation and Fitness

For Ernest Mayr (1975) one of Darwin's key achievements was the introduction of population thinking to evolution, and in particular its contrast with typological thinking. Mayr (1975) argues that prior to Darwin thinking in biology was primarily typological, a way of thinking he traces to Plato wherein entities are thought to have 'perfect' forms, that denote essential properties of a particular type.

With population thinking, in contrast, the focus is on the uniqueness of each individual: individuals share traits by which they can be grouped together as a population, but there is a recognition that this is a statistical phenomenon only--the individuals are all unique. “For the typologist the type (*eidos*) is real and variation an illusion, while for the populationist the type (average) is an abstraction and only the variation is real” (Mayr, 1975: 327).

Mayr is perhaps being a bit too harsh on typological thinking here (Lewens, 2007: 85) as the typologist is not necessarily committed to defending the idea that all types are the same and could agree that the particular type is just an abstraction. But what Mayr is pointing to is what is important in Darwin’s way of thinking that differs from typology “by offering a different way of thinking about the relationship between forms that *actually* exist, the forms that are *likely* to exist given specific local circumstances, and the forms that can *possibly* exist given general laws of nature” (ibid: 89[emphasis in original]). Darwin’s shift to population thinking emphasised the contingent facts, in the environment and the constitution of a particular entity, to explain why particular forms are in evidence at a particular time as opposed to others (ibid: 90). This different way of thinking is related to two concepts that Hodgson and Knudsen (2010: 55-56) discuss: ontogeny and phylogeny. Ontogeny refers to the development of a single organism, from embryo to death, effectively the life course of a single entity; phylogeny refers to the history of sizeable relation of organisms, that is normally dubbed a species. In sociological terms, this would mark the difference between an endogenous account, which sees all changes as occurring from within a particular entity, and a more multifaceted account that takes into account both the changes from within and the interactions and

relations between entities in a population. The difference in these views will be seen in the discussion on Marx. As Hodgson and Knudsen (2010: 56) note natural selection encompasses both viewpoints not just one.

The differences between kinds of organisms, in the population thinking view, are the product of variations within populations; this leads to variations among populations which extend through time, constantly changing and producing new variations, but all descending from a single point. This is the conception of the tree of life, the notion that, abstractly, the various pathways and contingent factors that lead to divergence and different species, can be roughly represented on a map showing their descent (Godfrey-Smith, 2009: 14). This helps to clarify the relationship between populations, but can also point to different contingent factors that enabled for a branching off and the creation of new entities.

These two aspects of Darwinian thinking are tied a third concept, the one that we're about to dive into now in some depth, that completes the image: natural selection and the sub-concepts of adaptation and fitness that go into it. These concepts apply in relation to Darwinian populations, which are any populations of things that undergo natural selection (Godfrey-Smith, 2009: 6), characterised by varied entities that are capable of adapting and passing on information, interacting with each other and the environment, in an environment where there is a competition for scarce resources (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 26). This is a general definition, that applies beyond biology: the same terms, for example, applies to varied social groups competing for resources (financing and members) as much as it does to organisms competing for food.

Adaptation and fitness are central to natural selection, and though they are similar concepts they do have some differences between them that are important to elaborate on. They help to answer the question of why one change happened rather than another: because the one that happened was better adapted for its environment than the alternative. The selection process is cumulative in character, so entities become better adapted over time to a particular environment, with subsequent changes and adaptations building on the ones that went before (Dawkins, 1988: 49). The previous changes need not be related to the function of the finished element either; certain changes can serve one function at one time before being used for another function at a later time. For example, feathers likely arose as a thermo-regulatory system (similar to body hair), but later became adapted for the function of flight (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). This points to two crucial elements that are necessary for a selection process to occur: continuity, that adaptations can be carried down generations, and quasi-independence, that though traits are linked to a wider organism, and changes affect the organism, the traits can also be subject to selection pressures in themselves (Lewontin, 1972; Brandon, 1999).

Of course, in order for a selection process to work, there has to be different possibilities to select among, which is to say that there have to be variations, or variants, with differences in fitness, such that some will replicate differentially. (Sober, 2000: 9). In biology variability and adaptation usually occurs due to changes in gene frequencies; genes are the objects where heritable information is stored and passed on. However an exclusive focus on genes is wrong – genes express themselves through the phenotype, the physical characteristics, of the organisms, which is how they interact with the environment (Calow, 1983: 40). Change is not

exclusively the preserve of genes either, changes can occur due to the environment (i.e. a better diet might make you taller than someone else, despite no change in gene frequency) (Sober, 2000: 2).

What, though, is meant by fitness? Traditionally fitness is defined by an organism's ability to leave progeny: so if organism A leaves more off spring than organism B, A is said to be fitter than B. The rating of the fitness of an organism is thus not directly connected to how well fitted it is to a particular environment (Lewens, 2007: 45-46). The link to adaptation stems from the fact that the connection seems logical that the more adapted an organism is, the higher its chances of survival and success in a particular environment, therefore the more offspring it will leave and the fitter it can be said to be.

The concept of fitness, in this sense, is not unanimously received, however. Krimbas (2004), arguing against the propensity interpretation, which compares actual fitness against expected fitness, has argued that there is a danger of reifying fitness, treating it as an actual real characteristic of an entity which runs the risk of bringing back in teleology. He argues, instead, that fitness should be seen as a tool, one that's meaning is dependent on the specific trait being looked at, in relation to that traits history in an environment. In short, fitness should to some extent be seen as a relative concept.

Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009) points to a similar problem when he notes that definitions of fitness tend to be idealizations that assume a synchronicity and non-generational overlap with entities. He points to the possibility that there could be two entities, A and B, that are identical and reproduce in exactly the same manner (by

splitting themselves), but because A cycles through the process faster they will leave more offspring than B. A, under this definition would be more 'fit', but it does not actually have any advantages over B. Idealizing the situation, assuming that the two are the same across time, means that there is the possibility of misconstruing one entity as better adapted than the other, if counting offspring is the only test of fitness (Godfrey-Smith, 2009: 21-24). Though fitness is still useful as a concept, it does need to be understood within wider contexts than just the production of offspring, in order to distinguish between cases of selection and cases of drift.

Drift, broadly speaking, can be considered to be the process of luck in the selection process (Godfrey-Smith, 2009: 27; Sober, 2000). To borrow an example from Godfrey-Smith (2009: 27), if an entity is offed by a lightning strike, as opposed to a competition over a resource, then this is a case of drift. It's possible that the entity in question might be more prone to lightning strikes than others, but this needs to be a subject of investigation. In other words, it's crucial to distinguish "between reproductive differences due to advantages bestowed by phenotypic characteristics, and reproductive differences due merely to accident" (ibid).

The takeaway from this discussion, before diving into the question of adaptation itself, is this: no one element is responsible for a particular trait being selected, but rather the interaction between the local environment and the entity, consisting of a phenotype and a genotype. This is crucial when it comes to understanding what the concept of adaptation means. As John Maynard Smith (1966: 15) states:

> No animal or plant can live in a vacuum. A living organism is constantly exchanging substances with the environment ... Without these exchanges, life

> is impossible … life therefore is an active equilibrium between the living organism and its surroundings, an equilibrium which can be maintained only if the environment suits the particular animal or plant, which is then said to be 'adapted' to that environment. If an animal is placed in an environment which differs too greatly from that to which it is adapted, the equilibrium breaks down; a fish out of water will die.

This passage is outlining the importance of remembering that when talking of things being 'adapted' it always in reference to an environment, that is, there has to be something that the traits are adapted to. Natural selection, in this sense, is a local phenomenon – organisms are adapted to their immediate environments. A consequence of this is that it means that there are no adaptations that are, so to speak, universally 'good'. It is always context dependent. Gills, for example, are great adaptations to have if you live in water most of the time, but they'd be useless in a desert.

This might sound relatively simple, however there are some problems with the conceptualization of adaptation, or at least the problem of adaptationism which is a strong form of the natural selection hypothesis. Sober (2000: 124) defines it as the belief that "[m]ost phenotypic traits in most populations can be explained by a model in which selection is described and nonselective processes are ignored". It is, in essence, the belief that any trait an organism has must stem from adaptive advantage and that selection is the only cause that matters for being able to explain the origin of a trait. This can lead to the telling of 'just-so' stories, plausible sounding explanations for how a trait arose but that are either wrong or untestable (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). By contrast, Gould & Lewontin (1979: 581-584) point to spandrels, an architectural feature that exist as a result of a design flaw but was not actually intended to be there. They argue that this can apply in evolution: that certain traits that appear to be adaptations might simply be there because they arose as a by-

product of other traits being selected. The problem then is, how can we tell if something exists because it is an adaptation and as a result of selection, or if it is just there as a result of drift?

Part of this is a problem in how an adaptation can be recognised. George C. Williams (1966) took an intuitive approach; arguing that adaptations could, in some respects, be recognised by looking at them. Analogically we can look at human design, in engineering, and then look at characteristics of organisms in their environment and see a 'fit' in terms of design that can be called an adaptation. However, this approach runs the risk of falling into the problem of adaptationism (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Sober, 2000: 124), in assuming that anything that looks like an adaptation is one. This is not a mistake that Williams makes (1966: 90) as he stresses the need to only use adaptation when other factors, physical and chemical, would not serve as an explanation on their own. It is something that needs to be used with caution. The danger, however, is there and this is particularly so for social evolution; where getting stuck in circular reasoning (x does y, therefore it must have arisen because of a need to do y by x) [11] is all too easy.

An alternative way of looking at it would be from the perspective of the fitness of a phenotypic trait in a population; so the focus is less on what the variant is designed to do but whether or not it increases the fitness of the organism vis a vis other variants (Reeve & Sherman, 1993: 94). This is helpful as a definition as it stresses that adaptation is a relative concept and is contingent on the environment and available alternatives (ibid: 94-95). Natural selection is not a perfection-producing

[11] To spell out in more depth: x does y; so there must have been a need for y; and we know this because otherwise x wouldn't do y.

phenomenon. It selects the best available variants for an environment, not the best possible that can be conceived (Sober, 2000: 39). Or, to use an analogy, "[N]atural selection is a little like a game of poker: The best hand (phenotype) wins (reproduces) regardless of whether it is a pair of twos or four aces" (Reeve & Sherman, 1993: 95).

This approach, however, is not fool-proof. As already discussed, though there is some merit to looking at the number of types of trait in a population and concluding that it is the fittest, this does not tell us much about the adaptation itself and can be a flawed approach (Krimbas, 2004; Godfrey-Smith, 2009). Similarly, though they are related, there is no necessary link between fitness and adaptation; indeed, as Sober (2000: 78-79) points out it's possible for a disadvantageous trait to spread through a population, if it is attached to a 'fitter' organism. Fitness is an average measure for the whole organism, not a measure for particular traits (ibid: 83). This gets even more complicated when it comes to the social world, due to the fact that there are different replication processes than just producing more offspring: there can also be diffusion of ideas as opposed to direct replication of an entity (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 91). For this reason, how fitness should be measured in Darwinian social evolution becomes a complex question (ibid).

What I propose here, is to take the view that both fitness and the intuitionist approach be treated as tools, that are context dependent (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 91; Krimbas, 2004), and have different uses in different contexts. I believe it can be reasonably said that a trait can be considered an adaptation for a particular task if there is some evidence that it evolved in specific ways that made it more effective performing the task in its environment and the change occurred due to the increased

fitness that results (West-Eberhard, 1992: 8). It is possible to start from the assumption that a particularly useful adaptation is a result of a selection process, however past history and contingencies place constraints on what it can do in terms of optimisation, so it would be wrong to assume that it is the only explanation (ibid: 132-133). For this reason I am on the same page as Neander (1995a, 1995b) and Nanay (2005; 2010) as against Sober (1984; 1995) in seeing selection and adaptation as linked together. Cumulative selection, in environments where there are limited resources, means that certain adaptations are going to be shaped by selection processes: if an entity with a particular trait is selected over other entities with other traits than it can reasonably be said that the trait is more adapted to the particular environment, because it has been able to make more use of the limited resources (Nanay, 2005; 2010). But changes to the trait do not just happen as a result of mutation in the replicator, as Sober (1995) would argue, but rather the selection at the level of the interactor feeds back information into the replicator that can alter the trait (Nanay, 2005). Natural selection, as a process, makes it more likely that certain variants are going to be brought into existence over others by its involvement in the process of adaptation: a particular adaptation is successful, which then leads to further intermediate changes that makes a future variant more likely than it would have been without selection (Godfrey-Smith, 2009: 43).

However, selection is not the be-all, end-all of the process and the reason for a traits spreading is not always down to an advantage that it might have. Luck, or drift, can play a role (Godfrey-Smith, 2009; Clatterbuck, Sober & Lewontin, 2013), and what looks like an adaptation might just be a spandrel, or else an exaptation (an

adaptation that originally had one use, but is now co-opted to something else) (Gould & Vrba, 1982).

For this reason it is useful to adopt a terminological distinction from Sober (1984: 97-100), that of between 'selection for' and 'selection of', where

> "Selection of" pertains to the *effects* of a selection process, whereas "selection for" describes its *causes*. To say that there is selection for a given property means that having that property *causes* success in surviving and reproducing. But to say that a given sort of object was selected is merely to say that the result of the selection process was to increase the representation of that kind of object" (ibid: 100).

To illustrate this point he makes reference to a child's toy, where there are different sized balls that are also different colours, with each size having its own colour. The toy is split into four separate parts, each with holes in the ground which are also different sizes, getting smaller and smaller as they descend the levels. By shaking the toy the balls will be sorted onto different levels, the correct level for that size of ball. This demonstrates Sober's point: each level will have balls that are the same size and the same colour, however it is only the *size* that is being selected for. That is the causal factor that saw the balls end up on different levels. The colour of the balls is sorted alongside the size, however the colour has not causally affected where the balls end up. Hence there is only a selection of colours[12].

A final caution on this note though is on the well-known point about the 'theory-ladeness' of observation: that the way we look at the world is in part determined by the background theories we have which govern how we interpret it and our backgrounds as human beings. That is what looks like an adaptation to us

[12] Some more will be said on this distinction below, when we get into the subject of the distinction between replicators and interactors

might be influenced by what we think of as adaptations, for instance we might look at adaptations drawing on an analogy with human engineering, which may lead to certain mistaken views about what a biological adaptation would look like (Williams 1966). As an example of this there is the burgess shale and the Cambrian explosion, where a diverse set of fossils were discovered that appeared to indicate an enormous explosion of different body types at the start of the Cambrian that had seemingly not been there before. This was largely based on the intuitive observation that the creatures looked a lot different from one another, looked different from creatures that were not in the fossil record before, and looked different to creatures existing now. Stephen Gould was quick to take the findings as justification for his notion of punctuated equilibrium (more anon) and the idea of rapid generation of new types. However, later examination of the data, showed that much of the strangeness of the creatures came from looking at them wrong (seeing antennae as legs for example) and that, when looked at closer, they were shown to be classifiable under standard types and were less diverse than thought (Sterelny, 2001: Ch. 10; Fortey, 1998).

The point, of course, is that we need to be very careful when studying the record, so as to be sure that we're aware of how our background theoretical process might be influencing our interpretations and observations. In particular this is true with adaptation; whilst I stated above that there are useful reasons for assuming something is an adaptation as a starting point it does need to be handled with care, so as not to be seeing adaptations everywhere.

Are Something like Genes needed for there to be Social Evolution?

It is sometimes thought that social evolution cannot follow Darwinian principles, or is even impossible, due to the fact that for culture and society there is no analogue with genes – things that carry and pass on heritable information. Is this belief correct?

The short answer to this is no. Even without something like genes, or genes of social evolution, the postulates of natural selection would still apply. Darwin, after all, developed his theory without having any idea that genes existed (Hearn, 2014: 178), demonstrating that the concepts can still be usefully applied without their being an exact one-to-one analogy. A longer answer, looking at the concept of memes, can reveal some interesting reasons why social and biological evolution are different in some ways and why having too close an analogy to biological evolution can constrain understanding.

Memes were invented by Richard Dawkins (1989: ch. 11) as a way of understanding processes of cultural evolution, though nowadays they are more famous as a series of internet humour posts, which are easily changeable by users and can be used in different scenarios (e.g. the Grumpy Cat) (Solon, 2013)[13]. Dawkins' original purpose was to provide an analogue to genes for cultural evolution: memes were "the new replicator" that serve as the genes of human culture (ibid: 192)[14]. As the famous passage describing them says

[13] Whether this mutation of the concept represents a vindication or a refutation of the meme idea I leave for the reader to decide.

[14] The question of whether memes are real entities, or just a metaphor, is an open one: Dawkins is somewhat ambivalent about it, whereas others such as Blackmore (2000; 2001) and Dennett (1991; 1995) and McNamara (1995) have argued for them being real. Hull (1988) and Runciman (2009) take the view that it is primarily a metaphor.

> [M]emes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body… so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation (ibid).

The concept of replicators will be discussed in greater detail further on in this chapter: for now it is sufficient to know that, for Dawkins, replicators are discrete entities that are capable of making copies of themselves (ibid: 15)--for Dawkins genes and gene-like entities are the only replicators that exist. These replicators, in the genetic sense, can then build 'survival machines' or 'vehicles' that house them and ensure the replicators ability to replicate themselves (ibid: 19; 254). For Dawkins distinction helps to keep in mind the differences between genes and organisms; the genes are the replicators and are therefore the locus of selection – natural selection affects only them because only they can carry information from one generation to the next. Organisms are merely the means by which genes interact with the world and are, consequently, not selected for or acted upon by selection.

This is effectively the same as how memes operate in Dawkins' conception. Memes have the same characteristics of any replicator: they have longevity (can stay together and not break up to allow for longer time of copying), fecundity (can replicate quickly) and copying-fidelity (they make reasonably accurate copies of themselves) (ibid: 194; 17-18). Unlike genes, however, memes are not competing for a defined space on a chromosome of DNA, but are rather competing for 'memory space'[15] in the human brain (ibid: 195-196). Successful memes are those that are best able to hang around in the brain, as opposed to others. But note that memes are, like genes, 'selfish' in the sense that they care about propagating themselves not providing

[15] Dawkins is here makes an analogy between computers and human brains

a greater benefit to the 'vehicle' that they are part (Blackmore, 2001). Thus whilst it might be more practical and relevant for me to be able to remember, say, the details of Runciman's (2009) model of social evolution, with its distinctions between 'practices' and 'roles', it is much better for a particular meme in my head for me to instead remember the names of all one-hundred and fifty-one of the original Pokémon[16].

Memes are a powerful concept. Certainly once you learn of it, it becomes very hard to not think in terms of it. However here is where its danger, as an analogy, lies. As Godfrey-Smith (2009: 144) has argued, part of the problem with memes is that it leads to a form of 'agential' thinking, where memes become part of a "paranoid" framework that where there is "a hidden collection of agents pursuing agendas that cross-cut or oppose our interests". This way of thinking can be very misleading, as it can lead to talk of beneficiaries of the selection process, or fitness, being interpreted literally, rather than being seen as a metaphor to aide understanding of population changes. Lewens (2012) also points towards critiques of meme theory that suggest that people are passive recipients, that they exist as a bundle of memes, rather than being active agents, picking among ideas and in control of their own actions, similarly to how Dawkins metaphor of 'lumbering robots' and the term 'vehicle' creates the sense that orgnaims are passive and being manipulated by their genes (Brown, 1999: 40-43). As we will see, it's for this reason that Hull (1998) in part prefers the term 'interactors' rather than vehicles, as it gives more agency to the organism.

[16] And boy do I wish this was just a joke to illustrate a point...

Meme theory is potentially also misleading in providing a warped account of how cultural processes come about. Susan Blackmore (2006) has argued that memetics trumps other theories of cultural evolution because it does not see culture as an adaptation: rather it is always about what is beneficial to the memes. This immediately raises the spectre of Godfrey-Smiths (2009) agential way of thinking, but it also obscures the processes of power behind social and cultural evolution. Dickens (2000: 57) points to the example of an advertising jingle. He notes that jingles are catchy so they will hang around in the brain, but that this is not to the memes benefit: rather it is to the advertiser's benefit, who are hoping that the jingle will stick around and thus remind the person to buy the product. Similarly Blackmore (2006) argues that Microsoft Word is an example of a successful meme: people use word documents, and the success of word documents leads to more people using the made thus replicating the meme. But this obscures the main reason for the spread of Microsoft Word: namely that it is the most widely available office processing system and this is largely down Microsoft's monopoly position in the market, which has less to do with replicating success of their product than their ability to use their economic and political power to close down, or absorb, competition and maintain their status[17]. Thinking on this from the meme point of view thus obscures the agency of the people behind them and the purposes that a particular artefact, tool, idea etc. might be serving; and the power asymmetries that allow certain ideas to spread ahead of others.

[17] As anyone who has ever had a prolonged fight with the Microsoft Office system will be able to attest, their spread is hardly down to their being models of efficiency and good design

Hodgson and Knudsen (2010: 77-78) have also criticised the meme concept for being confusing, particularly as to the lack of clarity over whether it is behaviour or information that is being copied through the meme. Boyd and Richerson (2000) make a similar point, in arguing that by having too close an analogy between genes and memes it oversimplifies how cultural evolution works and thus misses some of the key differences, relating to human behaviour and psychology. A too strong analogy misses the fact that cultural notions transform in transmission and are not necessarily stable, without there having to be a direct competition between sets of ideas. For instance, the use of the suffix *–gate* has specific connotations for older Americans, namely that of the Watergate scandal, and so the suffix, when applied, means specifically a scandal involving government. However, for younger Americans who grew up without witnessing Watergate, the suffix can be applied to any kind of scandal. This is a transformation in what the cultural idea means, but it has not come about by a competition between memes; the same suffix is still being used it's just that the same suffix has been transformed and taken on a broader meaning.

The preceding passages identify a problem with wanting too close an analogy between biological and social evolution; it simplifies things too much and also means that some important differences are lost between the two. There isn't a need for a 'gene'-like unit in social and cultural evolution and looking for one is unhelpful. As Edmonds (2005) points out the gene-meme analogy has failed to provide useful analysis or interesting takes on phenomenon, and hasn't greatly furthered understanding. At least part of this is due to the fact that, as in the example of the advertising jingle, it misses the force that agency can provide in explaining why a

certain meme is built in a certain way, or the reason for its existence. It's also worth noting that there are multiple-levels of selection (Nowak, 2011), which have different forms and levels of replication and interaction (Brandon, 1996), an idea that will be explored further in this chapter. The meme idea also places too much importance on cultural elements, e.g. ideas, whilst overlooking the ways in which social elements, e.g. institutions, can propagate themselves, irrespective of having to be directly mediated through cultural elements (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006b; Hull, 1998; Hearn, 2014: 178-180). For this reason the meme idea is largely unhelpful, as it serves to confuse issues rather than bring them clarity.

There are certain ideas that are useful to take forward from the meme idea, however. One is the idea that Dawkins (1989: 193; 198-199) recognises is that there doesn't have to be a biological advantage to a cultural item – it has a potential and selective pressure that sees it survive all on its own. So a seemingly biologically strange behaviour, as an extreme example suicide can replicate without there having to be a biological advantage, as cultural operate faster than biological evolution and so can override genetic interests (Richerson & Boyd, 2006: 14-15) [18]. As Lewens (2012) notes, however, this insight is not unique to meme theory, though, and other areas of the social sciences are interested in these failures of cognition. A second point worth keeping in mind is that cultural or social entities can propagate even though they don't provide a useful benefit to a group. This may not be, as Dawkins (1989: 198) says because it is advantageous to itself (the piece of culture), but it is a concept that is worth bearing in mind. Culture and social settings come from people,

[18] Though I confess it's also not obvious what advantages there would be to a meme for suicide, but this just points back in the direction of Godfrey-Smith's (2009) critique of agential thinking. Even talk of 'genetic interests' is complicated, as genes do not have interests.

but they persist beyond them and have power over them and their effects can consequently continue long after the function they evolved for originally is no longer relevant.

Karl Marx: An Early Evolutionary Model

Karl Marx, undoubtedly, produced one of the most famous theories of social change. The notion of dialectical materialism, or historical materialism, was adapted from Hegel's own notions of the progress of human history and sought to explain how societies moved from their primitive beginnings, up until they advanced to the final stage of human life in the communist stage. In this is sense it is an evolutionary model in the classical sense of the term in sociology: it depicts a series of linear stages and the dynamics of the theory are put towards explaining how societies have passed through those stages.

Hegel viewed the world as progressing towards an ideal, a self-awakening; that the 'world spirit' would essentially reach a point of self-knowledge where it properly understood itself. History was the progression of the spirit coming to self-knowledge. Marx, in some sense, turned Hegel on his head and swapped the idealism for materialism as the drive of the theory. External conditions, distribution of wealth and labour in society, shaped the conditions of humans; their character depended on the character of society and its relation to nature. People produced themselves through their labour, in order to escape from their hostile environments and be able to develop. By doing this, however, they craft more problems in terms of the dynamics of society. Societies are then fuelled by the conflicts between different

classes, which for Marx will eventually culminate in the arrival of the communist society – where class conflict is eliminated and people live in peace (Cohen, 1978: 22-25). Or in short, "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle" (Marx & Engels, 1848: 246).

How does history advance in Marx's view? Simply put, there are different 'modes of production', which have different 'productive relations'. Modes of production would be 'feudalism', 'capitalism', 'socialism' etc. Whereas productive relations are the classes and their relations to one another. The forces of production are the technological ability, knowledge, tools, resources, labour power etc. that are available to humans that enable them to produce. People enter into productive relations with one another, which is where the classes and the social relationships stem from (Perry, 2002: 35-37). It is the productive relations which give rise to the material structure of society and it is upon this material base that the social superstructure then comes into being (Singer, 2000: 48). Simplifying a bit, then, Marx's theory becomes a three-step process: "productive forces determine relations of production, which in turn determine the superstructure. The productive forces are fundamental. Their growth provides the momentum for the whole process of history" (ibid: 50).

Conflict, particularly conflict between classes over exploitation, is the main driver of change in Marx's theory. As he outlines

> At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundations the entire

> immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed [.,.] No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself (Marx, 1977: 425-426).

This is the broad outline. The forces and relations of production come into conflict as they develop. Once the forces of production have reached their full development there will follow a social revolution, brought about through the conflicts between the classes that then leads to a new stage of development. Each conflict between the classes simplifies the arrangement until it eventually gets to the capitalist mode of production where there are only two large classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletarians (Marx & Engles, 1848: 246). The result of this final conflict would be a 'sweeping away' of the old productive order and with it the class relations and antagonisms (ibid: 262). Society would thus arrive at the final stages, socialism and communism, where there would no longer be class antagonisms and thus conflict would be gone from society with resources used for the general good (Perry, 2002: 39). This would bring "the prehistory of human society to a close" (Marx, 1977: 426).

Marx's theory does align somewhat with the older views on evolutionary theory--societies pass through a determined set of stages, in a particular order, and it is possible to treat these as progressive changes (the succeeding stage is better than the last one). As well as this, it is also shares the endogenous character of the older characterisations, which is to say that changes in the society come from the internal dynamics from within that society (Wright, Levine and Sober (1992: 56-57). This is one of the crucial elements that marks it out as different from Darwinian social evolution: Marx's theory can be, to a degree, seen as a typological theory, whereas

Darwinian social evolution takes population thinking to be its essence (Mayr, 1975), or to put it in other terms, Marx's is an ontogentic theory, whereas the Darwinism is a phylogenetic one (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 5-56). That is the latter is concerned, not only with internal variation and adaptation within the society, but also the selection process that operates between populations of entities, in this case other societies and modes of production (to use Marx's term here).

The most important problem is the teleology in the theory. The question of what teleology is can be a difficult one. Having its roots in millenarial thinking, associated with the Christian tradition, teleology is usually either interpreted as the notion that there is an end-point to a process, or a pre-determined end, or that there are goals and purposes in processes (Mayr, 1992: 123). Mayr distinguishes between three kinds of teleological thinking: 1) teleomatic processes, where the process has an end point but the changes occur automatically, without goals, subject to natural laws (ibid: 125); 2) teleonomic processes, where the process works as a program, so it has an end state and goals but this is placed in it from the beginning (ibid: 127); 3) adapted features, which is natural selection, where traits, through the process of selection, are adapted to fit, or solve, particular environments such that it can look like a goal directed, or end-point, process (ibid: 131). Mayr's (1992) view is that it is incorrect to categorize the third, Darwinism, as being teleological as natural selection does not need the notion of an end-point, nor does it imply that there is goal-orientated behaviour or a sense of progress and purpose. Natural selection is an optimization process, but it has no end goal and the various dead-ends that have resulted from it put paid to the notion that it is progressive in the sense usually talked about in older forms of evolutionary theory (ibid: 132).

This brings us back to Marx. Marx saw his theory as leading to a pre-determined end (Runciman, 2009: 17). His theory was, in evolutionary terms, an 'optimizing' one in that it saw the relations of production as being the optimal ones given the 'environment', or mode of production that the society was in. However, due to these two views, it takes the view that the possibility of change in a stage is sufficient for the change to occur. This turns it into a theory where there is an inevitable passing through the different stages that Marx sets out (Wright, Levine & Sober, 1992: 51-53). There is also the problem of Marx's view on the difference between the base and superstructure. His theory is economically deterministic, in that he sees the material base as determining what the ideological superstructure looks like, either in a strong form of their being a straight determination or weaker form in which the superstructure has a certain autonomy, but is not wholly independent of class interests (Noble, 2000: 86-87). This however is problematic as focusing too much on the economy misses the way in which other factors, of ideas, environmental change and such, can alter societies and push them in different directions, underestimating the amount of variation that there can be in forms of society (Runciman, 2009: 20).

Similarly, and problematically for Marx's theory, there is also the curious question of the 'Asiatic mode of production' (O'Leary, 1989; Dunn, 1982). Essentially, Marx to a certain extent had come up with two different theories to explain the development of the world: historical materialism, which worked for Europe, and the Asiatic mode of production, which worked for the Asian region (mainly meaning India). Marx held that despotic rulers had held back the forces of

production, meaning that the Asian countries could not advance and were stagnant[19]. In this view, colonialism was somewhat essentially as it would introduce the means of production that would enable the Asia region to start advancing through the stages (Marx, 1853)[20]. There's some immediate problems here, not least with the categorization of 'Asia' as if it were all one homogenous bloc rather than several separate political, cultural and economic units. The notion that they were stagnant, or poor, or feudal in some sense, necessitating the West to come roaring in in order to start progressing, is also off the pace: China was, at this stage, only just falling behind Europe on Goldstone's (2006) account, and India's share of the world economy, prior to Britain's intrusion, was 23%, h (Tharoor, 2015). Indeed, at the time of Queen Elizabeth I, so disparate were Britain and India that the Emperor of India only agreed to see Elizabeth's ambassador's out of pity (von Tunzelman, 2007: 13).

The problem for Marx, though, is that this seems to damage his original theory. Historical materialism can't account for the problem of the Asia, as Marx reads it, so he has to come up with a special theory to explain it. But then, as a result, his theory is no longer working as he intends it to be: a universal theory that explains history (O'Leary, 1989). Either Marx has to accept that the theory is not universal, or else accept that the modes of production do not work as he says they should (Hall, 1985: 13).

---

[20] Aijaz Ahmad (1994: Ch. 6) does make some good points though in contextualizing Marx: as he notes, whilst Marx is quite scathing about India his language is equally harsh when talking about European feudalism. In addition, his view on colonialism can be read similarly to his view on capitalism: not good, but necessary in order to advance towards communism.

Darwinian social evolution, however, can duck both of the problems with teleology and the issue of the theory not applying universally. As pointed to by Mayr (1992) Darwin's theory allows for there to be change and seeming purpose in nature without there being any end-goal to which it is being worked. Similarly, because it looks at population thinking (Mayr, 1975), it's not confined by the idea that evolution and changes only occur within a society: selection also occurs between populations of entities, or in this case between societies. Whereas Marx has to come up with a special explanation for why Asia did not develop the way historical materialism said it should, Darwinian social evolution understands that different populations of entities will develop in different ways, due to their differing histories and environmental contexts.

Boyd & Richerson (1992) outline a means by which this is possible. Cultural evolution[21] is capable of generating different variants, and consequently different unique historical trajectories, despite it being the result of a universal process (ibid: 287-288). This happens through two means. As above evolution proceeds on the basis of inheritance, variation and selection. Different variations occur in response to different environments, with the 'better' variants being selected as they fit that environment. Societies then inherit that variation from their past. In the social world there is the added element that people can make choices about what to inherit and what not to inherit - so a rule or tradition can be evaluated by people and, if it is no

[21] Note that Boyd & Richerson are focused on cultural evolution in their research – however for them culture is broader and seems to encompass society (a definition I don't quite agree on); this will be addressed in more detail in their section in this chapter.

longer beneficial, can be dropped or swapped for another thanks to human agency (ibid: 289-290).

This might not seem to be different from Marx so far; Marx can be rewritten to be saying something similar in so far as social relations will alter with regard to the changes in the forces of production. But it is at this point that the difference enters: Marx recognises only one stage for each set of forces of production. Darwinism however can recognise multiple stages for any given forces of production. This is because there is not just one local optimum that a society can reach, but rather many different local optima's (as well as sub-optimal maximums, or false optima's). Think of it like a topographical field: there are different hills and peaks, all different in some ways. A society can go up one, but not the others. Once it has started up a hill, however, it is difficult for it, if not impossible, for it to get to another hill. For this reason, despite being in a nominally similar environment with similar populations you can still get different societies with different historical trajectories (ibid: 294-298). Environmental changes, or endogenous changes, can then cause a society to move from one peak to another, but such occurrences would be uncommon (ibid: 299-300).

This then demonstrates the usefulness of having an evolutionary theory that does not have defined stages or does not presuppose a teleology, and the advantage of population thinking. It is more flexible and is capable of explaining more than the alternate theory and is not stuck having to try and explain everything to a universal model. A universal theory need not be a unilineal or a deterministic one – multiple causes can occur and so multiple trajectories can be taken. All that social

evolutionary theory presupposes is that, given differing environmental backgrounds, the 'better', but not necessarily the 'best', variant will be selected.

Marx may well be right that there is a sequence to societal development, and that societies have got more complex as they have grown. However we should be wary about linking this to any idea of 'progress' as this will always be subject to certain value-judgements about what is progressive and what is not (Runciman, 1989: 30-31). There is a need to be cautious about expecting any one theory to have a total explanation of all aspects, or to be the sole explanation for what drives social change. Societies are too varied, environments too different, for that to be possible. However, a general background theory that can incorporate different details and elements would be of use. By paying attention both to the preservational and creative sides of Darwinism, as well as its ability to incorporate different details and elements within its framework, a case can be made for it as a powerful and flexible theory for explaining social change over time; and one that does not commit the user to a notion of progress or teleology.

However, there is as yet no universally agreed theory or model of how Darwinism should be applied to social change (or even just social evolution and cultural evolution). In the next section I will look at different theories of how Darwinism can be applied. The useful aspects of each will be taken and put together to form, if not a theory, then a toolkit of useful elements that can be used to explain social change.

Assembling the Toolkit

In this section I will outline different models of social and cultural evolution. The purpose is not to suggest that one is better than the other and that that is the one that will be followed through the thesis. Rather it is to look at all of them, assess their uses, and pick out some relevant pieces from each for an understanding of social evolution and how it can be most effectively used as theory of social change.

Each theorist will have their own section; after they have all been discussed there will then be a bringing together of different elements to create a 'toolkit' that can be used to explain instances of social change from a Darwinian point of view.

Generalized Darwinism: Hodgson and Knudsen

This section begins with the discussion of with part of the ideas of Hodgson and Knudsen (2010), namely their concept of ‘generalized Darwinism’ and its three core principles, as this will set out the framework of Darwinian social evolution, into which other more detailed discussion of specific elements will be placed.

Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a: 5) outline the three main principles of Darwinism as variation, selection and inheritance--any Darwinian population will involve these three principles regardless of whether it is biological, social or cultural in nature. These three principles are the basis of Darwinism. They underline the complex system, where mortal and degradable entities are competing for resources in an environment of scarcity; they are thus locked into a struggle for existence (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 32-33). This draws on the population thinking (Mayr, 1976), which emphasizes the diversity within types in the various environments. So,

for example, in biology entities might be competing for resources in terms of energy, such as food, but in the social world entities may compete for resources in a similar fashion: firms might be competing for money for example. As there is only limited supply of money that firms can attract they are competing with other firms to attract people's cash and so be able to continue on.

It's also worth noting that whilst there is a tendency to view struggle for existence in terms of direct competition between two entities, this is only once sense of what struggle for existence means. Indeed, direct competition between two entities over the same resource, can be seen as a special case rather than the norm, as there are, as Darwin recognized, many other forms of selection, such as sexual selection and artificial selection, that are not involved in a competition between two individuals, though it does involve winners and losers (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 89-90). Nor should it be seen as being a direct conflict and fight between two entities. As Darwin (2009[1859]: 587) put it: "Two canine animals in a time of dearth, may be truly said to struggle with each other which shall get food and live. But a plant on the edge of a desert is said to struggle for life against the drought"

The phrase, therefore, should not be taken to mean exclusively a direct struggle between two entities for the same resource.

The principle of variation describes the mechanisms that generate and replenish variation in the population, which in biology is usually through mutation and in the social world can be through processes such as innovation and imitation; the principle of inheritance describes how solutions to particular environmental problems are passed on through generations, in the form of information; and the

principle of selection is the mechanism that leads to certain variations surviving over others, through their interaction with the environment (ibid: 34-35). These three principles operate on any kind of Darwinian population (Godfrey-Smith, 2009) and this includes the social and cultural worlds just as much as it does the biological.

Hodgson and Knudsen (2010) also distinguish between two types of selection processes: subset selection and successor selection[22]. Subset selection leads to the elimination of variety: as it does not involve replication it merely leads to the elimination of different variants within an environment (ibid: 94-95). This works, for example, in the sense that if a herd of antelope are attacked by lions and the slowest members of the herd are caught and killed by the lions, then the overall speed of the group will rise, as the fastest antelope will remain. This will happen regardless of how the slow antelope are eliminated, whether it is lions or a landslide (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006b: 479-482). This, however, is contractionary in character. As elements of a subset are eliminated, the number of members of the set will contract until only one member of the set remains (ibid: 479). This also applies to social selection; as Hodgson and Knudsen point out firms are eliminated by such matters as bankruptcy, failing to remain competitive in the markets etc. that are also the result of human choice and agency (ibid: 480-481).

Successor selection, in contrast, does include variation. They define it as "selection through one cycle of replication, variation, and environmental interaction so structured that the replication process causes new variation...and the

[22] An earlier paper referred to successor selection as generative selection; the change was made as they felt the term generative was more appropriate to the replication process (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 94 f.3)

environmental interaction causes replication to be differential" (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 98-99). By combining with the process of mutation and replication successor selection can lead to the generation of new varieties, meaning that entities can acquire new properties that were not possessed by their parent entities (ibid: 99-100). This applies equally to the social world, where innovation can lead to the generation of new varieties that are subject to the successor selection process, not just the subset process (ibid: 100). This is similar to how Neadner (1995) and Nany (2005) have argued that cumulative selection can lead to the generation of new variants, that would not have otherwise occurred without selection.

This then is their argument for the generalized Darwinian framework. In the first place it is because most accounts of change and organization of systems "*require* Darwinian principles to complete their explanations" (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006a: 2). As an example of this Hodgson (2009: 171) looks at the concepts of agency and power and argues that, without a proper understanding of Darwinism, these concepts cannot be properly understood. In order to understand why someone decided to do x at time y, there needs to be an understanding of what caused the person to be making the decision at that time and to have the options that he did. Similarly when looking at power there is a need to be able to understand the circumstance that meant that someone had the power to do something, or over someone else, at a certain time. These are not uncaused elements that come out of nothing: they are caused by something in the chain of history and Hodgson (and Knudsen) argue that generalized Darwinism can best help us understand the chain of causes.

But, as noted before, generalized Darwinism is not enough on its own; it needs to be supplemented by auxiliary hypotheses, explanations and assumptions in order to be able to explain specific events. For Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a: 17) Darwinism is a meta-theoretical framework into which other theories can be slotted but is not a complete theory on its own. “Darwinism always requires further explanations of the particular mechanism that occur in specific cases” (ibid: 16). For this reason it is vital to note that older theories, studies and understandings in sociology are not and should not be thrown out (Runciman, 2009: 28). A Darwinian understanding can provide the basis for a better understanding of social change, and earlier cases of it, through reinterpretation and further explanation. But it always needs to work with that earlier information and supplement with other theories of explanation, such as methodological individualism or functionalism. This is, indeed, one of the arguments for the Darwinian framework: that it can incorporate and improve upon earlier theories of social change.

Replicators and Interactors: David L Hull

David Hull’s work is directed towards understanding on the process of science, hence his use of the term 'conceptual evolution'. What he is most looking at is the way that concepts are transmitted through the scientific community and how a certain set of concepts come to be selected over others (Hull, 1988: ch 12 & 13; 2001, 42-43). Hull’s important contribution came from his expansion on a concept that came from Richard Dawkins: the separation between 'replicators', for him genes, and 'vehicles', that is, organisms. Hull takes this distinction, but twists it around in

some important ways that gives emphasis to different matters. In particular he changes the name 'vehicle' to 'interactor' and gives the interactors the driving role in evolution (Brown, 1999: 204-205). Hull's reasoning behind this was that he felt the term vehicle carried misleading connotations of passivity, a connotation that the more active term 'interactor' does not contain (Hull, 2001: 48).

Hull's terminology has been powerfully influential in understanding within biology (Godfrey-Smith, 2000), but it also extends outwards into Darwinian social evolution, where attempts at understanding how societies, organizations and cultures evolve also take on board the notion of replicators and interactors (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010; Gabora, 2004; Becker & Lazaric, 2004). For this reason, whilst Hull is the theorist of origination in this section the discussion will expand beyond him to include how his concepts have been developed by later theorists.

Hull first begins with a desire to alter the traditional vocabulary of how evolution is talked about. In biology the vocabulary revolves around genes, organisms and species. Hull believes that it should be changed to speaking about replicators, interactors and lineages. The reason for this is that his terms are more general and mean that conceptual evolution can also be spoken about, alongside biological evolution. This also helps, he thinks, to resolve the issue of the levels of selection debate (that is what level, gene, organism etc. does natural selection operate on). The levels of selection debate is one closely bound up with the units of selection debate, and the two can sometimes be confused (Brandon, 1999). Levels of selection refers to the idea that selection is abstract concept that operates on a hierarchy (gene, individual, group etc.) whilst the units of selection concerns which phenotypic traits selection acts on (ibid: 177). Hull's terminology was designed to solve some of the

problems within this debate, by showing that replication and interaction are two closely connected processes; both are necessary but neither are sufficient on their own (ibid: 2).

Hull (1988: 408) defines replicators as "A entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications" and interactors as "An entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction *causes* replication to be differential" [emphasis in original]. Selection is defined as "a process in which the differential extinction and proliferation of interactors *cause* the differential perpetuation of the relevant replicators" and lineages are defined as "an entity that persists indefinitely through time either in the same or an altered state as a result of replication" (ibid: 409). There have been other, more refined definitions of replicators and interactors since Hull wrote. Hodgson and Knudsen (2010: 123) have refined the definition of a replicator to include that it must 1) have causally involved in producing another copy; 2) the replicated entity should also be, or contain, a replicator; and 3) in the process of creation the copy must obtain the information necessary to produce more copies and work as a generative mechanism. They further add that that interactors should have integrity and should maintain that integrity despite environmental changes, have a shared organizational components and dependence on the replicators that comprise it, and that replication should be dependent on the on the property of the interactor and its environment (ibid: 166-167).

For Hull selection is a process and entities should be defined by the function that they perform in that process (ibid: 402). This would mean, for example, that entities are not directly tied to the level of selection that they're on. This is why he

prefers the terms replicator and interactor because it is more general and fluid. So a gene could be a replicator, but at other times it could function as an interactor, and the same could be said of organisms, species and so on (ibid: 412-418). What matters for the classification of an entity as an interactor, or replicator, is the function that it performs: so in order to be considered an interactor the entity has to cause replication to be differential (Brandon, 1998). But the actual causal mechanism behind a particular interactor can vary (Hull, 2001: 47).

Finally, Hull has a third concept of a lineage, which he defines as "an entity that persists indefinitely through time either in the same or an altered state a result of replication" (Hull, 1988: 409). Lineages are capable of changing indefinitely through time, so they can't be either replicators or interactors (ibid: 411). They are sequences of replication, but importantly they have to involve replication: this is to make a lineage distinct from an organism, or institution, that just happens to be long-lived (ibid: 410). Lineages are less remarked upon in the literature, with most of the focus going to replicators and interactors. However it is an important component for understanding the development of organizations and entities in the social world, particularly when it comes to nation-state scale organizations that often have lots of different components and tributaries all feeding into one area--which is what helps to create the sense of a deeper history that plays such a part in nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1992; Smith, 2010).

Hull's work has been very influential, and his concepts are used in biology (Brandon, 1998; Godfrey-Smith, 2000; Sterenly et al., 1996) as well as in social science fields (Knudsen, 2004; Blute, 2007; Becker & Lazaric, 2003; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004), with the distinctions being helpful for separating out what selection

is acting on and what is being transmitted. However, there are some criticisms of the idea; Peter Godfrey-Smith (2000; 2009) in particular has been critical of the idea of replication and the dominance of the concept. He argues that, in actual fact, replicators are not essential to the process of evolution (Godfrey-Smith, 2000: 413). In relation to the replicator concept he has concerns that using metaphors of 'programming' have been misleading as it suggests that replicators are primary controllers of development (ibid: 411). His other concern is that the replicator concept meshes too well with an 'agential' view of evolution, which sees genes, or replicators, as "pursuing goals, having interests, and using strategies" (Godfrey-Smith, 2009: 36). Godfrey-Smith believes that this is harmful to our understanding of the evolutionary process as it reintroduces notions of teleology into the area and, in addition, creates the sense that there is a hidden, persisting entity that is controlling the process, "the locus of agency", rather than the creation of new entities that resemble the old ones (ibid: 37-38).

Godfrey-Smith's criticisms should bring a note of caution into the discussion. Metaphors are in some ways the only way that discussion can proceed but, as we saw with memes, they can be powerful and lead us down blind alleys. Nanay (2002) argues that, contrary to Godfrey-Smith, replicators are necessary for selection, but not sufficient. He makes a case for distinguishing between types of replication and types of selection, with each of these types having different explanatory power. He divides replication into three forms: 1) trivial replication (replication wherein no new, spatially distinct entity is formed during the replication process, such as two water drops merging); 2) non-trivial replication without variation (wherein the replicating entity creates an exact copy of itself); and 3) non-trivial replication with

variation (wherein the replicating entity creates copies with variations). There are then two sub-types of selection: cumulative selection (wherein the process of selection between replications with variations makes the changes accumulate over time); and non-cumulative selection (where there is a selection among replicators without variation, so there are no changes that accumulate over time) (Nanay, 2002: 115-118). He argues that replicators are necessary for the process of cumulative selection to happen, but that they are not sufficient as there are other factors and conditions (such as the external environment) that need to be taken into account when looking at any particular case.

I am in agreement with Nanay: I believe that the replicator concept, and the interactor concept, are very useful in clarifying what is being talked about, as well as the concepts being necessary but not sufficient for the evolutionary process and our understanding of it. Godfrey-Smith raises pertinent points in his criticism and these are worth paying attention to and keeping in mind, particularly when it comes to ascribing too much to replicators and moving in an agential direction. I do not, however, believe that this makes the concepts inherently flawed, just that we need to be careful when using them to ensure we are not falling into the trap of thinking in that way.

A further point of contention is on the subject of whether replicators can also be interactors, or whether interactors can influence replicators. Hodgson & Knudsen (2010: 116) are quite clear on the issue: “the distinction between replicator and interactor is vital”. They are not arguing for an overly simplistic understanding that says that replicators only perform the function of replication, or that they never interact with their environment, “Replicators do not literally replicate by themselves”

(Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 115). Their view is, rather, that in order to be able to maintain conceptual clarity and coherence it is necessary to keep in mind what the replicators are in a particular scenario and what the interactors are. Otherwise, for example, "it is impossible to distinguish between inheritance and contagion" (ibid: 116).

This makes a lot of sense. It is important to be able to maintain distinctions both for conceptual reasons so as to not confuse the levels of analysis, particularly when looking at selective environments and the sort of pressures that are in operation, as well as for the reason of avoiding sloppiness when it comes to theorizing. However, I am not wholly in agreement with the idea that replicators and interactors are always to be distinguished. That is, I believe that there are special cases in which the replicator and interactor can be the same.

In biology there are obvious instances where this is the case: in the very origins, the evolution of the replicator, they must have also been interacting with the environment (Blute, 2007; Brandon, 1998: 178-179). As Brandon (1998: 179) points out, along with Hull (1988; 1994: 627), what matters is the function that an entity is playing at a particular moment that determines whether it is a replicator or an interactor. For this reason it is not inconceivable that an entity could be performing the function of both.

But this is a question of biology. What about in the context of the social world? Here again matters are perhaps a bit more complicated than it first seems. Brandon (1998: 190-192) makes the point that normally replicators would be at lower levels than the interactors. However, in the case of groups, it is possible that

groups themselves are the replicating entities, if this is occurring in an instance of inter-group competition. In these cases what is being replicated is the group as a cohesive whole, so it is functioning as both the interactor and the replicator. Of course, in this instance, it would be easy to point out that the group itself is not replicating, just the various traits that go into constituting the group. The question of what are the social replicators and how they work within interactors will be discussed later, in the section devoted to Hodgson and Knudsen's ideas. However it is worth addressing this point here as it clarifies where I am coming from on this issue.

It is true to say that what is being replicated are the elements that constitute the group, so the group itself as a cohesive whole is perhaps not replicating by itself, taking us back to Hodgson and Knudsen's (2010: 115) point about this being an overly simplistic way of seeing it. However, my view is that at a certain level of emergence and abstraction it is not always helpful to break things down into the constituent elements. Nation-states, for example, are built out of various habits and routines, the flagging of the nation that was recognized in Renan's (1882: 17) definition of the "everyday plebiscite" and examined more closely in Michael Billig's notion of "banal nationalism" (Billig, 1997). But it is also more than that: the flagging and the plebiscite only gain meaning through being in the context of the nation--the flags and the plebiscite interact with the cultural environment of the nation, and gain their meaning through that interaction, just as the nation gains its meaning from them.

This is a point made by Sterelny, Smith and Dickson (1996) where they note the fuzziness that can exist in determining what can be a replicator. They use the example of platypus burrows to illustrate their point: they argue that the burrow itself

can be considered the replicator. Not all burrows are the same, each will have variations in them as a result of the interaction between the platypus and the burrow, and the platypus children will memorize these structures and differences and copy them when they come to make their own burrows. The burrow is acting as a both a replicator, in passing on its structure, but also an interactor, interacting with the environment in a way that is causing its replication to be differential (Sterelny et al. 1996: 399). The perspective is essentially relative and dependant on the perspective being taken.

This I suggest is also true in the social context, where there can be complicated cases where the distinction between the replicator and the interactor is not so clear-cut. Knudsen (2004: 158) has previously pointed to the fact that teams within organizations are complicated cases and could possibly be classed as both interactors and replicators. I think there is a certain truth to this that is dependent on visibility. Teams within a firm are not so visible to the outside, so are perhaps less replicators than interactors, but teams with visibility, such as football team, can be said to function as both. The team is constructed out of habits and routines, but the team is also interacting with the environment that is causing its differential replication. Consider the success of the Barcelona model of playing football and how this took over for a while, with all teams seemingly becoming obsessed with passing from the back and various other tactics. This is a case of replication, the model and tactics and style are replicating over other teams, but also of interaction, the success of the Barcelona team, particularly under Guardiola[23], caused the replication to be

[23] Guardiola himself is an interesting case of the selective environment leading to changes for adaptation purposes. As has been noted by some, since he came to England and the Premier League

differential as other teams began to copy and emulate the style. It is, I would argue, a similar thing with nation-states which are so large and vast, with many invisible practices, habits and routines built into them, that treating them as just interactors can be analytically unhelpful.

Moving away from Hull a little more now, I'm going to move onto discussing the question of what replicators and interactors are as they relate to the social world. Having discussed replicators and interactors in more abstract terms, this is now intended to provide a more concrete sense of what they are and how they operate in a social context.

In terms of replicators there is a division between habits and routines (Lazaric, 2000; Becker & Lazaric, 2003; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010). Habits and routines are dispositions, not expressed behaviours (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 79) and habits are "replicators in the sense that they preserve and transmit social roles, interpretations, attitudes, knowledge, and skills and act as the relatively durable substrate of all beliefs and deliberative reason" (ibid: 80). Routines are similar, however the difference is that habits relate to individuals, whereas routines relate to groups or organizations (ibid: 140). So routines are, in some sense, the habits individuals adopt in relation to specific contexts within organizations, but are not reducible to habits; they are metahabits that emerge in structured environments provided by organizations that are not linked to any one individual (ibid: 171). "*Routines are organizational dispositions to energize conditional patterns of*

---

he has become much more comfortable with 'route-one' (punt the ball forward) tactics than when in Spain or Germany.

behavior within organizations, involving sequential responses to cues that are partly dependant on social position in the organization" (ibid: 140 [emphasis in original]).

An important component of the function of routines is in knowledge transmission--routines are the means by which knowledge is transmitted among people within an organization, sometimes through articulation, but often tacitly. Whilst this is advantageous to a firm, as it prevents their routines from being copied by competitors, it does have the disadvantage of meaning that they are not always copied perfectly: this means that, because people are active agents in interpreting and understanding routines, there can often be variance and mutation in the routines themselves (Becker & Lazaric, 2003). This is also true of habits (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004) and it is for this reason, the possibility for mutation and variance, that habits and routines can be seen as *generative replicators* (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 140-144), meaning that they can generate new variants that allows for generative selection to take place, as opposed to merely subset selection (where variants are eliminated but no new variants are produced) (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006b; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010).

For Hodgson and Knudsen (2004; 2010) interactors are represented by firms, or organizations. As interactors are "relatively cohesive [entities] with boundaries that host replicable information" (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 117), this makes sense. Firms are entities that enclose the replicators, the habits and routines, within them and engage in a form of competitive selection with the environment, such that some habits and routines will replicate more successfully than others (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004). Organizations, examples of which are "tribes, families, states, business firms, universities, and trade unions" (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 170), are

entities that are bounded, have principles of sovereignty that establishes who is in charge, and a clear chain of responsibility and command (ibid: 170). Interactors also "[*host*] *at least one replicator*" (ibid: 165 [emphasis in original]). This is an important point, as interactors, especially at organizational levels, are going to contain bundles of replicators that go into constituting them.

For a nation-state, for example, it's more than just the various state-features, institutions and organizations that define it; it's also the everyday symbols and habits that get replicated through the population, the "banal" (Billig, 1995) aspect that gives meaning to what the nation-state is, beyond simply being a form of state. This is also the case with other, non-national states (be they empires, kingdoms etc.); they all constitute organizations, institutions and also everyday habits and symbols that give them a particular definition as a state as opposed to another. This is partly why I believe that, in certain cases, it makes sense to treat states as being replicators and interactors: at this stage the state has, like routines within firms (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 171), taken on emergent properties that mean it is no longer reducible to the various replicators that go on to constitute it. This is not necessarily the case with all forms of organization, but it is I believe the case with organizations that are large and made up of numerous, interlinked parts that are not easily separated. This is also demonstrative of the fact that there are various levels of interaction and selection, in the idea of multi-level selection (Nowak, 2011; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Brandon, 1998): while firms are interactors at one particular level, the level of organizational interaction, at another level, the level of state interaction, they are to a certain degree functioning as replicators within the state, just as genes are

still functioning as replicators, within the individuals within a firm even if the firm's interactions are not concerned with genetic replication (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004).

This then, are my final thoughts on it: Hull's distinction between replicators, interactors and lineages is useful for understanding the process of natural selection, both in biology and sociology. The concepts as Hull designed them are abstract and generalizable. Likewise his definition of evolution being a process, where the units are defined by the function they perform in that process, helps to lend clarity and analytic understanding for distinguishing between entities, making them easier to spot. The concept of a lineage is useful for distinguishing why certain institutions or structures can change over time, whilst also still being considered to be derived from, and part of, an earlier structure and institutions (e.g. a nation, which can be quite different things depending on the time period, but still have a connection between its forms). [24]

There is a need to be careful when using the concepts, so as not to fall into 'agential' thinking (Godfrey-Smith, 2009) and also that we are not being conceptually sloppy and looking at objects from the wrong level or performing the wrong function (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: Ch 5). However, whether something is an interactor or a replicator is a matter of perspective (Sterelny et al., 1996) and it is worth keeping in mind that whilst there is a hierarchy of interactors (Brandon, 1998), adding to that fuzziness and necessitating the need for being conceptually clear, there can sometimes be special cases, both in biology and sociology, where it is useful to think of replicators as performing the function of interactors, as Hull (2001: 27)

[24] This will be looked at in more depth later on in the thesis

himself argued. These issues should not be considered an impediment towards using the terms.

Cultural Variants: Boyd and Richerson

Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson have developed an understanding of cultural evolution and how the transmission happens between people and groups. This is based on a mathematical model that they have put together (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). As my maths is appalling and basically stops at long-division the focus here will not be on assessing the relative merits of the model, but rather the logic and concepts that they deploy to describe cultural transmission and evolution.

For them culture is crucial for understanding human behaviour; people acquire beliefs and values from those around them, so their attitudes and actions cannot be understood or explained without taking this into account (Richerson & Boyd, 2006: 3). They see this in population thinking terms, with organisms carrying inherited information through time (or down a lineage to use Hull's term). This is also important with regard to understanding culture (ibid: 5). Culture is defined as *"information capable of affecting individual's behavior that they acquire from other members of their species, through teaching, imitation and other forms of social transmission"*. In this theory information is any kind of mental state that is acquired or modified by social learning and which affects behaviour, so ideas, knowledge, beliefs, skills, attitudes etc. (ibid: 5). Culture is a part of human psychology, but selection acts on it directly. Consequently culture can promote beliefs that would otherwise go against parts of human psychology. For instance, group solidarity, or

altruistic beliefs, over self-interested beliefs (ibid: 14-15). Culture is important as an explanatory variable because variation in the social environment is not enough on its own in order to explain behavioural variation among people, and would also struggle to explain differences in variation within cultures (ibid: 30-31). As an example of this they point to Soviet Union where, despite the fact that there was concerted suppression of local cultures at an institutional level, the cultures themselves did not die out and resurged once the Soviet Union fell. The reasons for this was because of the underground networks, and within family networks, that kept the culture alive. This does not mean that culture is immutable, but merely demonstrates that if there is a lack of will to adopt a new culture then it is hard for the old culture to be replaced (ibid: 31-34). On this last point we can note that nationalism is perhaps a successful example of a new institutional structure being able to suppress and homogenize local cultures.

The process by which transmission occurs is through social learning. Whilst social learning can be loosely called imitation, it is also more complicated than that as ideas can get from one person to another via a complex array of processes (ibid: 63-64). Here they want to distinguish between 'imitation' and 'true imitation'. The reason is simple; that if imitation is all that matters then there is a puzzle – namely that cultural learning is quite common in nature but cumulative cultural learning, of the type that humans have, is rare (Boyd & Richerson, 1996: 52-53). This is the difference between imitation and true imitation. With imitation a creature can learn by doing, that is it is taught how to use a tool and can then use it itself. In true imitation a creature is able to learn how to do something just by observing another creature doing it. This has significant advantages to building a cumulative culture – it

means that resources and time does not have to be spent individually teaching each member, but rather the behaviours can spread quickly and be maintained over generations (ibid: 54-55). The maintenance of cultural evolution requires only two factors: transmission – information going from one brain to another – and persistence – the information staying in the brain so that it can be passed along to another generation (ibid: 56-57). This leads to their definition of social learning: "the acquisition of behavior by observation or teaching from conspecifics" (Boyd & Richerson, 1989: 20).

Importantly the spread of social learning, culture and behaviour is not random. There is a process at work which they call 'biased transmission'. Biased transmission occurs when people preferentially adopt a particular cultural variant over another cultural variant, sometimes for conscious reasons and sometimes not. In general the cultural variant would usually be one that is beneficial, in terms of helping people to survive or advance, but the visibility of it matters (i.e. one that is beneficial, but not visibly so, would not spread as well as one that is less beneficial, but more visible) as do quirks of human psychology that might prefer one over the other (Richerson & Boyd, 2006: 68-71). Recall the point above about natural selection picking the best available but not the best possible variant that might exist. People are discerning in how they choose, so when selecting among behaviours to adopt they will pick the one that is most frequent in the group (reasoning that it must be the best in the environment), whereas if there is no behaviour that is clearly favoured they would be better relying on individual learning – that is learning by doing over simple observation – as this would increase chances of discovering a better way of behaving in the environment (Boyd & Richerson, 1989: 30-32). In

support of this contention Castro and Toro (2004) point out that another significant difference between humans and other animals is that parents can express approval and disapproval of their actions and behaviours. So a human parent expressing these feelings would communicate whether their child was doing the behaviour right and so make the rate of transmission and learning better, as well as providing another outlet for biased transmission.

This model of cultural transmission is useful – it provides an understanding of how behaviours and ideas can be passed among people within a group and how it can persist. It also provides an outlet for understanding how variations in culture can come about, despite similarities in environment, and how certain traditions can stay for a while and change over time. As an understanding of cultural evolution the concepts of biased transmission and the processes of transmission and true imitation are very helpful for explanation and understanding. This, however, is not to say that there are not problems with Boyd and Richerson's approach, particularly in light of this thesis' topic on social change. Tim Lewens (2012) points out two points of difficulty: the first is that equating culture with information can pose difficulties, particularly as no definition of information is provided that would distinctively mark it out (ibid: 746). Similarly he points out that it is perfectly possible for a behaviour to be individually learned and transmitted as an individually learned behaviour without there needing to be a 'culture' through which social learning happens (ibid: 748). Another issue is that, whilst Boyd and Richerson don't deny the role of society or institutions, they are perhaps too strongly focusing on culture and ignoring the ways in which social organizations and institutions can effect change, or transmit information, without there being a mediating culture or process of learning (Hearn,

2014: 179). Inclusion of social organizations and institutions is, however, solved by the inclusion of the concepts of routines, as discussed above, and the concept of practices, that will be looked at below in the section on W. G. Runciman.

Attractive Ideas: Dan Sperber

Following up on Boyd and Richerson's ideas, they can be usefully supplemented by additional understandings provided by anthropologist Dan Sperber (1996). Sperber understands culture and its spread epidemiologically, similar to how a virus spreads (ibid: 25). For him he divides culture into two forms of representation: mental and public. Mental representations are such things as beliefs, intentions, preferences etc. Public representations are language, texts, signals etc. (ibid: 24). The important point for him is that representations get 'transformed' as they are transmitted and become public representations (ibid: 25), which then become cultural representations when they get distributed widely in a group, such that most members have a mental version of it (ibid: 33). But, as we acquire representations, in order to hold them in mind we must reinterpret them ourselves, which is necessary to understand and interact with people (ibid: 34; 40). For Sperber representations are only replicated very rarely as in most cases they are transformed, i.e. the representation changes very slightly, when they are transmitted (ibid: 58). Some representations, however, maintain a stability and those are usually the cultural representations that are easily remembered, due to the way that human psychology works (ibid: 74-75). In part what lies behind this is human cognitive structuring – we innately have a disposition to develop concepts according to a schema. Concepts that

fit better with the schema are easily internalized and remembered (ibid: 69). This is largely to do with structural matters; as an example he points out that we might want to remember the formulation of Gödel's theorem, but find it difficult to do so, but we might easily remember a representation of the story 'Little Red Riding Hood' even though we want to forget it (ibid: 66). This gives a better answer to the question of why certain ideas might hang around in the brain over others than does the meme solution – it actually points to cognitive design in the human brain rather than the meme itself and its desire to replicate.

Of particular use for understanding is Sperber's point that humans have a capacity for meta-representation, which is essential for expanding knowledge and processing half-understood knowledge, both essential qualities. However it can also lead to people being susceptible to "mysteries" – that is something half-understood for which no complete representation can be achieved (ibid: 72). Sperber gives religion as an example of this, whereby it explains certain elements of the world and natural order, but also has an element to it (the supernatural) that can not be adequately explained. When this occurs mechanisms of biased transmission, to use Boyd and Richerson's term, can be quite powerful. In particular Sperber points to the argument from authority, or for elders, being particularly strong (ibid: 72). He also notes that the success of a mystery in many ways depends on its evocative character, which makes it more memorable, for example in the way that it seems to go against intuition or common sense knowledge (ibid: 73-74).

Sperber's ideas help give strength to arguments about how cultural ideas can spread in a population and have affective power over people and change their behaviours. This is obviously important when considering theories of social change,

as new ideas would have to spread in a population. I also think that Sperber helps to support and expand on ideas found in Boyd and Richerson, even though the research programmes are not related. Similarly however, Sperber perhaps concentrates too much on culture and neglects social elements as well. In the next sections we will look at two theories that do have a stronger focus on social evolution as well as cultural evolution.

Practicing Roles: W G Runciman

W G Runciman, unlike the theorists discussed above, does not focus wholly on culture, or treat culture and society as being similar things. Rather he makes a divide between them, arguing that selection operates on three distinct levels (biological, cultural and social) and the mechanisms that generate variation and selection in each one are different (Runciman, 2009: 3). Consequently social selection cannot be reduced to cultural selection and both cannot be reduced to biological selection. This is not to say that there is no connection between them, but culture, for Runciman, is based much more on the individual behaviour of people whereas social aspects are based more on rules. Cultural behaviour, or acquired behaviour, changes to social, or imposed, behaviour when a change in environment necessitates a system that relies less on personal characteristics and more on rules and order (ibid: 40).

Here I'll largely be passing over Runciman's theory of cultural evolution. It's similar to Boyd and Richerson's (2006) and Hull's (1988), in that he defines it as largely the transmission of information via imitation or social learning that affects

the behaviour of individuals (Runciman, 2009: 95-96). There are some nuanced differences between them, in particular Runciman's use of the 'meme' concept, but the generalities are close enough that we do not need to go into an in-depth discussion on it. A study that shows how Runciman's notion of cultural evolution works is found in his article "'The Diffusion of Christianity in the Third Century AD as a Case-Study in the Theory of Cultural Selection" where he explains how the cultural differences between Christianity and the other pagan religions of the time, and the environment they were in, facilitated Christianity's spread in the 3rd Century AD.

This section will instead focus on Runciman's view on social evolution and its distinction from cultural evolution. For Runciman the study of society and societal change concerns institutions: "sociologists…look both for and at human institutions, and … these can be broadly defined as interrelated sets of rule-governed practices" (Runciman, 1986: 151). Practices are defined as "units of reciprocal behaviour informed by mutual recognition of shared intentions and beliefs", and practices make up roles, which are positions that people take within a community or society (Runciman, 1998: ch. 1, para. 5). Roles are important as they represent a distance from the people themselves, that is roles are governed by a set of mutually shared expectations and beliefs that conform to an acknowledged institutional rule or rules (Runciman, 1986: 153). What this means is that there is no need to be concerned with the individual in a role. Whilst in the role the person has to act as something and will act as that something regardless of their personal characteristics (a king is a king, a priest a priest, a CEO a CEO etc. regardless of who occupies it). This marks off an important distinction between Runciman's conception of cultural and social

selection. It is not, however, roles which are the units of selection but rather practices. This is because roles are made up of practices. Essentially roles are, as you would understand them, like parts in a play that can be occupied by different people, but those roles are associated with certain practices that are performed that marks one role out from another. So, different people can occupy the role of a king, but that role, through its practices, will still mean that the occupants will perform in a certain way.

The reason for this is that power is an important part of human affairs. Power, whether economic, political or ideological in character, is driven by a desire to influence the behaviour of other people, normally through changes in institutions (ibid: 154). As practices are the units of reciprocal interaction, within the institutional roles, it is through these that people's behaviour is influenced. Practices can mutate, or be recombined, through a society's history and it is this process that brings about institutional change and thus change in societies (ibid: 155-156). In talking about the selection of practices, however, it is not so easy to say that those that get selected are simply those that are best adapted to the social and institutional environment. For Runciman practices are always mediated through roles and the systacs (his general term for stratified relations such as classes, castes etc. (Wickham, 1991)) and thus in attempting to determine which practices are the most successful, or best adapted, it needs to be considered in relation to the power dynamics present in the society as mediated through the various groups (Runciman, 1986: 158). This maintains the principle that selection is relative, in terms of what is 'better', and needs to be assessed according to the local, rather than global, environment (Runciman, 2009: 32). Importantly this also means that the theory is neutral between whether a change

is intentional or unintentional – what people intended to do by their actions, and whether they succeeded or failed, does not matter so much to the analysis as looking at what the consequences were and analysing that (ibid: 140-141). Causes of variation cannot by themselves explain the consequences of it; there is always a certain amount of mutating, variation, change and selection that occurs as a result of social interactions (ibid: 5-6).

Runciman's divide between cultural and social selection is useful for maintaining a good sense of where analysis needs to be done. As with Boyd and Richerson he does not deny that there is some cross-over between the two, and believes that culture can often get transformed into institutional arrangements, but he does believe that the dynamics that drive them are different and so require different kinds of explanation. This distinction is useful in addressing the criticism that people can behave in a certain manner as a result of institutional matters, and information preserved, not because they have learned a behaviour specifically from the culture or because that information has been directly transmitted, but simply because that is the pattern of behaviour that is conferred by the particular role. This is what Runciman's ideas of roles and practices seek to explain.

A criticism of this point might be that Runciman does seem to deny individuals agency at times. Whilst it is analytically useful to abstract from the individuals who are in the roles, so that the roles themselves can be examined, it perhaps also loses something. Octavian was different in the role of Emperor than was Nero for example. Whilst they both carried out the duties of Emperor, afforded by that role, their individual idiosyncrasies also led them to take different actions and attitudes within that role that influenced matters. This might be a matter of saying

that they practiced it differently, in Runciman's terms, but then this also raises a point that what, exactly, a practice is can also be unclear.

Despite this his theory is useful, both for the division between cultural and social selection and the understanding of institutions that it provides, but also because he locates power as being of importance to understanding how societies change and evolve through time. This adds a complexity to the notion of the 'environment' for social selection as there is a need not just to look at the environmental considerations of the time, such as the economic system, but also a need to look at the dynamics of power within that system. So it might be that one practice might seemingly be better adapted for an environment than another, but because the other has a stronger position within the power dynamics this means that change will not come about. This is an important consideration to take on board when looking at social selection.

Puncturing Institutions: Hendrik Spruyt

Differing from previous theorists in this section, Hendrik Spruyt draws specifically on Stephen Jay Gould's understanding of Darwinism, namely the notion of punctuated equilibrium (Spruyt, 1994a: 23-24). The idea, developed by Niles Eldredge and Gould (1972), was that macromutations could not be seen as merely micromutations scaled up over a long time; that change, when it happened, could occur rapidly, as a key change would be selected for in the environment and thus spread quickly through a population (Gould, 1980b: 157-159). Note that it is the geological sense of rapid here, so we're talking in terms of tens of thousands of

years, not a few generations (Sterelny, 2001: 75). Between periods of rapid change there would be 'stasis', whereupon stresses would accumulate that would eventually reach breaking, or boiling, point and there would be a rapid change in a species as it went through large leaps (Gould, 1980c: 153). This would generally occur when species were isolated from their parental stock, so that a change in the environment would mean they would be under different and more intense selection pressures that would produce the rapid changes causing a speciation, that is the creation of a new species, to occur (ibid: 152-153).

In saying this Gould and Eldredge were not claiming that no change occurred between the leaps, rather that such change simply did not accumulate down the generations. Change would, as it were, wobble around a mean that it would not strongly diverge from. It was only at the point of punctuation event that the change would accumulate and extensive speciation would occur, though this itself was a process that could take generations, not just one leap (Sterelny, 2001: 75-76).

For his understanding Spruyt takes this idea and applies it to understanding institutional change. He defines institutions differently to the others, calling them "contractual agreements between rational individuals…[which] need not take the form of a formal contract…individuals, whether they behave in an optimising or satisficing way, pursue the formation of institutional structures that they believe will best meet their interests" (Spruyt, 1994b: 530-531). Drawing on Gould he argues for two premises: first that history and social change should be seen as being multilinear, that is of being part of a range of possibilities, rather than unilineal, with one stage succeeding another (Spruyt, 1994a: 5); and secondly by understanding institutional change as an infrequent phenomenon that occurs mainly where there is a serious

exogenous shock (ibid: 7). By conceiving of things this way there is a better understanding of how change came about, as we can look to the numerous competing forms of institutions in existence and look for why one triumphed over the other, and secondly for modelling purposes it would explain why certain social formations remain static but seem to have a rapid change. The need is to demonstrate why one set of institutional arrangements were better than the other in a particular environment, after a change brought in a new set of variety (ibid: 24).

Punctuated equilibrium is a hotly debated topic in biology (for a review see Sterelny, 2001: ch. 8), but it is a useful concept to have for social evolution. In particular it can account for how revolutionary change can come about. Whilst Runciman (2009: 176-178) and Richerson and Boyd (2006: 50-54) are likely correct to point out that sudden rapid change is not as common as it appears, and mostly occurs through small accumulated stages, the concept of there being a tipping point at which something will rapidly spread is useful. Although much variety might be generated in an environment, much of it may not go anywhere until a final piece is put in place that causes the change. As I will be arguing later, in the case of Japan and its transition to modernisation, this concept fits quite well.

Of use as well is Spruyt's focus on intentionality and individual agent's actions. Whilst, in aggregate, it may be useful to eschew these kinds of questions when looking at mass social change it is a reminder that, regardless of whether a consequential change is an intended or unintended change, it at some point would have to be brought back towards what an agent, or group of agents, were wanting to do or planning to do. This need not mean that their actions were the most efficient response to changes in the environment, but it does stress why changes are perhaps

not so common – even if an economic structure is overhauled, for example, actors would not redesign institutions unless it is absolutely necessary due to the path dependent effects (Spruyt, 1994a: 24-25). This links with what Boyd and Richerson (1992: 294-298) argued regarding local maximums, the multiplicity of which may be available in an environment.

Conclusion: Evolutionists Ensemble

Taken together, what does all this mean for the thesis?

As I said the purpose here is to construct a tool-kit, picking out what would be useful from each of the individual theories as they can be applied to this thesis. As was seen in the study of Marx there is a need to avoid the pitfalls of unilinearity, of seeing things progressing from one stage to another. Likewise there is the danger of teleology and not paying enough attention to the creative forces of evolution, how it can generate variety and how that variety interplays with one another.

Each of the theorists under discussion here arguably avoids those traps. Spruyt (1994a) provides the most pertinent reminder of it. Taking from each of these it is argued that there is a divide between cultural and social evolution (Runciman, 2009), that whilst both are important they are not necessarily reducible to one another and should not be treated as if what happens with one goes for the other. In this light the notions of Sperber (1994) and Boyd and Richerson (2006) offer the best insight into understanding cultural change, on the basis of people's capacity for selective imitation, that is being able to discern between good and bad things to imitate, where some cultural variants will be more likely to be chosen than others

because of the way that human cognitive capacity is structured. In the realm of social evolution there is much agreement, in general, between the models of Runciman (2009) and Hodgson and Knudsen (2010), who both see institutions as providing the means by which information is inherited. Though there are terminological differences (roles and practices, against habits and routines) these are not so dramatic that the understanding gleaned from both cannot be welded together in order to properly understand social change from a Darwinian perspective. Spruty (1994) again is a reminder to be on the lookout for institutional variety and competition in environments, alongside Runciman (2009) about the need to identify power structures and alongside Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) on the subject of intentionality and agency. He, Spruyt, also serves to point out that whilst change can be gradual it can also be rapid and that large leaps require large changes, or shocks.

Lastly, behind it all, is Hull's (1988) useful distinction between interactors and replicators and lineages, with his notion that all three are equally important and play their role in advancing evolution. Whilst there are questions over the extent, and usefulness, of replicators being considered also interactors and this is a debated topic in the field (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010; Hull, 2001; Brandon, 1998), it does not detract from the usefulness of the concepts.. Hull's point is that what matters is not a particular entities place on scale that matters (as under Dawkins' distinction between replicators and vehicles (Hull, 1994)), but rather the function that it plays.

What then is the intent behind this thesis? Here I would borrow a metaphor from Richard Dawkins (1982: 1). He looks at a Necker Cube, an optical illusion where the intersecting lines are interpreted by the brain as a three-dimensional cube. By looking at it, however, we can 'flip' it over and see it from one perspective, top-

down, or another, bottom-up. Neither one is the 'true' perspective, they are just different interpretations. That is largely what this thesis is setting out to achieve. It does not argue that this is the true, and only, way of looking at social change and understanding it. Rather it makes the case that this is one way of looking at it and that this way of doing so opens up possibilities that help us to better understand how social change happens. To extend the anaology further, social evolution is the process of looking at the Necker cube from a different angle: each of these tools helps to pick out details of interest within that perspective flip.

The next part of this thesis is made up of four chapters, each one looking at a different theorist of social change, in order, Immanuel Wallerstein, Michael Hechter, Michael Mann and Ernest Gellner. As stated in the introduction, these four have all been chosen as representatives of particular theories of social change, with the major focus being on that element of their arguments. In these chapters I will outline and then engage with their theories through the Darwinian social evolutionary perspective, arguing that this perspective can account for blind spots in their theories and go beyond them in its explanation. However, mindful of Hodgson and Knudsen's (2006a) point about Darwinism not being enough on its own, they are not completely critical exercises and in each chapter there will be a lookout for useful, and helpful, auxiliary explanations that can be incorporated into the later project of understanding the rise of nationalism.

The World-Systems of Immanuel Wallerstein

If the free-traders cannot understand how one nation can grow rich at the expense of another, we need not wonder, since these same gentlemen also refuse to understand how within one country one class can enrich itself at the expense of another.

- Karl Marx (1977[1848]: 269)

This chapter will focus on Immanuel Wallerstein's (2011[1974]) theory of the world-system as a theory of social change. It will be divided into three sections. In the first section there will be an exposition of the theory; this will then be followed by a second section that will be an analysis and critique of the theory. The final section will focus on two elements of critique of the theory, that it has a normative edge and that it rests too much on teleological explanations for its development, and will outline how a social evolutionary perspective can avoid these two problems.

The Correct Unit of Analysis

Immanuel Wallerstein's notion of the world-system starts from a fairly simple premise: the correct unit of analysis for understanding the development of the world is not the sovereign state, but rather the structure and functioning of the world economic system of which the state is a part (Skocpol, 1977: 1075-76). The world-system is thus distinct from a world-empire[25], which is defined by having a common political system (Wallerstein, 1974: 390) and so, for Wallerstein, the study of the rise

[25] Note that Wallerstein posits that the world-system divides into two varieties: world-economies and world-empires. As the focus here is on the former, and to avoid confusion, I'm using world-system to refer to the economic variety, and word-empire to refer to the political variety.

of the world-system is also the study of the development of capitalism (Hopkins, 1982: 83).

The context for Wallerstein's work was the reaction against modernization theory, which held the nation-state as sovereign and separated from other states, and the assumption that there was a single-path that all countries could follow to move from traditional societies to modernity (Skocpol, 1977: 1075). Modernization theory suffered from a set of problems, however, in that it ignored constraints that were placed by other factors and countries (ibid) and consequently could not explain why some countries in the world are rich and others are not and why the gap between the rich and poor is growing (Sweezy, 1972: 61).

The answer to the question, in response to modernization theory, was developed by Paul Baran and Andre Gunder Frank and became known as 'dependency theory' (Noble, 2000: 187). The idea was fairly simple, in so far as it was applying the Marxist notion of exploitation of classes to the exploitation of nations. As the second epigraph above notes this idea was itself not that unknown to Marx, though to my knowledge he didn't pursue the idea any further than those short remarks[26]. The basic summation of the idea would be that poor countries are poor, not because of any internal deficiencies within the country, but because their resources are stripped from them and used by the wealthy nations in order to develop themselves as part of the process of colonialism and imperialism. As Frank (1969: 3) explains: "underdevelopment...is the necessary product of four centuries of capitalist

[26] It is also perhaps worth noting that in the same talk Marx notes that he is in favour of free trade, over protectionism, a rather different position to the one that most dependency theorists holds. He does state, though, that this is because free trade causes social disruption, which advances the socialist cause.

development and of the internal contradictions of capitalism itself". Central to this was the idea of expropriation and appropriation of economic surplus. The surplus is taken from the many and given to the few, creating the divide between the metropoles and the satellites (the periphery). Economic development and underdevelopment went hand in hand and were inseparable (ibid: 9). This trend, essentially, carried on into the modern world, with the poorer nations being unable to develop not due to inherent backwardness but simply because of the dynamics of the capitalist system of production kept them there (Noble, 2000: 188-189). In brief, the poverty is caused by the countries having in the past been conquered and restructured so they served the purposes of the conquerors, who transferred the wealth out of those countries to their own in a form of capital accumulation (Sweezy, 1972: 62) The gap and its widening is thus simply the logical consequence of the capitalist system in place (ibid).

Dependency theory ran into problems in the 1970s in the face of two, unconnected, events in the world. The oil crisis in 1972-1973, which appeared to show that the Western countries did not have complete, or determining, control over the economic system; and the success of some underdeveloped countries, such as South Korea and Taiwan, in growing at a rapid pace and catching up with the developed countries, suggesting that the world system was not preventing poor countries from developing, or keeping them in a state of dependence (Noble, 2000: 191-92). History seemed to refute the contention of underdevelopment theory that the only way of the exploited countries developing was to withdraw themselves from the capitalist system (Frank, 1965), as many economies were seen to be capable of developing and advancing by using a careful combination of liberalizing industries

alongside protecting state and native industries and allowing them to develop to a competitive level (Stiglitz, 2002; Wade, 2003). It was, then, into this arena that Immanuel Wallerstein stepped, with his reconceptualization and advancement of dependency theory, which he termed world-systems theory, first articulated in the his work published in 1974 as *The Modern World-System Vol. I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*[27], initially projected as a five-volume project, but now seen to be between seven and nine.

Wallerstein conceived his project as being larger than just an attempt at applying the notions of dependency theory on a global scale. What he was looking to do was create a "unidisciplinary" approach to studying social systems, not just parts of that system (Wallerstein, 2011: 11). By breaking out from the study of individual states, to study the system entire, Wallerstein was hoping to perform a work of sociological astronomy, that is finding certain laws in certain smaller areas and then extrapolating those laws to apply them to the system as a whole (ibid: 7). So, in this sense, by understanding the European world-economy, as it came into existence in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the world-system entire can be understood as it operates across the globe. To this there is also a normative part of the project. As Wallerstein argues only by understanding the origins of the present system can it be understood how to move to a more egalitarian system (ibid: 10; c.f. Wallerstein, 1974: 414-415).

[27] Note, the edition that I am using is the 2011 edition of the book, which has a new publisher and a new introduction. Apart from that, though, it is identical to the 1974 edition and the pagination is the same.

So what is world-system analysis? There are two starting places. The first was a reaction against the 'developmentalist', or modernist, perspective in social science. This viewpoint sought to study social change from the view that the unit of change were 'societies', that is autonomous units, usually state-centred, that are moving along a similar path of development (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1977: 41). The second was in looking at capitalism as a historical system, particularly as a globalised historical system, meaning that the system should be studied not according to the abstract ideals, or theorising, that is given to it but rather by how it is in reality and has actually existed (1996: 13). Capitalism, therefore, is a system where there is an accumulation of capital for the purposes of self-expansion (ibid: 13-14). The purpose of studying the world-system, that is taking the system as the unit of analysis, over studying individual states was part of a, in his terms, simplifying assumption Wallerstein made; by looking at the system as a whole the changes in sovereign states could be explained as a consequence of their interaction in, and development of, the world-system (2011: 7).

The world-system itself is defined in terms of how Wallerstein sees social systems. For Wallerstein the defining characteristic of a social system is the existence of a division of labour within it; the various parts of the system are therefore involved in an economic relationship where exchange is necessary for them to meet their needs (1974: 390). It then follows that the world-system is definable as a "unit with a single division of labor and multiple cultural systems" (ibid). We shall return to the issue of what a single division of labour, in the context of the world-system, means in a moment. The world-system is then defined by its mode of production. When the system is capitalist then all means of social organization,

means of production, coercion of labour etc., are capitalist: "the world-economy has one form or the other. Once it is capitalist, relationships that bear certain formal resemblances to feudal relationships are necessarily redefined in terms of the governing principles of a capitalist system" (ibid: 92). With this he also makes the claim that there, essentially, has never been any socialist modes of organization, as the world-system is capitalist (Wallerstein, 1974: 415).

The world-system takes on one of two forms: either a world-empire or a world-economy (ibid: 15). Wallerstein's contention is that, prior to the arrival of capitalism, all world-systems had been empires. The use of the term 'world' does not necessarily imply that it must cover the globe. Rather it is used to mean that the system is "larger than any judicially-defined political unit" (ibid). It is an economy on the grounds that the basic linkages between its various parts are founded on economic relations; in contrast an empire is a political unit with a high degree of political centralization over its dominion that gains surplus through force of taxation and tribute (ibid). The achievement of the world-economy is in the increase of the transfer from the periphery to the core without the waste spent on the maintaining the large political superstructure required by the empire (ibid: 15-16). Hereafter, use of the term world-system will mean 'capitalist world-economy' as opposed to world-empire.

The world-system emerged in Europe in what Wallerstein calls, following Fernand Braudel, 'the long sixteenth century', a period running roughly from 1450-1640 (Wallerstein, 1972: 95). The world-system is separated out into three zones: a core, a periphery and a semi-periphery. In the process of emergence the core centred around Western Europe, the periphery was Eastern Europe and Spanish America

whilst the semi-periphery was formed around the Christian Mediterranean (ibid: 95-96). At this point we can begin to see what Wallerstein is meaning when he talks about a "single-division of labour" being a characteristic of the system. What has happened is there is a transfer of surplus from the peripheral regions to the core regions, with the semi-periphery acting as something of an intermediary (Skockpol, 1977: 1077). The emergence of this system happens for a variety of reasons but, essentially, the make-up of the state plays an important role.

In the core there emerged a series of strong states that were capable of enforcing their rule over their own populations and bringing people all roughly into line. This also happened as a function of bureaucracy, which brought both nobles and merchants into the government (Wallerstein, 2011: 136-137). This allowed for the development of capitalism as the investment of merchants and development of industries could only occur in a regime with a stable political order that was provided by the rise of absolutism[28] in these states (ibid: 134). By contrast the peripheral regions were not able to create such strong states, consequently they, the peasantry and citizens, were often prey to the power of local lords as a result of the second serfdom[29], that led to their focus being placed on producing cash crops (ibid: 94-95). This meant that Eastern Europe became the 'breadbasket' and supplied more agricultural food in a transfer to the core. This transfer allowed Western Europe, the core, to free up labour from agriculture, as not so many people were needed to work

[28] It should be noted that Wallerstein does not mean absolutism as in absolute control – he believes such would be absurd. What he means by it is a situation where the state is capable of getting its way in political decision making more than others. He gives 'statism' as a substitute for absolutism, but I'm sticking with the latter term due to its more common usage (and, in any case, Wallerstein mostly uses that term as well) (Wallerstein, 2011: 144-147).

[29] The retrenchment of feudalism that occurred in Eastern Europe

on the land, and allowed them to move to towns to work in new industries and trade, simultaneously turning merchants into powerful economic and political actors (ibid: 98-99, 102).

The core states' strength was also increased due to the rise of standing armies. As the bureaucracy and revenue of the state increased they were capable of employing people, vagabonds and those without jobs, to work as soldiers. This increased the state's ability to extract surplus from its own population, increasing revenue, as well as increasing its power in perpetuating the system itself (ibid: 139). This also further facilitated the growth of capitalism as the states themselves would often contract with 'military entrepreneurs' to build their armies, who would subsequently borrow and invest money, as well as increasing employment and overall spending (ibid: 140-141). More people employed, meant more food being purchased, which meant more demand, which meant more growth and so on.

A crucial component of Wallerstein's theory is that of a third layer outside the traditional 'core' and 'periphery' there is also a 'semi-periphery', one of the elements that distinguishers Wallerstein's theory from standard dependency theory. The semi-periphery plays an important structural role in the workings of the world-economy (Wallerstein, 2011: 349). The semi-periphery is essentially a mix of core and periphery production processes and act as something of an intermediary between the two groups. It is, however, constrained as it is under the pressure of avoiding becoming a peripheral country, but is also trying and advance to core status (Wallerstein, 2004: 28-29). However, the most important component of the semi-periphery is its political importance. By dividing the core and periphery it prevents there from being an overwhelming bloc of exploited groups, the periphery, who

could challenge or overthrow the system. Likewise as the semi-periphery plays the role of both exploited and exploiter its power is weakened whilst anger is directed at it from the periphery (Wallerstein, 1974: 405). So it shields the core from the periphery and allows the system to keep functioning smoothly.

How then did the world-system emerge? And why did it emerge in Europe and not elsewhere? I'll address the second of these questions first, as Wallerstein doesn't give it as much attention and it works as a nice lead in to the basic premise behind the emergence of the world-system. He briefly asks why it was that the world-system didn't emerge in China and basically comes to the conclusion that the pressures were not right. What happened in the case of China was that there was a centralised political system, that of a world-empire, which had to manage and administrate a huge land which sucked up lots of resources meaning they could not be invested in a capitalist direction (Wallerstein, 2011: 60). Likewise the staple food, rice, required a large amount of working hours, but not much land, so there was no geographic pressure to find new lands to colonise. Culturally, as well, the value system of Ming China, based on Confucianism, did not allow for much in the way of change to the organizing principles. The state stayed the way it was because it was seen as being the best there could be. In tandem with the last point, because there was the bureaucracy, there was no authorisation of overseas adventures in part because of that activities of Japanese pirates that threatened Chinese vessels (ibid: 62-63, 61).

The contrast can now be shown for Europe. Although similar in population, technology and land mass to China in the fifteenth century (ibid: 60) Europe had one advantage that China did not: it was made up of a variety of states, not one

centralized state. There was no world-empire there. What this means is that, even if other states were not wanting to expand because they were not experiencing the pressures, another state might be. And if that state took the plunge on a risky venture due to those pressures and was more successful than other states, they would be inclined to follow along, seeing the rewards that it could bring.

And this, roughly, is the chronology that Wallerstein gives for the expansion of the world-economy based on Portugal's need to expand outwards (ibid: 46-47). Portugal had a strong state, giving it an internal peace, whilst also having a geographical limit, namely that having the strong state of Spain next door there was no land for it to expand into. The only option for expansion, and for investment from merchants, was for overseas exploration, for which Portugal was also geographically suited being located on the Atlantic, next to North Africa and having favourable sea-currents alongside experience of long-distance trade (ibid: 49-52). Effectively, given its position, Portugal had no other option but to take the plunge. Once that was done, and it proved to be successful in exploration, it would then incentivise other European states to follow along, as they proceeded to. The European world-economy thus came into existence with the expansion out to the Americas, which provided an additional source of revenue in terms of land, gold and silver bullion (ibid: 68-70).

So how did the world-system emerge? That is, following Hopkins' formulation of the history of the development of the world-economy being the same as the development of capitalism (1982: 83), how and why did the economies of Europe transition from feudalism to capitalism? For Wallerstein this comes largely as

a result of economic pressures, in conjunction with some other factors[30]. In Western Europe feudalism went through a crisis in the fourteenth century as expansion ceased and the economy stagnated. This led to rising prices, food shortages, social unrest and depopulation of villages (Wallerstein, 2011: 22-25). This affected the income revenue of the seigniorial class and richer peasants took advantage of this by acquiring land from them and thus power vis-à-vis the landlords (ibid: 26-27). In Eastern Europe, in contrast, the collapse of population on the land led to a strengthening of the landlord position and concentration of property in large estates leading to the 'second serfdom' of the peasantry (ibid: 27).[31]

The economic problems of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries also allowed the state to strengthen itself, creating bureaucracies and armed forces that allowed them to better enforce taxes on the population and weakened the power of the nobility (ibid: 28-30). These factors created the major pressures that led to the move away from feudalism towards capitalism. An expansion of usable commercial land was necessary, which for most countries could be done internally and was done through the enclosure movements. This allowed for an improvement of economic efficiency and production, assisted by the stronger state that then enabled for a greater surplus extraction (ibid: 37-38). Allied to this were the developments of different methods of labour control that took shape depending on the conditions of the region. In Western Europe there was a greater move towards peasant power and freedom, whereas the conditions in Eastern Europe led to the second serfdom of the peasantry (ibid: 38). That then led to the beginnings of the division of the system into

[30] N.B. here there is just going to be an outline Wallersteins' conception of how the transition came about. Some objections to this conception will be addressed in the next section.
[31] Yes, I know there's a bit of contradiction here – more on that in the next section.

the core and the periphery and so the start of the surplus transfer from the periphery to the core. And, as said above, Portugal began the expansion overseas due to the geographic pressures placed on it.

Why did the world-economy not become a world-empire? Wallerstein states that such events occurred in the past, where ancient Rome, China and Egypt for example, turned naescent world-economies into world-empires (Wallerstein, 1974: 390). Why did this not happen this time? Well Spain tried. Under Charles V the Hapsburgs attempted to turn the world-economy into a world-empire to suit them. Their attempt failed however, as war with France proved to be a drain on resources, with both countries declaring bankruptcy in 1557 and halting conflict with the peace of Cateau-Cambraesis in 1559 (Wallerstein, 2011: 184). What was revealed from this was that, in the modern world, the limits that economics placed on imperial ambition, with the bureaucracies becoming too large to be properly financed, leading to an inflation of public credit (ibid: 185). The economic burst forward, caused by the change to a capitalist world-economy, placed too much strain on large political organizations, hence Spain's failure (Wallerstein, 1974: 407). The other core states at that time were then quick to recognise this and stuck to promoting their own internal development (Wallerstein, 2011: 197-198). Structurally the world-economy as a system had more benefits to it than did a world-empire as a system (ibid: 179). With the decline of Spain the emphasis shifted away from the Baltic trade and towards the Atlantic trade, which brought the Dutch to prominence, and then England, with their ongoing overseas expansions (ibid: 198-199). With the expansion of Europe, and the colonization of other areas, the other world-systems in existence (Russia, Ottomans, Asia) were brought under the reign of the capitalist world-economy, which now

centred on industrial production and expanded the periphery for exploitation (Wallerstein, 1974: 408).

During this period the world-system was led by three hegemonies, each at different times. First was the United Provinces (the Netherlands) in the mid-seventeenth century, second Britain in the mid-nineteenth Century and lastly, in the current period, is the United States from 1945 onwards (Wallerstein, 1983: 102). The hegemon is a crucial component of the system, creating stability in the system so that capitalistic enterprises, particularly monopolistic ones, can thrive as well as lending a sense of order and security to ordinary people (Wallerstein, 2004: 58-59). The hegemon is not an empire, but is rather a core state that during a period of unbalance in the world-system, takes a powerful lead amongst the states, by gaining an economic edge on them, leading to a political and military edge, and so has a great deal of influence on the world-system and the other states within it in all of those arenas, and cultural influence as well (ibid: 101-102). The hegemon is not all powerful though. The hegemon ensures smooth running of the system, but they eventually fall as, being generally speaking liberal in character and promoting liberal ideals, the spread of technology eventually balances things out such that the hegemon can be challenged, its economy declines as entrepreneurs go elsewhere for labour, and so it drops down to merely being another core state in the balance (ibid: 105-106).[32]

[32] Wallerstein doesn't really explain why all hegemons promoted liberal ends though (apart from, presumably, free trade benefiting them). But it would be hard to see Hitler's Germany being liberal, if it had won the war and become the hegemon. Similarly it's not explained why there can be only one. Indeed I think there's a decent argument to be made that the US and the USSR were both hegemons at their time of being.

What is the final trajectory of the world-system? Wallerstein believes that the contradictions of the system will spell its own end. Those contradictions are in the long-run that the continued capital accumulation, without redistribution, will eventually lead to a drop in demand and damage the ability for capital accumulation (Wallerstein, 1974: 414). There is also a problem of political legitimization and lack of belief in the system, especially when it reaches a point of stagnation (Wallerstein, 1996: 159). This is in part brought about by the completion of the process of commodification, which will make the process of surplus extraction transparent and consequently capitalism will lose its appeal (ibid: 90-91). Once this process is complete the process stagnates and the terminal decline begins (Mann, 2010: 178)[33]. The stagnation period takes away the legitimacy of states themselves, and the policy of reforming the system, so that people become less patient with it and seek alternatives to bring it to an end (Wallerstein, 2000: 262-263). Indeed Wallerstein believes that the system has now hit its terminal decline and that that process will take fifty years (ibid: 263).

What then will replace the system? Initially Wallerstein believed that, as a result of a long struggle, there would be a change in system, a transition away from the capitalist world-system to a form of socialist world-government (Wallerstien, 1974: 415; Wallerstein, 1976: 352). Now, however, there seems to be a certain pessimism creeping into his work. Indeed there is an interesting evolution in his pessimism. In *Historical Capitalism,* originally published in 1983, he takes the view that either the bourgeoisie could take a 'conservative' stance and allow the system to

[33] Although, as Mann (2010), points out there is no reason why capitalism cannot just create new needs to commodify.

degenerate into a more egalitarian system; or else they can try and seize the process of transition and, dressing themselves up in 'socialist' clothes, turn it into a more repressive system (Wallerstein, 1996: 107). However, in *Capitalist Civilization,* originally published in 1995, he has come to the conclusion that there are three possibilities: either a neo-feudalism, which would be an inegalitarian system of parcelized sovereignties likely based on hierarchy; the second possibility a form of democratic fascism, with a caste like division of the world into two strata (essentially attenuating the core-periphery division); or the third possibility of decentralized, egalitarian world order - with the third being the least likely (ibid: 162-163).

To adumbrate: the economic pressures placed on the feudal system led to its collapse and the transition towards a capitalist social system. The differing successes of peasant power and state control then led to the beginnings of the division of labour in the world-system. The opening up of the Americas led to a new source of revenue and an expansion of land, the increase of which enabled the core states, Western Europe for the most part, to divest away from agriculture and into newer ventures that helped solidify their power. Having done that the world-system expanded around the globe until it became the only system into which all states operate. Eventually the contradictions of the capitalist world-economy will grow to be such that it will be replaced with a new system, as all systems have a life-span. Wallerstein's hypothesis is that it will be replaced by a socialist world-government. And that, roughly, is the origin of the capitalist world-economy in the long sixteenth-century and the broad outline of Wallerstein’s theory of the world-system.

Three Main Critiques: Historical, Political and Assumptive

Having laid out Wallerstein's theory of the world-system, this section will now briefly look at three of the main criticisms that have been made of Wallerstein's theory. Each one takes a slightly different approach, in flagging up an issue, whilst all three point to a main problem, namely the economic determinism at the heart of the theory. The first critique comes from Theda Skockpol (1977), who makes arguments against the theory of the transition from the feudalism to capitalism on the grounds of historical issues and inaccuracies. Secondly is Astride Zolberg (1981) who takes the view that Wallerstein fails to take into account the political manoeuvrings that happened in Europe at the time and that the political sector needs to be treated as being relatively autonomous from the economic and a determinant in its own right. Lastly is Robert Brenner (1977), who argues that Wallerstein is assuming the very thing that he needs to explain, namely the growth and development of trade.

Theda Skockpol's (1977) argument against Wallerstein is primarily on two counts: that of economic reductionism and of theoretical and historical issues. The question of economic reductionism will be returned to later, as all three of these critiques essentially make that point. For now I will concentrate on expanding on Skcokpol's two other points and how they relate to world-systems analysis.

The first point that she makes, and perhaps the most damning one, is that Wallerstein's own theory cannot explain the transition from feudalism to capitalism, manifestly what he is attempting to explain (Skcokpol, 1977: 1078). She argues that by just having the two large typologies for a system, world-empire and world-

economy, Wallerstein cannot accommodate the dynamics of feudalism, and so cannot explain the transition. He is left relying on a teleological argument of systems survival by arguing "[that] the crisis [of feudalism] "had to be solved" if "Europe" or "the system" were to survive. The emergence of the capitalist world system is presented as the solution" (ibid). She also notes that the only definite dynamics in the system are market processes (commercial growth, spread of trade and recessions) and technological innovation, though he doesn't explain what this means, and hence the problem of a two-step reduction of socio-economic processes to market forces and of state policies to dominant class interests (ibid: 1078-1079).

The second argument that Skockpol makes is that the history does not bear out what Wallerstein is arguing. For instance, she points to the relationship that Wallerstein posits, between West and East Europe, specifically the extractive trade. On Wallerstein's theory the reason the East experiences the 'second serfdom' of the peasantry was because that method of labour control was most suited to that region for surplus extraction by the lords. This happened as a result of the East's incorporation into the world-system (Wallerstein, 1972: 96-98). However, as Skockpol points out, the re-enserfment was underway in 1400 and mostly completed in 1500. The expansion of trade and grain exports only began after 1500, with the biggest expansion occurring between 1550 and 1600. So the expansion of trade did not cause the re-enserfment, as Wallerstein's theory would predict, but precedes it (Skockpol, 1977: 1082). Or, in Robert Brenner's words:

> Economic backwardness in Eastern Europe cannot be regarded as economically determined, arising from "dependence" on trade in primary products to the West... it would be more correct to state that dependence on grain exports was a result of backwardness; of the failure of the home market (1976: 60).

In Wallerstein's world-system theory the causality is backwards. Of course Wallerstein could still make the argument that the re-enserfment was necessary, as a form of labour control, in order to facilitate the expansion of trade. But then he would be stuck, again, making the sort of teleological/functionalist argument that he elsewhere repudiates (Wallerstein, 2011: 134).

Zolberg's (1981) argument against Wallerstein is developed in a three-fold manner: he first asserts that what Wallerstein is doing is simply reading the present back onto the past and that, the reason why the notion of world-system analysis sounds so convincing, is simply that it sounds like a reflection of what we see in the present world. That present is read onto the past, which is then used to confirm what we see in the present. He perhaps unfairly calls this a "conjurer's trick", saying "his solution to the problem he has posed is founded on a conjurer's trick whereby the past and present are made to mirror each other, and what is said about each appears to substantiate what is said about the other" (1981: 254).

The second part of the argument is that Wallerstein pays too much attention to economics and does not treat politics with enough care. That is, Zolberg makes the case that politics is a relatively autonomous region from economics and, though affected by it, cannot be reduced to it, which is what Wallerstein does (ibid: 255). To make his case he points to the fact that the reason Spain failed to develop a world-empire was due to it having to fight France and that France's strength was due to it having a strong state, and also an alliance with Turkey (a country outside the world-system) that allowed it to fight Spain to a draw, in 1559, with the two countries exhausted. That then established the 'European equilibrium' that allowed the differing states to develop in different ways (ibid: 263-264). Likewise the strength of the

Dutch economy rested on its having a powerful navy, which could back their entrepreneurs, as well as secure trade routes and stretch their imperial dominion. It is not then a coincidence that the country that would emerge with the largest colonial spoils, Britain, also invested heavily in its navy over territorial troops (ibid: 265-266). What Zolberg is pointing to here is that there is often a greater strategic interaction between countries than world-systems theory would allow, with its notion of being inside and outside the system. He is also making the point that the interaction between politics and economics is complex and that often one can not be reduced to the other, rather they can influence each other to varying degrees and part of the job of analysis is to work out to what degree.

A sub-point to this is that there is also the issue that Wallerstein does not adequately define what he means by the strength of a state. He holds that a state can be considered strong based on how it compares to other states in the world-economy, but what defines strong over weak is not all that clear. It is simply asserted that states in the core are strong, whilst those in the periphery are weak. However there are relative differences amongst states in the core. As Zolberg points out, England and France are both core states but have different outcomes in their state building. England was able to become a core state, in large part because Europe was broken into a system of states held in relative equilibrium and it was able to use statecraft and political-strategic interactions to its own benefit in order to expand its navy and strengthen itself (ibid: 268). France, by contrast, developed on its path because its geographical location, as well as being larger than England, meant it had to develop a strong centralized state, with a large bureaucracy, in order to fend off foreign interventions as well as control the various principalities within it (ibid: 269;

Strayner, 1970: 50-52). However, as Zolberg notes, France, despite having the 'strongest' state did not achieve paramountcy in the core; leaving Wallerstein in the somewhat odd position of arguing that the reason for this was because the French state was too strong (Zolberg, 1981: 269).

His last point is to make the case that the reason for Europe's success can be better explained by noting that, unlike other regions at the time, Europe had a plurality of sovereignties, and had different political interactions among them. This, he contends, is an important point as it is a feature that was unique to Europe, that other regions did not have and should not be treated as an incidental aspect of European history and Western Europe's rise to power (ibid: 277). The system of states, not either 'states' or the 'system', should be used as the unit of analysis in Zolberg's account (ibid: 280).

Robert Brenner (1977) in his critique of Wallerstein is, in part, carrying on a critique he has made before more generally on the assumptions that underlie theories on the transition from feudalism to capitalism (Brenner, 1976). It is worth, then, clearing up one possible misconstrual from the outset: Brenner is not accusing Wallerstein of not being Marxist enough. Wallerstein himself has said that he finds the tradition and analysis of Marx useful, in his understanding of capitalism (Wallerstein, 1974: 387), but that he isn't necessarily placing himself as a Marxist (Wallerstein, 1995). Rather Brenner's argument is that Wallerstein is, in following Paul Sweezy and Andre Gunder Frank, committing an assumptive error: that is that they take the view of Adam Smith, "that trade based division of labour determines economic development through the growth of specialization and thereby the productivity of labour" (Brenner, 1977: 37).

What Brenner is pointing out is that trade, and the tendency of humans to engage in such activities, is not just something that can be assumed to happen but rather needs to be explained and that that explanation, and the explanation for the dynamic of development is located in the class struggles that caused the transformation (ibid: 38; Brenner, 1976). This cuts to the heart of Wallerstein's thesis as, Brenner is claiming, his is the idea that the development of trade is responsible for the determination of the new class relations that arise with capitalism (Brenner, 1977: 40). Thus it is that Wallerstein essentially says that the means of production and the method of labour control are determined by the countries position in the world-economy (ibid: 65).

As an example, Brenner points to the fact that, contrary to Wallerstein's argument, it was not that Poland ended up on the periphery because it had weak state, vis-à-vis the core, but rather it was the state's relationship to its own peasantry, the class relations. Specifically the free trade policy adopted by the state, which sent the grain supplies out to the core countries, was to serve the interests of the serf-lords, by providing cheap industrial goods, and to undercut the local industry, which prevented the peasants from having an alternative which might have undermined the lord's power over their serfs (Brenner, 1977: 65). Poland's underdevelopment was not due to the functioning of the capitalist system, but rather due to Poland not becoming capitalist; the serf class structure it maintained prevented the existing means of production from being put to use in potential capital accumulation. It was this class structure, not the rise of trade and world market as Wallerstein would have it, which prevented the emergence of an internal dynamic of development (ibid: 71). By pressing for the point that trade was the dynamic that led to development, and in

insisting that regions' ruling classes selected the method of labour control that were best suited for surplus extraction, Wallerstein implies that the core chose free wage labour, whereas the Eastern periphery had the choice but passed over on it. This, however, suggests that social actors had a greater degree of choice than their situations would actually warrant (ibid: 81). It would also indicate that the ruling classes had the foresight of knowledge to know what would be the best form of surplus extraction and method of control.

This, then, constitutes the four main critiques that have been levelled against Wallerstein's world-systems theory: that it theoretically does not explain what he says it does; it suffers problems of being inaccurate at a historical level; it ignores political structures and how they influence events; and it ignores the individual histories and conflicts that chart the trajectory of countries transformations. The critiques are all of the belief that this error stems from Wallerstein's economic reductionism, though Brenner's is more that he's got the economics wrong and hasn't paid enough attention to the surrounding social and political factors, namely class conflict. I think this is the case, but that problems also stem from an implicit normative position that Wallerstein has and that he weaves into his theory. In the next section we will look at both of those areas and, crucially, demonstrate how it is that Darwinian social evolution can avoid them.

Issues: Normative and Teleological Analysis and how Social Evolution Avoids Them

This section will make a contention that there are two elements that make up Wallerstein's thinking on the world-system that impedes his analysis: these are 1) that Wallerstein has a normative viewpoint, deriving from his Marxist leaning views, that capitalism is bad and that this obscures some of his understanding of the system he seeks to describe; and 2) that there is an implicit teleology/functionalist argument in Wallerstein's thinking that makes his argument analytically weaker. So I will argue adopting a Darwinian social evolutionary viewpoint enables the elimination of both of these problems and allows a sifting of the sand to find the gold that lies within what Wallerstein is arguing.

I'll start by addressing the normative point. There are, to some degree, two Wallerstein's that come through when reading his work. There is the Wallerstein who wrote the book *The Modern World-System* (2011) where he displays a tendency to covering all sides of an argument, with pages of extended quotations being battered backwards and forwards passing by to the point where his own view and argument will often be unclear and has to be deciphered from the few sentences of commentary and implications that he makes at the end of such passages (Janowitz, 1977 also notes this tendency). On the other hand there is the Wallerstein of the articles and the polemic *Historical Capitalism with Capitalist Civilization* (1996) where he is very direct and very clear about what his own view is and what is own argument is, but tends to make wilder claims and is not quite as careful in detailing the how's and whys. What unites these two Wallerstein's is the theory of the world-system and that it is central to understanding. So, for that reason, I think it is fair to

take Wallerstein's views of capitalism that he develops in his articles and polemic and use it to inform an understanding of his theory as developed more carefully in *The Modern World System*.

What does Wallerstein's normative position do? It, in effect, leads him to overlook elements of the histories that he is detailing and the information he is giving that do not mesh with the theory of the world-system that he details. Whilst all such systematic accounts will, to some extent, struggle to incorporate all details, the errors from Wallerstein are largely stemming from his normative position (Zolberg, 1981). In effect Wallerstein's dislike of capitalism leads him to want to position it as the cause of everything that is wrong, which misses the fact that reality is more complicated and requires a more nuanced theory to accommodate (Runciman, 1998: Ch. 3).

The wider point being made here, and one picked up by many commentators (Skockpol, 1977; Janowitz, 1977; Zolberg, 1981), is that Wallerstein is engaging in a form of economic reductionism; that is attempting to attribute all changes in politics, culture, etc. to changes in the economy. Reductionism, the idea that we should reduce explanations to the lowest level of phenomenon possible, is not necessarily a bad thing. However I would contend that what Wallerstein is doing is "greedy reductionism" (Dennett, 1995: 80-83). This is when an attempt is made to reduce things to below the level at which the explanation needs to happen. For example, there is some merit to attempting to explain some social interactions at a psychological level, and psychological formations at a biological level. There would be no merit, however, in attempting to explain social interactions at a physics level,

even though people are all made of atoms. It would simply be the inappropriate level of explanation and nothing would be gleaned from it.

This charge, I think, can be levelled at Wallerstein: that due to his normative view he has a desire to explain everything at the level of economics (though there are some caveats to this, which I'll get to) and economic interactions. And, for what it's worth, Wallerstein admits this charge, though he doesn't see any problem with it, insisting that his point was to stress that the economic and political spheres were not autonomous of one another (2011: xxii). Indeed this is the whole point behind his notion of having a unidisciplinary approach (Wallerstein, 2004: 19). That is certainly true, but Wallerstein is extending further than that, in trying to make the case that politics was dependent on the economics; that is political transformations happened as a result of economic changes which is, effectively, the classic Marxist division of the base and superstructure (Singer, 1996: 50).

To give a contrast I'll illustrate an example of a good form of reductionism that is Hendrik Spruyt's (1994a) reduction of Charles Tilly (1992) theory on the matter of states being able to wage war. For Tilly sovereign states arose largely as a result of their ability to wage war and prepare for war with one another. Those who performed this task better won out and were able to absorb other states and come to prominence in Europe (Tilly, 1992: 20). For Spruyt, in contrast, there is a need to explain this at a deeper level, the institutional level. As Spruyt argues the reason why certain states were better able at waging war and thus dominating was due to the institutional structures of the countries which made them better able to wage war than other countries (1994a: 32-33).

Here is a good example of reductionism: war is still an important factor in the emergence of states and in the rise of the sovereign state, but the states preparedness for war and ability to wage it is now given an explanation outside of war itself. The explanation is to be found in the different routines and practices that create the sovereign state as an interactor, which is then able to outcompete the alternate forms of political organization. There is a selection of interactors, with the consequence that there is a diffusion of the replicators that constitute it, leading to their spread and adoption by other states. By contrast, for Wallerstein, he attempts to explain all factors at the economic level, by which is meant market forces and trade dynamics (Skockpol, 1977; Brenner, 1977) with the difference in states power and in the character of the states regimes are determined by the state's position in the economic system (Zolberg, 1981: 266). Spruyt's formulation also fits better with population thinking: there are different populations of entities, the differing state organizations, that are selected among in competition with one another, and as a result of selection pressures from within. This acceptance of their being different state formations means that there is not the developmentalist assumption, that Wallerstein in effect makes (Skockpol, 1977: 1089), that states are the proper mode or organization within the world system. Contra Wallerstein, states existed before the system not the other way around (Spruyt, 1994a: 19).

It can also be pointed out that the theory is, to an extent, suffering from the familiar problem of ontogenetic thinking. This might seem strange as a criticism, as Wallerstein is looking at trade and the interaction between countries. However, his focus is restricted to Europe and the interactions between European countries. It is, again, attempting to explain the rise of capitalism and modernity solely through an

endogenous focus on Europe (Bhambra, 2011: 674). By contrast, Washbrook (1988) has argued that, in actual fact, South Asia shared similarities to the world-system that Wallerstein develops: South Asia was a hub for a variety of different intersecting trades of goods that extending out and all the way to Mexico. Indeed, as he points out, it can even be argued that there was a split between a core and a periphery, as Mexico suffered problems of deindustrialization in its textile industry due to the importing of South Asian cloth (Washbrook 1988: 60). This illustrates the problem with Wallersteins ontogenetic viewpoint. By only looking at the endogenous development of the European world-system, and seeing this as the only world-system, he is unable to incorporate other entities existing in world-systems on their own, and sees the world-system, and capitalism and industrialism, as expanding out from Europe to the rest of the world (Bhambra, 2011: 673-674)[34]. A more phylogenetic account, in the Darwinian social evolutionary perspective, would incorporate the development, and interaction, between the different entities, showing how the connections can influence endogenous changes, rather than focusing purely on endogenous changes.

This problem of Wallerstein's restriction into ontogenetic ways of thinking leads back to the problem that was discussed in relation to Marx: teleology.

As discussed above, teleology can be understood in a variety of senses and is to be contrasted with the Darwinian way of thinking (Mayr, 1992). What is meant here is in the essence of Mayr's (1992) definitions of teleomatic and teleonomic

[34] Whilst there is no need to except Wallerstein's framing that there are world-systems, whether one or plural, rather than just entities interacting that seemingly forms a coherent system, it is interesting to note that in the idea of multiple world-systems competing there's a possible analogy with clade selection, a possible higher-order form of selection between species that exists above group selection (Okasha, 2003)

senses, that there is an automatic change in a system that occurs whenever the potential of that system is used up; and that there is a goal directed process behind it. But whereas the teleonomic sense might be fine in a limited, restricted and localized form, with Wallerstein it is built-up to almost be representative for the entire system. In Wallerstein's world-system theory it often comes across that all events that occur are working towards some end in the system; and that that system has a logic or structure such that it works to that end regardless of what people do within it, or that people's actions are always in some way working to its benefit. Consider these sentences:

> Amsterdam picked up the threads of the dissolving Hapsburg Empire, creating a framework of smooth operation for the world-economy that would enable England and France begin to emerge as strong states, eventually to have strong "national economies" (Wallerstein, 2011: 199).
>
> The solution... is to have three *kinds* of states... this semi-periphery is then assigned as it were a specific economic role, but the reason is less economic than political... the existence of the third category means precisely that the upper stratum is not faced with the *unified* opposition of all the others because the *middle* stratum is both exploited and exploiter (Wallerstein, 1974: 405).
>
> ...This pattern of rise, temporary ascendancy, and fall of hegemonic powers in the interstate system is merely one aspect of the central role of the political machinery in the functioning of capitalism as a mode of production (Wallerstein, 1982: 105).

Do these statements indicate a teleological explanation? I think a case can be made. Although there's no direct statement, the implication in all of them is that such events are happening because it enables the system to keep working. The rise of a hegemon is not an independent event that results from specific historical conditions, but rather is a necessary part of the maintenance of the smooth running of the world-system. Likewise the semi-periphery is not a result of individual histories but a

designed part of system, that's there in order to ensure its continued functioning without a revolutionary overthrow.

This can also be seen in Wallerstein's discussion of the origins of nationalism, racism and ethnicity (Wallerstein, 2010). He starts by noting that the category of 'peoplehood' is intuitively understood, and yet there are problems with offering a definition of it. He also notes that peoplehood divides into three categories: race, nation and ethnicity. He argues that each one relates to a different element of the world-system--race is part of the division of labour, a way of pitting a class against itself, the nation relates to the political superstructure of the world-system, and ethnic people is related to the creation of household structures, that enable the continuation of un-waged labour (ibid: 79). The issue, here, is that in all these cases the phenomenon in question is explained by the needs of the world-system. The nation exists to provide a sense of a deep past for the state, and thus bind the particular group of people together and make them more likely to obey the states rules, thus diffusing tensions that might arise due to inequalities within the nation, and aggression that might result from external actors (ibid: 81-82). Elements of this are, as we'll see, similar to Gellner's theory on nationalism and the function that it serves. The problem for Wallerstein's is it's not clear who is putting together the nationalist program. If it is for the world-system, as Wallerstein suggests, then that suggests that it is the world-system itself whose logic dictates their creation in order to ensure its smooth running. But this doesn't explain why individual actors and groups would create a nation-state, or a nationalist sentiment, as opposed to something else. Again, it comes close to the teleological reasoning that it comes into existence to serve the purpose of furthering the world system.

There is a further problem in that, in Wallerstein's view, the world-system can only have one mode of production, so, e.g., it can only be capitalist, even if non-capitalist systems exist within it. The trouble here is that this doesn't allow for a great deal of distinction within the system and the theory itself then cannot explain the variation, other than to simply say that economically that particular mode of coercion works best for that region (with wage-labour generally being the province of the core and coerced labour being the province of the periphery). However that general summation does not help to explain why a particular country adopted a particular system at a particular historical point, and why it might change towards something else. And this is something that Wallerstein seems to implicitly recognise as when he does look at specific states, he tends to go into a detailed narrative analysis that oftentimes centres more on politics, structure and demographics more so than the largely economic arguments he makes when looking at the big-picture.

This, however, is not a problem for Darwinian social evolution. Darwinism is not married to the notion that there has to be one definitive system, that all others fit into; nor does its logic require it to be able to explain everything with regard to a single theoretical mode. It does not create general laws that work in all times and places, but rather it sets out "general parameters within which particular processes take place" (Hearn, 2014: 183). It provides theoretical tools for understanding why a process happened, that is why a particular cultural idea or social institution was selected, in a local environment, under a particular set of pressures. It is a general theory in the tools that it offers, not in the explanations it provides.

As alluded to above in the discussion with Spruyt (1994a), Darwinian social evolution sees things through the lens of population thinking (Mayr, 1975; Godfrey-

Smith, 2009). This means that, contrary to Wallerstein, it accepts the existence of different populations of entities, the basis of variety, rather than typologies that have to be adhered to. Wallerstein's world-system, because it is unitary, doesn't accept that there can be a diversity of systems and modes of production in existence, in different places, and so gets tangled in trying to explain away entities that do not fit the pattern (Skockpol, 1977). Nor does Darwinian social evolution accept the notion of progress--dead ends, and modes of production and systems stagnating or getting worse--are accountable within the theory: there is no progressive drive, only a movement towards more adaptation in localized areas (Mayr, 1992).

The diffusion of a particular system is better understood as the result of the selection pressures in particular local environments, that can then become more global. Successful systems are imitated, to the best that this is possible, resulting from the selection of and for interactors and replicators. So, in understanding the spread of capitalism, it can be better understood as a selection for the replicators, the worldview (Gabora, 2004) that capitalism and nationalism provided along with its institutional alignments, that was diffused when others noted the success of industrialization and sought to imitate it or adopt aspects of it for their own territories; and the selection of interactors, namely sovereign states that were able to outcompete, through military as well as economic competition (Tilly, 1975; Spruyt, 1994a) their alternatives in the form of city-states. A similar thing could be said as well for empires, where the success of certain empires as interactors led to other states seeking to develop their own for purposes of acquiring resources and prestige (Kumar, 2010).

For these reasons Darwinian social evolutionary theory is capable of accepting that different replicators and interactors will come to fruition, as a result of different selective environments (Brandon, 1998) and selective pressures being in operation, without having to classify it towards a generalized, global scheme. So, whereas Wallerstein was left having to explain that despite Poland looking like it was a feudal mode of production it was in fact a capitalist mode of production due to it being in a capitalist world system, Darwinian social evolutionary theory is fully capable of allowing that there can be different modes of productions in different places, and even under an interconnected system.

By not being bound to this social evolutionary theory would not have to maintain, as Wallerstein must, that the Soviet Union was really capitalist because it was part of a world-system. Instead what can be said was that the Soviet Union was using a specific kind of mode of coercion in order to enforce its rule – a mode of coercion that was, in fact, fairly common throughout Russian history, due to the realities of its disparate population and harshness of the land, and was adapted by Lenin to form the theory of the state that exists under Marxist-Leninism (Miller, 1993: 9-10). In contrast in various different places capitalism as a mode of production was compatible with either a mode of coercion (such as in Pinochet's Chile; or nowadays China) or a mode of persuasion (Europe; America etc.), the type of mode being adopted being determined in part by the contingent history of the environment that it went into (Runciman, 1995: 34).

The recognition that it is the local environments that matter, and that interconnections can lead to different systems all existing at the same time, also helps to avoid the problem of being too Eurocentric in outlook, as Wallerstein and other

theories that see only one particular form of modernization, can do so (Bhambra, 2011). By focusing instead on the interactors that come into being instead, Darwinian social evolution can understand each particular case in response to its own pressures from within, but also in its relations to other populations of entities and how they impact on one another, without privileging one area over others, or one particular way of understanding or advancing as being the most progressive one. There can be multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 2000; Ichijo, 2013), and these different modernities result from interaction between the entity, at the level of an interactor and replicator, and its relation to the particular environmental contexts, historical, geopolitical, that it is located in.

To conclude: there are some valuable elements to Wallerstein's theory. His is a reminder not to necessarily treat states as units of analysis and as autonomous entities; rather we should be mindful of the fact that they operate within a system of states and their interactions have effects, for good or ill, on one another. However, as a theory, world-systems analysis fails to offer an explanation for the events that it seeks to describe and it is too economically determinist. By trying to reduce everything down to being an aspect of the economy it instead engages in a form of greedy reductionism that does not offer an explanation and is not a true unidisciplinary viewpoint: rather, in seeking to reduce all phenomenon to the economy, and the economy down to market interactions and forces, it is a monodisciplinary viewpoint.

In contrast Darwinian social evolutionary theory does not offer an overarching theory into which all must fit, but rather a set of mechanisms for explaining why certain environmental pressures lead to the selection of certain

practices, institutions, cultural entities and so on, by examining why those selected entities were better adapted to the environment in which they found themselves. Its appreciation of phylogeny allows it to explain differences at the level of the population of entities, rather than just endogenously. It thus pays attention to individual history, as well as being able to look at the interactions between different environments and states. By seeking only to explain, and not predict, it is also not bound towards saying anything is predetermined.

We leave Wallerstein and world-systems theory now to look at our next theorist, Michael Hecther. Initially inspired by Wallerstein and his theory (Hechter, 1975), he later moved away from it in an almost completely opposite direction: from a strucutal theory to a rational-choice theory. It is the latter that will be the focus for theoretical engagement.

The Rational Actors of Michael Hechter

Michael Hechter started out working in a similar tradition to the previous theorist discussed, Immanuel Wallerstein. His first major work, *Internal Colonialism* (1975), can to a certain extent be read as the application of Wallerstein's world-systems theory within one country, with the regions of the country being separated into the different economic roles that Wallerstein placed as between countries. *Internal Colonialism* (1975) develops a model to explain differences within nations, and the development of different nationalist feelings. Within countries the uneven wave of modernization would lead to certain cultural groups being more advanced than others. This then creates a cultural division of labour between a 'core' and a 'periphery', with the advanced core group being able to reallocate resources to their own benefit and maintain their dominance over the periphery. This leads to the creation of distinct cultural groups as individuals come to associate with the group they are part of by region (Ozkirimli, 2010: 79-80), a case of uneven development similar to that seen in Gellner's theory.

However, Hechter became dissatisfied with the structural theory that under-grid *Internal Colonialism* (1975), coming to see that there were certain aspects that the theory could not explain--that whilst structural approaches could explain collective interests, it was not adequate for explaining why actors might react to circumstances in the way they do (Hechter, 1987: 6). This dissatisfaction, and the influence of Mancur Olson's work *The Logic of Collective Action* (1964), prompted a

change in direction for Hecther, towards rational-choice theory. It is this theory that this chapter will be focusing on.

Whilst this chapter will be engaging specifically with the work of Hechter, it does also have a wider aim of engaging with rational-choice theory at the level of a general theory of explanation. The purpose is, therefore, to explicate the ways that Darwinian social evolution can work as a general theory of explanation and can solve some of the problems with the rational choice approach (Hodgson, 2013; 2015). The reason for choosing Hechter, as opposed to another rational choice theorist, follows from the general themes of this thesis. The thesis is in part concerned with social change, generally, and nationalism specifically so Hechter, as a theorist who uses rational choice theory as a general theory to understand history and the contemporary world, as well as specifically to understand nationalism, makes sense as a choice.

Structurally this chapter is split into two major sections. The first section will provide a brief overview of Hechter and exposition of his understanding of rational choice theory and how it mixes with his social change and nationalism. The second section will then examine the problems of rational choice theory and argue that Darwinian social evolution provides a better explanation for the development of social groups, as it does not suffer from the same problems rational-choice theory does.

Hechter and Rational Choice Theory

As discussed, Hechter's move towards rational choice theory was as a result of coming to the view that rational choice provided a superior general theory for

explaining certain problems in sociology (Kiser & Hechter, 1998: 786). His problem was that structuralism failed to provide a sufficient explanation for why individuals in a group would band together and develop solidarity with one another to enable them to pursue their collective interests, such as through nationalist movements (Hechter, 1987b: 5-6). In *Internal Colonialism* he had been struck by the fluctuations in nationalist support in Wales and Scotland, and it was this fluctuation that he felt his structural model struggled to explain (ibid: 5). He came to see it as a puzzle that needed to be explained in its own right, coming to appreciate that structural theories were not sufficient for explaining why individuals react to specific circumstances, given that they have some discretion in the choices that they make. It was this that led him to rational choice theory, and he put it to use to develop the theory of group solidarity (ibid: 5-8).

His move away from structuralism and towards rational choice theory happened at a time when many were becoming disenchanted with structuralism. However, for some, this led to a move away from general theory all together. In particular Hechter argued that in historical sociology there was a movement away from general theories as being explanatory and towards what he and Kiser termed inductive theories, that is theories that looked at particular circumstances and developed mechanisms and understandings that were only relevant to that time-period (Kiser & Hechter, 1991: 1-3). This was a reaction against perceived failings of deductive theories. However they argued that any theory "must specify both causal *relations* between variables… and the *mechanisms* responsible for producing these relations. Whereas causal relations can sometimes be inferred from empirical

observations, causal mechanisms in social science can only come from general theories" (ibid: 4 [emphasis in original]).

Causal relations are often inferred from the historical data, as they have to be when there is no experiment. For this reason it is important to specify a mechanism "that describes the process by which one variable influences the other" (ibid: 5). Mechanisms are important because they indicate which variables need to be controlled and so help to highlight a causal relationship (ibid). These mechanisms should be explicit, so that it eliminates the danger of ad hoc explanations. They are not, however, directly observable so can only be arrived at deductively, by specifying mechanisms that subsume under causal laws. Causal laws themselves are derived from general theories that specify those laws and consequently the mechanisms (ibid: 4-6). For Hechter rational choice theory provides the best, current, general theory that provides the means for stipulating mechanisms, causal laws and deductively explaining problems in historical sociology and social theory (Kiser & Hechter, 1998: 811).

Before beginning to detail Hechter's own theory of group solidarity, and how it ties in with his theory on nationalism, it's probably best to spend a few moments explaining what is meant by rational choice theory in the sociological context. The theory itself has some different propositions attached to it and it does not always mean the same thing, discipline by discipline. The notion of rational choice theory originates in economics when, as the conventional history goes, the marginal revolution in 1870 made precise cost-benefit calculations possible (Elster, 1986:

26)[35]. Rational choice theory is most prominently connected with methodological individualism, which is "the view that all institutions, behavioural patterns, and social processes can in principle be explained in terms of individuals only: their actions, properties, and relations" (ibid: 22)[36]. Rational choice theory joins to this by providing the agents with the preferences that they should have (e.g. agents are self-interested) and the agents' choices are then considered rational if their choices are consistent and can be explained by their postulated preferences (Sen, 1977: 322-323). Methodological individualism and rational choice, essentially, stem from a tradition that seeks to provide micro-foundations to the understanding of macro phenomenon. In sociology this tradition is most associated with Max Weber, who believed that sociology is concerned with explaining people's purposive behaviour in relation to social settings they live within (Noble, 2000: 119; see also, Kiser, 2005).

The problems with rational choice theory and methodological individualism, as found in economics, are fairly numerous.[37] Sen (1977: 331-332), for example, complains that the assumption that individuals are always going to be utility-maximizers does not hold up all that well in a general sense, as most people will not behave in such a manner in all social circumstances. Likewise Herbert Gintis (2000) points to a problem in the self-regarding assumption of rational-actor theory. In the ultimatum game, for example, two people are in a scenario where one is given ten dollars and can make an offer to the other person of whatever portion s/he wishes to

[35] I say 'conventional history': the notion that there was a marginal revolution is disputed (c.f. Ekelund and Hébert, 2002)

[36] As we'll see later, although methodological individualism and rational choice theory go together, they are not necessarily the same thing. Variants of methodological individualism have existed for long before rational choice theory was formalized as well (c.f. Udehn, 2002).

[37] I'll here leave aside the criticism that methodological individualism implies political individualism, for a discussion of which see Roberts (1996: 20-26) and Farrell (2010).

offer. Should the other person accept, then they both get to keep the money. From the rational actor perspective the choice that should be offered is a split of 9-1, as the person receiving the one dollar will still have more than s/he came in with, it is rational for him/her to accept the offer. However, in all versions of the game, the other person virtually always rejects the offer of one dollar and the predicted 'rational' response of accepting the offer is rarely approximated. This demonstrates that there is more to people and the motivations of their behaviour than simple utility maximization (in this case a sense of fairness and punishment of a person perceived to be going against such norms) (ibid: 316).

Hechter, however, maintains that rational-choice theory, as used in sociology, is distinct from how it is used in economics, and that the lack of understanding of this distinction partially explains the resistance to the uptake of rational-choice theory in sociology (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997: 191-192). The first thing to note in the sociological sense of rational choice is that it divides into two types of rationality: 'thin' types and 'thick' types (ibid: 194). In the thin sense what matters is not the beliefs, assumptions and intentions of the actor themselves, but whether or not they are consistent with the action they take and the goal that they want to achieve (Elster, 1983: 1). Thin models have an advantage in being highly universalistic, as the model can in theory be applied to all groups of peoples and in different contexts (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997: 194). However, the disadvantage lies in the fact that the thin models are "substantively empty. They can be made consistent after the event, therefore, with nearly any kind of behaviour" (ibid: 195). Thick models, on the other hand, are more substantive: they seek to specify the agent's values and beliefs as their intentional behaviour is only understandable if it is known what is motivating

them towards action. This also enables some predictive power at a collective level. Agent's idiosyncrasies are likely to cancel one another out so that there are remaining common values that can be used to predict collective behaviour (ibid: 194). What the values of the agents are, however, is not specified; the sole requirement is that "individuals are self-interested, not selfish" (ibid). The problem with the thick theories, however, is that in specifying the agent's values, they are often wrong and mutually inconsistent (ibid: 195). Despite these problems Hechter and Kanazawa argue that "rational choice provides a heuristic framework that permits the diverse findings in all of these fields to be unified. Another advantage is that it aids in making the logical links between different theories more explicit" (ibid: 195).

It's also worth noting that rational choice theory is not a micro-theory, or a particularly individualistic one. It is primarily a social theory that is concerned with looking at how individual rational actions can, in the aggregate, lead to social outcomes that may or may not be rational, in the sense defined by the theory. It is not the case that the outcome must be either rational or desirable, indeed in many cases it can be undesirable, but also stable in the sense that nobody will deviate from it (ibid: 192). Rational choice theory is a "multilevel enterprise", in that it has assumptions about individual values and desires, but also places these desires within specifications of the social structures (ibid: 193). Social structures are equally as important determinants of outcomes, as are individual values, because they place constraints on what individuals can do as well as providing the material context for individual's actions (ibid).

For Hechter the value of rational choice theory is that, as a general theory, it produces generalizable laws that can be applied in a variety of different circumstances and historical time periods and used to understand a wide-range of phenomenon, not just a particular time-period or context (Kiser & Hechter, 1998: 795-796). Although the mechanisms, and the causal effect they have, can only be examined indirectly, they can be tested for their usefulness of understanding. Three criteria laid out for assisting in the process of determining whether the mechanism provides a useful inference of the causal relationship are: plausibility, time-lag reduction and empirical implications. This amounts to asking whether the proposed mechanism is a plausible one, given the standards of the scientific community and the known facts; how short the delay is between the postulated cause and its effect (the shorter the time the better); and what outcomes would be expected to happen given this mechanism, and can this effect or outcome actually be found (Kiser & Hechter, 1991: 6-8).

With this in mind I'll now turn towards Hechter's theory of group solidarity.

Group Solidarity and the Explanation of Order

Hechter, in developing this theory, is in general concerned with the explaining the fact of order within heterogeneous societies. Homogenous societies, it is sometimes argued, do not require much of an explanation, or at least the notion of shared values and norms binding the people together is not so problematic[38].

[38] Hechter believes that it is not enough to merely cite shared values to explain social order in homogenous societies, see (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1993).

Granting this, it still remains to be explained how social order is produced in heterogeneous societies. In this case there is a problem in that there are distinct groups within the society who may not all share the same norms and values and, as a consequence, the order within those societies cannot be explained by appeal to shared norms (Hechter et al., 1992: 329-330).

The theory of group solidarity explains the emergence of global order, that is society wide order, as part of an unintended emergence from local order, that is a smaller group's solidarity (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1993: 458). Before discussing the ways in which order is produced within the smaller groups and then up to the larger group, I will first discuss why groups are formed in the first place, on the understanding of Hechter's rational choice model, which is not quite the same as how order is produced.

Groups, essentially, form when there are jointly-produced private goods that individuals cannot obtain by themselves. In effect there must be something that a set of individuals desire that no one of them can gain by themselves. This then gives them the incentive to join together and form a group, in order to produce that good and be able to consume it (Hechter, 1987a: 415-416). The types of joint good include such things as security, from other people or from natural disasters, joint production of food, greater access to information and other such factors. This pooling can also lead to greater efficiency, with assigning different people different tasks. However it comes with costs; joining together in a large group of common interests will, naturally, restrict people's autonomy and freedom as they must comply with rules set up in order to ensure the regulation of behaviour. For this reason such comings

together will normally occur in circumstances where there are uncertainties or obstacles in the natural environment (Hechter, 2000: 20-21).[39]

The problem, of course, is in maintaining social order in these settings once people have come together to produce the joint good. As the assumption is that everyone is self-interested, then everyone has the temptation to contribute as little as possible towards producing the joint good, whilst consuming as much of it as they can. This is the free-rider problem (Elster, 1982: 467). In terms of rational choice, this means that the rational action of each agent is to defect, that is to choose not to contribute, so as to do as little work as possible but consume as much as possible. This, of course, creates the problem that if everyone follows this strategy then everyone is worse off.

To account for this, Hechter notes the way in which groups often have important means of monitoring and sanctioning group members in order to achieve compliance (Hechter, 1984). This works with the group dynamics: the dependence of the members on the group determines how much compliance the group can demand of its members (the upper-limit so to speak), whilst the effectiveness of the group's ability to police its members determines how much compliance they actually receive (ibid: 162). Sanctioning is the normal pattern for ensuring compliance, however this only works if the group is able to successfully monitor the members and see when they break with the norms that the group puts in place, and also whether they are able to sanction them appropriately and in a way that the members will accept as being justified sanctions given the violation of the norm (ibid: 162-163). Monitoring is the

[39] Rousseau, in *The Social Contract* (2008), outlines a broadly similar theory for the origins of social contracts.

only means by which such compliance can come about, though, so it is a necessary event for the group even though it places costs on the group itself (ibid: 163).

This is what ensures the groups solidarity: the monitoring and sanctioning ensures that everyone contributes their fair share to the production and takes their fair share; the justice of the sanctioning ensures that the members do not believe that they have been unfairly treated and so desire to leave the group.

As an example of Hechter's argument for how solidarity is maintained in heterogeneous societies, we can look at his (later) arguments on what nationalism is. For Hechter nationalism, and nations, are essentially the largest forms of groups with solidarity that presently exist in the world (Hechter, 1987a; Hechter, 1995). Hechter sees nationalism as being amenable and understandable in the terms of rational choice theory. Other things notwithstanding the phenomenon can be understood in rational and instrumental terms (Hechter, 1995: 56-58). Hechter, to some extent, follows Breuilly (1993) in linking the state and the nation together; that is that nationalist movements are about capturing the state or creating a state for their own (Hechter, 1987a). The first step to explaining nationalism is thus to explain the emergence of the state. On the basis of Hechter's theory of group solidarity this happens as follows:

Recall that on Hechter's theory group's form when there is a joint good that a set of individuals want but which none of the individuals can obtain on their own. They join together in order to produce the good. Each of these groups then monitors the behaviour of its members using the discretionary resources that are available to them. A group that has high solidarity, that is groups with extensive rules and

effective controls on their members, will produce more social order, a group with low solidarity less order (Hechter, 1995: 60). The high solidarity group will be more productive than a low solidarity group. Within a territory, however, there will be multiple groups. Some will be high solidarity, some low solidarity. There will be competition between the groups, though, as they try and take members off of one another and predate on the production of each other, so that other groups are able to get the same resources without having to work as hard. It is for this reason, so Hechter argues, that the productive groups will come together and divert some of their resources to create a third-party mechanism that can regulate the behaviour of the groups. From this the state is born. The state now has the task to which each group performs for its members; monitoring and sanctioning intergroup behaviour so that everyone is contributing their fair share and only allocated the amount due to them. It is this process, however, that leads to the rise of nationalism. The nature of the state means that it will create oppositional groups, that is to say groups that are opposed to the state. These groups may desire either to alter the state's boundaries or its form. These groups will bind themselves and create their sense of solidarity through the use of nationalism; they will posit that they represent the nation against the state.

Hechter sees nationalism is an instrumental strategy that groups can make use of when they desire to break away or capture the state when they believe doing so will improve their own position vis-à-vis the state and other groups (Hechter, 1995: 59-62).[40] This is often directed by local elite groups, who, in the face of a

[40] The story Hechter tells on the creation of the state is similar in some respects to that told by Robert Nozick (1980).

strengthening central state, may launch an oppositional nationalist movement against direct rule in order to maintain their position. Equally, in the face of a declining state, local elites may also launch a nationalist movement, spying an opportunity to increase their power and advance their own interests (Hechter, 2000: 30). This is also made clearer when Hechter's definitions of nationalism are spelt out. Nationalism is "[the] *collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit*" (ibid: 7 [emphasis in original]); the governance unit is then defined as "[the] *territorial unit which is responsible for providing the bulk of social order and other collective goods - including protection from confiscation, justice and welfare - to its members*" (ibid: 9).

The type of nationalism that occurs, then, depends on the situation that exists within the territory, regarding the state, and the situation that exists regarding the groups that wish to form their own movement. One focus of Hechter's work is a desire to understand how negative outcomes emerge from movements, focusing on nationalist movements, particularly outbreaks of violence (Hechter, 1995; 2000b). Because Hechter treats his subjects as rational actors, the manner of containing the negative aspects is clear: there is a need to change the incentive structure of institutions such that the negative aspects do not predominate (Hechter, 2000b: 14-15).

This is the ultimate explanation for order in a global sense in heterogeneous, or what he dubs unimodal, societies that is to say societies which have deviant groups but are distributed around a mean (so there is a sense of their being a singular society rather than multiple ones, as in e.g. the Soviet Union). Global solidarity is produced by the groups keeping an eye on their members and preventing deviations,

whilst the state monitors the groups. The state, so Hechter argues, steps in on groups and deviant individuals when they threaten the state's existence or when they impose too many costs on other groups within the state. (Hechter et al., 1992: 343). Indeed, the state attempting to regulate behaviour on its own could end up being harmful as people would simply become dependent on the state, which has a low-control capacity (ability to monitor) what its citizens are doing. It is better to let the monitoring be handled by the local groups. "Order in heterogeneous national societies is enhanced by the existence of large numbers of relatively small groups that are unable to command control over resources that threaten the unique position of the state" (ibid: 343).

This, of course, is not something that is necessarily unique to nationalism as the same logic is present in other organizations (for instance, empires relied on indirect-rule, which allowed local groups to police themselves to a degree, within a larger group structure, Hechter giving the example of the Ottoman *millets* system (Hechter, 2000: 49)). What is unique for nations is the salience of national identity, that means that people are willing to make sacrifices and work for the larger group in a way that is not quite the same with other forms of group organization (ibid: ch. 6). Though we could imagine that there can be other possible group organizations that people would be willing to make such sacrifices for: religion in times past and present is one that stands out.

To bring this all together and make it explicit; what Hechter is saying is that social change occurs when there is a change in a the institutional structure, such that it alters people's actions based on what it is instrumentally rational for them to do. In case one, individuals need to come together to form groups when there are goods that

they want to obtain but cannot by themselves, which is the origin of societies. In case two, there is a need for groups to gain protections for their members from other groups, in order to be better able to produce, which is the origin of the state. In case three, certain groups decide that they would be better off outside the state's influence, and setting up their own state, which leads to nationalism. In each of these cases of social change, the change happens because what it is rational for a person to do, instrumentally speaking, alters due to the change in the institutional structure; with the creation of new institutions generating new structures that alter agent's actions within them. This is the dynamic between individual's values and structural contexts and constraints (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1992: 193).

With this explanation in place, we can now move on to looking at rational choice and social evolution as general theories and theories of social change.

Social Evolution and Rational Choice

I'll begin this section with some general criticisms of Hechter's argument. This will help to illustrate what some of the general problems are with making a rational choice argument about social change and as a general theory. With that done, I will then move on to arguing how Darwinian social evolutionary theory moves beyond rational-choice theory. Essentially, I will demonstrate that social evolution is the "superior general theory" that can supplant rational choice (Kiser & Hechter, 1998: 811).

Above I outlined some of the problems with the conventional notion of rational choice theory. Hechter's sociological take on it avoids some of these

problems, but not all of them. As Hechter acknowledges one of the blind spots in rational choice theory is that it is not good at specifying what people's values are, or working out what they are (Hechter and Kanazawa, 1992: 208). More needs to be done on correcting this, but it's not entirely clear how it can be done, without just reducing to the sort of generalizing assumptions that, as we will see, Michael Mann uses (1986: 4-5) about people wanting wealth, power and so on in order to secure comforts for themselves, a way of doing things that Hechter elsewhere criticises (Kiser & Hechter, 1991). Hechter doesn't, and doesn't want to, go down the Milton Friedman route and declare that "the assumptions don't matter" and that all that matters is the predictive ability of the theory (Keen, 2001: 149-150), but it does seem hard to avoid the idea that the rationality assumptions can either be made thinner, and render them so general as to be close to vacuous and unfalsifiable (Hodgson, 2015), or make them thicker, but in all likelihood wrong and thus neither generalizable or useful.

A specific problem with this can be seen in Hechter's theory of group solidarity. Essentially the theory is a social contract theory. Normally a social contract theory is setting out what the moral rules or just conditions of society are that should be run, given the principles set up when the contract was drawn. Hechter is, in this instance, taking this premise and using it to explain under what conditions groups will form together, but draws practical lessons from it instead (i.e. under what conditions will a group form, and under what conditions will a group want to split). This becomes problematic, however, because there was almost certainly no human group that formed like this; indeed given humanity’s evolutionary heritage we were likely born into already existing social groups that were merely maintained.

Individuals did not instrumentally decide that we should form a group to obtain a joint good. Likewise the origin of the state is probably not in groups wanting to police one another, but in conquest. Hechter might well respond to this by suggesting that he was talking about specialised, or historically particular, groups, rather than general human groups, but this then becomes illustrative of another problem: that at the moment when the theory needs to be precise, it becomes vague.

For example, in Hechter (1984) he gives an outline of the importance of monitoring to producing social order and then gives specific examples of the types of monitoring that groups can engage in in order to maintain order in the groups. The problem here is that the group that he is examining is factory workers and the strategies that the management can use to ensure that the workers are being as productive as they can be and are doing their jobs (ibid: 164-171). The issue is that factory workers are a special-type of group, in a special type of environment that lends itself easily to the type of monitoring (input, output assessment, agent monitoring) that Hechter discusses. It's not all that clear how well this applies to other groups, though, and Hechter doesn't really demonstrate how he gets from A to B. How would a Church congregation make an input, output assessment? Does a Church group actually perform a type of monitoring? We might say that yes, indirectly, through observation but it’s not at all clear whether this is sufficiently strong to keep people’s behaviours in check. After all, CCTV cameras are constantly observing behaviour, but it doesn’t have much impact on deterring anti-social behaviour (Doctorow, 2011).

This problematically extends into the theory of social change developed itself. Rational choice theory is, to some extent by its nature, focused on equilibrium

which means that it frequently stresses stability over time consequently meaning that it struggles to work with institutional change (Farrell & Shalizi, Un-pub: 3). This is due to the nature of the strategy, which is frequently placed within game theory. Game theory essentially takes the set of strategies that a rational person would use, given a scenario, and plays them out to see which strategy is the dominant one. The dominant strategy is the one that is stable, that is, it cannot be beaten by an alternate strategy (Axelrod, 1984: 56)[41]. An example of this is with the prisoner's dilemma game, where the dominant strategy in a one-shot game is always to 'defect' because it is the only rational option given the scenario. The dominant strategy will thus beat out all of the others, but it also makes it hard to account for how and where change comes from. The strategy, by definition, is stable and thus self-reinforcing.

This is a problem for Hechter as well. Although he does argue that change comes about when an oppositional group arises and sees that it has a better opportunity on its own (Hechter, 1995), the reason why a group would think this is not all that clear. So it is that the theory of group solidarity, based on rational choice, gives an instrumental reason for why individuals might join together to form a group, and then a state, and then why an oppositional group that's large enough might want to break out, but it doesn't quite account for all social change that could happen, or social change that's more endogenously built from a change within the state rather than a break with it.

A final, additional, problem is that it's not clear why some groups originate states and others do not. Hechter's argument is that groups will come together when

[41] The technical term for this is Nash Equilibrium, after John Nash who first proposed it

they require a form of monitoring, with the state being a third, neutral, party that provides this service of adjudication. But the problem here is that this does not offer an explanation for why states arose in some places but not in others. If the need for neutral monitoring is all that's necessary then why did it not occur more generally?

Darwinian social evolution can, however, account for this because of its crucial inclusion of the environment, and the pressures and constraints provided by the external environment, as well as understanding of how particular views, preferences and morals evolve in relation to these constraints (Hodgson, 2015). Carniero (1970) provides an argument for explaining why states arose in some areas and not others and it's largely down to the effect of the ecological environment. In areas where villages were close together and were constrained by their geography, meaning there was nowhere else they could move to, conflict would mean that one village would absorb another, or force it to pay tribute, leading to an accumulation of resources that enabled the creation of a state. However, in areas where land was plentiful but there was no geographic constraint, villages subject to aggression could instead move area, meaning that the aggressor could not gain the extra tribute and resources necessary to found a state. This is a Darwinian social evolutionary explanation in that it the environmental context is providing different selective pressures, which means certain actions are going to be more adaptive than others. In a scenario where villages can up sticks and move away, there's no advantage to putting in the extra resources required for monitoring. In scenarios where they cannot, there are advantages to be had from monitoring and putting together a state.

This points towards what Hechter's account is lacking and, to a degree, what is lacking from rational-choice analysis in general; a means of explaining why the

institutions set up the way they do and how they come to be that way across the society. Institutions arise and change because they demonstrate themselves to be better at coping with certain environmental factors than other forms of doing so. Farrell and Shalizi (un-pub) outline a way in which social evolution accommodates that process of change. To simplify the argument, people have a certain set of beliefs, the manner in which they understand the world that they share with a group but each of these beliefs will be different, sometimes radically different, in some way for each person. This means that there are shared beliefs that can be passed from one person to another, but also that these beliefs can get changed through the process of transmission. Selective retention then means that certain beliefs are likely to stick and spread whereas others will fail to spread, often due to the nature of social structures which will favour certain beliefs over others. This is the mechanism of variation (ibid: 6-7). Following this is the mechanism of selection. When an action is seen to work, or not be punished, then others will adopt it, such that it can become a collective action. Similarly to how a virus might spread, the new actions will become adopted by others and will be institutionalized. This new adoption process alters people's schemas and opens the way to new understandings that can be made and new potential innovations in action. Once an action spreads far enough and becomes newly institutionalized it will then be harder to clamp down on; violence has its limits on the suppression of ideas (ibid: 15-20).

This points towards how some of these issues are resolved under a Darwinian social evolutionary understanding. By allowing for a fluidity between networks, not breaking things into defined groups, it enables an understanding for social change that is less static that the one that Hechter proposes. At least, in this case, the change

does not have to come from something as dramatic as a state being threatened by an oppositional group. Small changes can build up that fundamentally restructure the institutional set, thus change can happen endogenously and without people necessarily functioning with the instrumental rationality that is otherwise supposed.

A stronger criticism of rational-choice theory from a Darwinian social evolutionary perspective comes from Geoffrey Hodgson (2013, 2015). Hodgson argues that rational-choice theory does not do an adequate job of explaining individual's actions. Essentially the self-regarding assumption behind the theory can't explain why people would act kindly towards others and, when it is extended to include other-regarding behaviour, the theory becomes too general and consequently unfalsifiable (Hodgson, 2015). Preferences, which rational-choice theory relies on as explanations for behaviour, are not strong enough and do not account for the fact that people might make decisions that they prefer not to do, but which they feel compelled to do so out of a sense of obligation or morality. Hodgson argues that Darwinism is necessary to explain how particular moral views come about and propagate in a society, and that this offers a more historically grounded account of human behaviour than does rational-choice assumptions (ibid: 103-104).

What these arguments, taken together, demonstrate is that social evolution works as a better "heuristic framework" (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1992: 195) that is generalizable and also groundable by looking at evidence of history and through deductive theorizing. Social evolution provides a general framework under which other mechanisms can be used to provide auxiliary explanations in specific cases (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006a: 15-16). This provides the theory with a greater level of generality and applicability, whilst also meaning it can focus on particularity and

local conditions in specific scenarios. Explicitly adopting the Darwinian social evolutionary perspective helps improve understanding by bringing out the implicit evolutionary thinking within theoretical accounts.

Recall that Hechter's theory of group solidarity states that individuals will come together when they want to produce a joint good, whilst the state arises out of a need to police such interactions. Whilst I have already argued that this account does not explain why states arose in some areas rather than others, it can be said that there is a Darwinian social evolutionary thread running underneath it: the notion of group selection producing heightened solidarity for within group members (Sober & Wilson, 1994; 1998; Choi & Bowles, 2007). To rewrite Hechter's hypothesis, what Hechter is saying is that those groups that have higher solidarity, and are better at policing their members and protecting their group, will be more likely to survive. This accords with the group selection framework, which argues that in scenarios where there is competition between two different groups, the group that is better able to show solidarity with its own members, which is to say clamp down on free-riding, will outcompete a group that does not and is therefore undermined by individuals that do not contribute to their group (Wilson, 1975; Sober & Wilson, 1994).

Multiple groups, after all, have to spring up before a state is required. Other individuals, or smaller groups, might see a larger group doing well and decide to imitate their structures and manner of doing things, the replicators diffusing and being adapted to fit their own local conditions (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010; Speber, 1996). Or there might be a conflict, with a larger group absorbing another group through conflict, or competition, in a selection process taking place on the level of the interactors; but the people within will not necessarily object to the conquest, as

they recognise that with the new authority in place gives them more freedom and safety to perform other actions (Hearn, 2014: 184-187; Carniero, 1970). The reasoning here is deductive and accountable towards historical evidence, and also does not rely on the social contract reasoning that Hechter brings into it, where individuals make an instrumental choice to come together and form a group in order to obtain a desired good. Darwinian social evolution takes out the seeming assumption of far-sighted rationality in Hechter's account and replaces it with a more localised form of it, where choices accumulate over time to produce an institutional set, that then gets imitated and replicated and changed from pressures within the group and through competition between groups, on the basis of its ability to deal with environmental conditions. Rational-choice theory and its assumptions are not required for the explanation and Darwinian social evolution is able explain these transitions as a general theory, but without becoming so general as to become unfalsifiable (Hodgson, 2015).

The Punctuating Powers of Michael Mann

'The state' is not a thing, that it does not, as such, exist. What 'the state' stands for is a number of particular institutions which, together, constitute its reality, and which interact as parts of what may be called the state system.

- Ralph Milliband (1969: 49)

Michael Mann's project is similar, in some ways, to that of Immanuel Wallerstein's: he is seeking to explain why it was that Western Europe came to triumph and dominate much of the world for a period of time. That is, why did Europe have the industrial revolution, become the colonial powers etc. (Anderson, 1990: 60)? Whereas Wallerstein settled on a mostly economic, and partly geographical, explanation, having to do with the differentials of economic growth allowing for exploitation of others, Mann rejected that approach as being too narrow and, instead, settled on the idea that there were multiple sources of social power not just one (Mann, 2010).

Also like Wallerstein Mann's project was originally envisioned as a trilogy, with two volumes making up the historical narrative and with the third being a summation and focus on this theory of power at a theoretical level (Mann, 1986: vii). The trilogy now extends to four volumes (1986, 1993, 2012a, 2012b), with two supplementary volumes (2004, 2005), that really combine to form one volume, with a presumed final one on overarching theory on the way. Whilst the historical sweep of this is breath taking, and rather daunting, it does have a drawback to it in the context of this thesis: the most relevant volume, the final one that would focus on the theory, has not yet been written or published. Consequently the full theoretical

details for the entire project are, essentially, contained within the first thirty pages of volume one. Mann's ideas do have a small pedigree in earlier articles that he wrote (particularly 1984) and he has elaborated further in response of criticisms (2006, 2008). These, then, will form the basis of the discussion in this chapter.

This chapter will proceed as follows; the first section will be a brief overview of Mann's background and how he came to the idea behind the *Sources of Social Power,* followed by an outline of his theory; the second section will then critique Mann's theory from a social evolutionary point of view. Particular attention will be paid to Mann's conceptualization of 'social evolution' and 'history'. I will also draw on criticisms that have been made about Mann's theory and then look at how a social evolutionary perspective can more readily respond to some of these criticisms. This is not covering all of Mann's work and the focus will be primarily on the first volume and the articles he has written. If it at times seems that there is a reliance on secondary sources I beg indulgence; where I am relying on them more I do so with those that Mann has approved as accurate descriptions of what he is doing.

The Sources of Social Power

Mann's work grew in the context of a seminar series that he ran, alongside John Hall and Ernest Gellner, at the LSE in the 1980s which looked into the origins and development of the modern world. As a result of that seminar series, all three would produce 'books of the film', that presented their take on the main concerns of the seminar series, John Hall writing *Power and Liberties* (1985) and Gellner producing *Plough, Sword and Book* (1988), which will be discussed in the next

chapter. Mann produced the first volume of what was meant to be a trilogy but is now projected to be five volumes: *The Sources of Social* Power (Mann, 1986: viii).

One thing to clarify at the start is that Mann, like Wallerstein, is not using 'the world' to mean the world. His concern is not to give a history of power that covers every social and political formation that has ever happened, on every continent, a point that Runciman, (1987) upbraids Mann on, and it's one that we'll return to later (I think Runciman is making a valid point but clumsily).

To the theory itself then. The first thing to address is how Mann understands human nature, which leads to the four sources of power, and how he understands society, which sets out how the four sources of power interact. For Mann humans are:

> Restless, purposive, and rational, striving to increase their enjoyment of the good things of life and capable of choosing and pursuing appropriate means for doing so. Or... enough of them do this to provide the dynamism that is characteristic of human life and gives it a history lacking for other species. These human characteristics... are the original source of power (Mann, 1986: 4).

Mann's outline of these characteristics is fairly general though this is not without reason. He is relying primarily on the notion of instrumental rationality, that people are motivated by the desire to achieve a goal, alongside a broad understanding of structural and cultural conditions and human motivations (Kiser, 2006: 66). Alongside this there is a focus on unintended consequences, mistakes and imperfect information and the influence these can have. Generally speaking he keeps the specification of goals at a largely general level, as seen in the above quote ("increase their enjoyment of the good things in life") rather than making a priori specifications (ibid: 62-63).

His view of society follows from this. Mann sees society is an unhelpful concept; the notion of society implies something that is rigid, unitary or that is a totality. Instead societies are "constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power" (Mann, 1986: 1). Mann is essentially rejecting the notion that 'society' can be without difficulty associated with another concept, for example a 'nation-state'. He has the same issue with the ideas of culture being unitary, or national, alongside transnational economic relations, that use capitalism as a master concept. For Mann these are all separate things that interrelate with one another, though they rarely coincide (ibid: 2). This points towards how Mann then comes to understand 'societies' and 'civilizations'. Societies are "limited and exclusive in their social and territorial coverage" and "members of a society interact with one another but not, to anything like the same extent, with outsiders" (ibid: 39). Neither are societies solely the sum of the different powers of individuals and their powers, rather they are "*federations of organizations*" (ibid: 52 [emphasis in original]).

Earlier societies are, however, more fluid than later ones. That is the social bonds that held people together were generally looser and so people could move about more freely than they would in later societies, joining different groups (ibid: 39). However, later on, with the arrival of stratification and the state, or essentially the arrival of civilization (ibid: 73-74), what Mann terms the 'social cage' closes. This social cage comes about with a jump in "human collective power over nature", focused around states that emerged next to major rivers (e.g. the Nile), that made intensive agriculture possible, but it comes with a fixing of social and territorial boundaries, hence it becoming a cage (ibid: 38). Once it closes there are not the same

free movement of people from one society to another as their identities start to fix and they start to settle within defined territories, that the growth of the state presides over.

This is the beginnings of Mann's theory. From the first, human motivation, he derives what becomes the four sources of social power, as they all arise to fulfil a human need or to accomplish a goal. The second describes how 'societies' form out of the interaction and overlap of the social relations from those four main powers.

According to Mann there are four sources of social power: Ideological, Economic, Military and Political. Together they form what he terms the IEMP model (Mann, 1986: 2). Mann's theory forms a part of the tradition of 'conflict theory', growing out of a fusing of Marx and Weber, that advances the idea that conflicting social interests best explains social change. The IEMP model is an expansion on class conflict theory (Collins, 2006: 19-20). The key, and original, innovation that Mann made was in splitting political power into two parts: political and military, giving military power a distinct formulation as a form of power apart from the others and as a force in social change (ibid: 21). As this splitting has caused much harrumphing in certain quarters I will be addressing it first, before detailing the others. Before that, though, I'll outline Mann's reasoning for the four sources of social power.

The Four Powers

The four sources of power are:

1) **Ideological:** Ideological power takes three forms: 1) meaning, a set of concepts and categories used to understand the world (e.g. religion); 2) norms, a shared understanding of how people should behave normally to create social cohesion (e.g. etiquette); and 3) aesthetic/ritualistic practices that are not reducible to rational science (e.g. fox hunting). Ideological organization then comes in two forms: 1) transcendent, where the ideology transcends existing institutions and generates a different 'sacred' form of authority distinct from secular authority; and 2) immanent morale, ideology that intensifies existing beliefs, confidence and power of an existing group (Mann, 1986: 22-24).

Mann clarifies that ideology does not necessarily mean 'false', indeed he makes the case that though ideologies by their nature necessarily "surpass experience" (in which lies its persuasive power, that it can't be falsified), ideologies with a grain of truth to them will be more successful as they will spread better (ibid: 23). I would dispute this point a little: it's not the case that ideologies have to have a grain of truth to them, but rather that people *believe* that there is some truth to it. Oftentimes this occurs by appeal to common sense, or between connecting two things that are unrelated but sound as though they could be. Of course the other means of spreading a 'false' idea is simply through sheer bloody-minded repeating of it.

2) **Economic:** Economic power revolves around the need to satisfy subsistence needs through the extraction, transformation, liberation and so on of objects from nature. A group that forms around these tasks is for Mann, in a purely economic sense divorced from political implications, a class. A class can then come to monopolize control over production, distribution, exchange and consumption and

so become the dominant class in social stratification and have general collective and distributive powers in society (ibid: 24). Organizationally this refers to the circuits of praxis, that is the intensive practical everyday labour, that lead to the extensive circuits of exchange - in these two forms economic organization controls intensive and extensive power and groups defined in relation to this are class groups (ibid: 25).

3) **Military:** This source of power is the intensive and extensive aspects of the necessity for physical defence and the usefulness of aggression. The organization of it centres on the concentrate-coercion type that, in its intensive form, allows for the coercion of a population to following laws, working etc. whilst in extensive form it allows for the extraction of tribute from nearby areas through the threat of reprisals. It mobilises violence (ibid: 25-26). Mann has, as we will see below, modified this definition slightly (Mann, 2006: 351-354), which takes it slightly further away from the current definition, which would allow for an easier confusion between political and military powers. Under the new definition Mann is focusing much more on the actual violence, rather than the purpose it serves, and how that can in itself have important consequences.

4) **Political:** Political power derives from the usefulness of territorialized, centralized administrative systems - basically it is state power. Unlike the other powers political power is not diffuse over a territory, it is concentrated in one central area from which its power is exercised outwards. Organizationally political power is dual: it has an inward and an outward face. Inwardly it is concerned with internal politics, depending on new techniques and the emergent possibilities from social life to facilitate greater cooperation or exploitation. Outwardly is geopolitics, where the concern is with the relation to other states and diplomacy. This has impacts on the

internal structure of the state, but is not reducible to that internal structure. Geopolitical organizations then take on two types: 1) hegemonic empires (presumably when politics combines with military power); and 2) multistate civilizations (likewise, presumably, with ideology and economics) (ibid: 26-27).

Adapting a metaphor from Max Weber, Mann writes that the four sources of power are "track laying vehicles", laying different gauges of track along a path down which society will trundle. The moments when a new track is 'laid' are the moments when the issue of primacy can be best addressed; that is when it can be examined why a particular power laid down that particular bit of track that took societies in a particular direction (ibid: 28). If I may, I would somewhat hubristically suggest that this still doesn't quite capture it, in the sense that the track laying vehicles still sound separate from one another. It might be better to describe it as a car, barrelling along the terrain, where each of the powers are a person inside. One will be driving (the prime), one in shotgun (the main supporter, assistant navigator), whilst the two at the back will chip in. At various points they might change positions, so that a new power drives and another navigates and this changes the direction that the car moves in. Whilst this has the slight disadvantage of implying that there are directions they are going to, rather than building things themselves, I think it captures better the interaction between the networks, and those networks are still choosing the direction to go in, the same as in the track laying metaphor.

What, then, is the criticism of Mann's division into four sources of power? The split centres on the principal idea that military power and political power should not be seen as two separate sources of power, but rather they should come under the same heading of political power. The criticism of the split is covered briefly by

Runciman (1987) and more fully spelled out by Poggi (2006). The argument is that Mann is confusing "the different forms of power (that is, the different kinds of inducements and sanctions which people can bring to bear on one another) with the different means of doing so (that is, the different institutions through which those inducements and sanctions are applied)" (Runciman, 1987). By splitting them, Mann is essentially removing a vital component at the heart of political power and so rendering that concept toothless (Poggi, 2006: 137-136).

Runciman's criticism can be dealt with first. Runciman is accusing Mann of failing to distinguish between forms of power and the means of using those powers. This is substantively true, however Mann would likely not view this as a criticism, as he is blurring the distinction intentionally. The key for Mann is in looking at the way that power is organized and the networks that it operates through. It is all well and good having a form of power, but it is no use to anyone, most of all the person wielding it, if they don't have a way of applying it. For that reason, in order to understand what forms there are, there has to be an understanding of the organizations and means of power that exist. More simply Runciman is arguing that Mann should extrapolate means from forms, whereas Mann is making the case for the reverse.

There are, in essence, two parts to Mann's sources of power: that each one is a network and these networks overlap and interact with one another (Mann, 1986: 2). The networks connect different areas to one another and though they have their own domains of responsibility, as it were, they are always overlapping and supporting one another (Schroeder, 2006: 5). The networks are 'containers' which action happens through (ibid). The term containers is Schroeder's and it works as a decent way of

understanding the concept, though one point to make is that container implies something more rigid than the networks actually are: they are capable of expanding and contracting depending on differing conditions (Mann, 1986: 30). Each mode of power has a differing "means of organization" (ibid). The element of organization is crucial for Mann - the power, after all, cannot act or have force if the logistics are not there to apply it, or the institutions are not there. There is, in essence, a technological or material limit to what power can do and what it can command (ibid: 9-10). With this there are two types of power: extensive and intensive. Extensive refers to the ability to organize large numbers of people over large territories; intensive power to the ability to organize and command a high-degree of mobilization and commitment from the participants, whether in a large or small area (ibid: 7).

This is the point that Runciman's (1987) criticism misses: that power operates through networks, with the size and shape of the networks being determined by what is logistically and technologically possible in that era. A form, or source, of power can only exist in so far as it can operate on people, which requires it to have a means of operation. Thus it is, that the means of power, "the institutions through which inducements and sanctions are applied" to use Runciman's terms, dictate what the forms are, and the means are, in turn, dictated by what technologically a society would be capable of and logistically capable of. The extent of a state’s power, for example, would increase dramatically with the invention of trains, planes and missiles as its striking reach becomes much larger and time it takes to strike becomes much shorter than when soldiers would have to march (Mann, 1986: 26).

This is also the underlying thread behind Mann's separation of political and military power that frustrates Poggi (2006). Poggi concedes that there are a few

empirical circumstances where military power can and should be treated as different from political power, but that these are instances, essentially, where the exception proves the norm (2006: 135-136). The concern for Poggi is that separating military power from political power renders the state weak as a concept. Essentially taking a Weberian approach Poggi argues that large and complex, modern states, only hold together because of coercion or the potential for it; this is the only means by which laws and political decisions get enforced and the way in which disputes get settled between parties (ibid: 136-137). Whilst Mann, in separating out military power, is talking about the driving force that militaries have had Poggi argues that Weber is making the point, and that he is following, that force is necessary for the domestic running of the state, making it a political matter (ibid: 140). Quoting Popitz he asserts "There is no social order based on the premise that violence does not exist" (ibid: 138). The first thing to note in this is that although Mann treats politics and military power as being separate organizations of power this does not mean that they are *separate.* Indeed the whole point behind Mann's treating them as interacting networks is to show how the various powers connect together and support and reinforce one another (whilst also allowing for the possibility that they can break apart and go against each other).

In his response to this Mann reflects on why there is a difference between political and military power. He makes a correction to his original formulation, noting that he originally defined military power as "the social organization of physical force in the form of concentrated coercion" but would now revise that definition to "*the social organization of concentrated lethal violence*" arguing that it better covers what he means by military power as being "focused, physical, furious,

lethal violence" (Mann, 2006: 351 [emphasis in original]). He proceeds to make the point that military power is distinct from political power as political power is usually rule by rules, that is the shame and consequence of breaking a law and being in jail, rather than the generalised terror that comes from angry people with guns shooting at you or firebombing the city you're in. He clarifies as well that military power does not mean 'armies' or 'state armies' but rather covers all paramilitary groups that use violence and force to advance their aims. Keeping with this he points to the fact that military forces tend to have their own distinct forms of internal organization, combining hierarchical authority and comradeship amongst the soldiers (ibid: 352-354). Military and political power often combine, but they are normally in their separate castes, with distinct groupings (ibid: 355). As I pointed out above the fact that they are separate networks does not mean that they don't group together and interact with one another; frequently military and politics goes together but also frequently they can diverge, or military can join to another political network (as was the case, for example, in the coup against Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973).

These are the two key points to take away about how Mann understands power: that the four sources are distinct, but overlapping and interacting, networks; and that each network of power has a distinct form of organization. The ability of the network to act as a power is based on its ability to logically and technologically achieve its aims.

This done it is now time to consider another aspect: namely that of the role of the state and the dialectic between the state and civil society.

The State and Civil Society

In an earlier article (Mann, 1984) Mann sets out his view on the state, its functions and its relations to civil society. Broadly conceived this was, at the time of writing the article, that the state covered 'political power', whilst civil society covered everything else (Mann has modified, or clarified, this distinction in future writings, cf. Mann, 2006). In setting out his argument Mann was seeking to understand the autonomous power of states: where had it come from and why? He argued that the state's autonomous power is a function of what it is, namely an arena for differing views to fight it out (Mann, 1984: 185, 187). Mann defines the state along Weberian lines, that is in both institutional terms (states can be recognised by the central location of the institutions that make them up) and in functional terms (states are defined by what they do - in this case by having a monopoly on rule making) (ibid: 188). What then is the nature of the power possessed by the state? There are two senses of state power: despotic and infrastructural power (ibid: 188-189).

Despotic power is the ability of the state elite to undertake actions without referring to civil society groups, or without having to negotiate with them. Infrastructural power is the power of the state to penetrate into civil society and to implement its policies through civil society groups. It coordinates the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure, which is the source of its power (ibid; 188-190). The match is not perfect but these could probably be described along the more conventional lines of power over and power to, respectively and there is a resemblance to Gramsci's notion of hegemony in Mann's conception of infrastructural power. The type of state can then be categorised based on the type of power they wield and the strength of that power:

Feudal Society: Despotic power is low; infrastructural power is low.

Imperial Society: Despotic power is high; infrastructural power is low.

Bureaucratic Society: Despotic power is low; infrastructural power is high.

Authoritarian Society: Despotic power is high; infrastructural power is high (ibid: 191).

In a later paper, however, Mann notes that he would prefer to modify the names he gives. Authoritarian societies, after all, have bureaucracies, sometimes larger than those in the labelled 'bureaucratic' society; and bureaucratic societies have more going for them than just that. For this reason he modifies 'bureaucratic' to 'democratic' or 'multipolity regime'; and 'authoritarian' is modified to 'single-party regime' (Mann, 2006: 356-357). Mann points out that infrastructural power and despotic power are slightly different in another sense: there has been a developmental trend to infrastructural power, that is it has grown and changed over years, whereas despotic power does not have a developmental trend - it is either there or it is not (Mann, 1984: 192). Obviously a reason for this is that infrastructural power is a spectrum; there can either be a lot of it or there can be virtually none of it. Despotic power, on the other hand, is an absolute. Either a state or a person has the total power to command what they wish and when they wish it or they do not. There's no real middle group, or else the power is not absolute and not despotic.

There is a dialectical process between the state and civil society. State inventions are not, after all, the property of the state, any more than those of civil society are the exclusive property of civil society. Various techniques that the state uses to bolster itself, and its despotic power, such as the invention of literacy, feeds

through into civil society whose groups can then use for their own ends, which has the result of eventually undermining the state's power and so loosening its despotic grasp. The reverse is also true; when civil society pioneered techniques of industrialism this could be appropriated by the state to bolster their own power, as happened with the Soviet Union (ibid: 193-194).

The state's origins are to be found, so Mann argues, in its necessity. That is, once societies reach a certain size and complexity, they begin to need an institution that can set rules, for property rights, laws etc. that are set monopolistically and are protected. This is the province of the state, as the arbitrator of the rules and the enforcer of them and the source of its autonomy and its power (ibid: 195-196). This, then, reinforces the importance of Mann splitting the political and the military realm from one another. For Mann the modern state emerges out of military revolutions in early modern times; both externally in terms of geopolitics but also internally, on the infrastructure that is developed to support the military forces. As the state takes on administrative and tax-extracting powers it then becomes a target for politically motivated groups to take over and put to their own uses. In other words, politics emerges out of military power (Collins, 2006: 22).

The state, as it came into existence, resulted from the usefulness to social life and dominant social groups of having a central and territorial administrative organization (Mann, 1986: 125). Civilization was an "abnormal phenomenon", the result of a specific set of conditions that meant that such organization was no longer avoidable, having to do with the build-up of populations and territorial constraint. When this occurred there was a 'caging' into a particular set of relationships with

those who were under the administrative and territorial reach of the state (ibid: 124-125).

A final concept to cover is that of 'interstitial emergence', a process that Mann uses to describe how a new society can emerge from the cracks of the old one (ibid: 15-16). Essentially, through the pursuit of their goals, humans create different organizations that are manifestations of differing sources of social power. As they build up, one of the powers begins to lead and, for example, create a despotic society. But, as already discussed, the innovations of this society bleed out, going to other parts of the society and other societies. This eventually leads to another organization of differing networks of power, which builds up and then emerges out and supplants the old society, as the old society becomes "less adaptable to change circumstances". And then the cycle begins again. This is the process behind the dialectic between state and civil society, and also behind the dialectic between empires of domination and multi-actor civilizations (ibid: 537). This is part of what leads to Mann's neo-episodic view of history, that essentially social change happens in "spurts" through a number of key, fundamental, structural transformations (ibid: 3). It also sounds similar to another concept: punctuated equilibrium. We'll return to this in a moment.

That, in sum, covers the outline of Mann's theory, if not the detailed exposition of it, which is very extensive. In the next section we will cover Mann’s conceptualization of social evolution and history, with a view to noting that the distinction is perhaps not as large as he thinks. Following this there will be a discussion of some criticisms before the final section where this will be taken together alongside an examination of what a specifically social evolutionary view can take from Mann's theory.

Social Evolution or History?

This section will outline Mann's criticisms of social evolutionary theory, and what he posits against it in his own theory of history. Here I'll make a brief note that Mann has, recently, reengaged in more depth with social evolutionary theory in his article "Have Human Societies Evolved? Evidence from History and pre-History" (2016). I will return to this article later in this section, as it comes after Mann's book was written so what's in there doesn't substantively affect the argument being developed.

Mann, in volume one of the *Sources of Social Power* (1986: ch. 2) notes that human evolution differs from that other species: namely that humans, despite the fact that they have spread across the whole of the globe, have retained their unity. There has not been a speciation event as evolved activities from one local population have diffused to others. Consequently, the story of human evolution is a story of cultural evolution (ibid: 35). On this point I am happy to agree.

The difference arrives, however, in how Mann conceptualizes social evolution. He writes (ibid: 36),

> All the rival theories of the rise of stratification and the state presuppose an essentially natural process of general social development…Their central orthodoxy continues to be a story of stages: from relatively egalitarian stateless societies; to rank societies with political authority; and eventually to stratified, civilized societies with states…

As Mann sees it this story is true, but only up to a point. Up to the Neolithic Revolution, inclusive, there was what he terms 'general social evolution', that is a cumulative process that was heading through stages and this was happening across

much of the world. After this point, however, the influence of evolution diminishes and eventually disappears and is replaced by a cyclical process instead, whereby there is movement around rank societies and state and stratification structures, but without permanent movement towards the latter (ibid: 39). This, for Mann, is the build-up and subsequently there is a "*history* of power. It will always be a history of particular places, for that has been the nature of the development of power" (ibid: 40).

Mann, here, is understanding evolution as traditionally done in sociology, namely in the stadial and progressive sense (Bhambra, 2011). His critiques, however, don't quite apply to the Darwinian understanding social evolution as being a process of variation, inheritance and selection in a competition for resources does not imply any kind of general tendency or pattern, nor does it mean that there are set stages that societies go through. It would not even contradict the notion of a cyclical process, as environmental changes could well see a society swap between two forms of organizing structure depending on which was the more adaptive.

It is also possible to point to cases in Mesoamerica, the Maya, Aztec and Inca, to see cases where civilization structures that Mann holds to be particularistic invention sprung up, to our knowledge, independently, which would seem to imply that this developmental path "might be more general and less particular than Mann implies" (Hearn, 2014: 182). Similarly, it's worth noting that the notion of particularistic effects does not discount social evolution. This misunderstanding is due to Mann's misunderstanding of what social evolution is. As Hearn says, "[e]volution tries to define some general parameters within which particular

processes take place. But unique, particularistic events, that send evolutionary developments along a particular path, are an integral part of the theory" (ibid: 183).

An example we might consider here is the Minoan civilization. It was, at one point, one of the strongest civilizations in the Mediterranean, with an enormous fleet and commands over the trade-routes making it very rich. However, it was unfortunate enough to have its capital based on the island of Crete, which was near the island of Santorini. Some 3,500 years ago the volcano Thera erupted on the island and virtually wiped out the whole of the Minoan civilization, destroying their fleet and wrecking large portions of their cities. Although they survived their power was dramatically weakened and they never recovered from the blow. This is an example of a unique event, an external shock, or a case of drift (Godfrey-Smith, 2009: 27), where bad luck effected the process. The Minoan's were, subsequently, unable to adapt to the sudden change that virtually wiped them out, and this failure enabled the rise of Phonecian and Greek civilization. Had Thera not erupted it is probable that the Greek city-states would not have risen to the prominence that they did, and we would never have had any stories about Atlantis[42] (Whipps, 2008).

Likewise Mann also makes a comment, when talking about the different ways in which ruling powers have dealt with institutionalizing class conflict, that "evolutionary tales are wrong. There is no best way of institutionalizing class conflict in industrial society" (Mann, 1987: 340). Again, this may be true of the evolutionary theory that Mann is criticizing, but it does not characterize all of them. Darwinian social evolutionary theory would, after all, posit that there would be no one best way,

[42] Legend has it that Plato based his story of Atlantis, in the *Criticas*, on the Minoans.

as every environment, that is composition of class groups, alongside economic, political, cultural background etc., would be different and would, consequently, require a different 'best' solution. Indeed the locus of the project is not in identifying the superiority of a successor form to a previous form, but in explaining and demonstrating why it was better suited to the environment (Spruyt, 1994a: 24). Variation is the watch-word of evolution, not uniformity. In this sense Mann's own theory is perhaps more evolutionary than he realises.

In his 2016 article Mann revisits some of these arguments and addresses them in more depth. He distinguishes between three sets of social evolutionary theory, a minimalist theory, a multilinear theory and a general theory of evolution. His basic view is that the first, the minimalist theory that says that people respond to pressures and adapt, is likely true but trivial and places too much force on external pressures and does not grant enough to endogenous potential of people (Mann, 2016: 205). It also suffers from the risk of being tautological. The second, multilinear view, says that different groups have different trajectories, but this places too much emphasis on the boundedness of groups and limits the ability to create a general evolutionary theory (ibid: 206). The general theory is problematic as there can be no sort of general theory that takes in and applies to everything: to demonstrate this social evolutionists would have to show how one part flows into the next. Sociology, Mann says, “is not that simple” (ibid: 234). The question of the tautological nature has been dealt with before so I won’t elaborate on that further. What is worth saying is that, in this, Mann still appears to be conceiving of the idea that social evolution requires stages and needs to be progressing towards something (greater complexity is the example picked out (ibid: 206-207)). However, this need not be the case.

He points to the fall of Rome and then the fact that the writings of Sun Tzu are still used by military generals as examples against evolution (ibid: 221). His suggestion is that this is indicative a cyclical process rather than an evolutionary one. But this is not so. The evolutionary process does not say that there is always forward momentum, or progress towards something: it merely says that what is successful in a particular environment will be selected for. In this case the fact that the writings of Sun Tzu are still used does not speak to a lack of progress, but rather to the adaptability of the writings themselves: generals of today can still find applicable insights from them, so they are still used. The same could be said of almost any idea, or philosophy, that survives. But what insights generals of today get out of it are likely to be different from those of 5 B.C.E. China. That is an interaction between the individual and the ideas. But it is not in itself anti-evolutionary. As Hutchinson (2005) has pointed out, many ideas, myths, symbols etc. are revived, or returned to, as people seek inspiration and sometimes these can help. If they can, they get selected. If not they die out and some other idea, either old or new, is adopted.

Mann argues that the minimalist level of social evolutionary theory, broadly the one being defended here, is "trivial" (Mann, 2016: 203). And yes it might well be considered that. However it is tempting to reply, adapting Shakespeare, that "some ideas are born trivial, some become trivial and some have triviality thrust upon them".

In short, Mann's distinction between social evolution and history is not as clear-cut as he makes out. Indeed, when he states "They [states] lacked sufficient caging resources…where those resources developed this was the result of local sets of circumstances" (Mann, 1986: 69), he is in fact describing a social evolutionary

process. Social evolution deals with local environmental circumstances and pressures, not global or general ones.

I will return to this point, about the implicit evolutionary reasoning in Mann's thesis, at the end of this chapter. Next I will discuss some of the criticisms that have been made of Mann's theory and how a social evolutionary view would look at them.

Criticisms

In this section I will look at two major criticisms: the limited nature of his comparative scope, focusing mainly on Europe; and the fact that he appears to often downplay the importance of ideology.

The question of comparison first. Runciman (1987) and Anderson (1990: 60) both note that Mann ignores other developments elsewhere, particularly in China. Mann is dismissive of this criticism, arguing that it was never his intention to do a history of the whole world or a comparative exercise (Mann, 1987). His view, essentially, is that his historical method allows him to develop out points and examine details in the leading powers that bring a better understanding (ibid). After all, regardless of what the whys and how's of it all were, it is true that Europe came to dominate the world historically. Mann's view is that his study, whilst Eurocentric, does contain enough comparison within it to explain the utility of the four sources of social power.

The view Mann outlines is that a wider comparative case is not available for studying the problem he's looking at, largely because Europe does not "have enough autonomous, analogical cases" (Mann, 1986: 503). Basically that there are not

enough comparative cases of the developmental type that he is looking at that can be compared against. No other society other that Europe went through this process, so there is no case to compare and contrast against. For this reason he opts for the next method available, which his historical narrative.

I do, however, think there is something to this criticism, even if Runciman's (1987) delivery of it was a bit garbled. Essentially what I take Runciman to be saying is this: that there are two tasks that face any theory that is purporting to be an explanatory and understanding one. The first challenge is 'can the theory explain and understand what happened'? That is, perhaps, the historical question. The second question then runs as 'can the theory explain why something that *could have happened, didn't happen*'? That, perhaps, could be called the comparative/speculative question. And it's a tricky one to meet, though I would not suggest that Mann's theory could not meet it. Indeed his section responding to those who criticise his lack of comparative analysis proves that, when he wants to, Mann can do comparative analysis as well as anyone else (Mann, 2006: 370-384).

The point that those who criticise the lack of a wider comparative analysis in Mann's study are making is that without some kind of comparison there is no real way to decide what it actually was that led to the 'European miracle'. That is without some way of seeing whether or not other places, societies, coalitions of social relations and power networks etc. had the same things going for them or not there cannot be a judgement about how crucial a development was. As Goldstone (2006: 272-276) argues China was, in many respects, keeping pace with Europe until very late in the day, in most of the important areas that matter, and Europe did not fully pull away until around the nineteenth-century, and that this difference cannot be

explained by simply noting the fact that China had more extensive power than intensive and Europe, or specifically Britain, had the reverse. Mann, though, disputes some of this argument (see his response 2006: 370-384); the basic thrust of his argument is that although China enjoyed similar living standards to Europe until around the mid-eighteenth century at that point China stagnated and Britain took off, due to a cumulation resulting from a combination of the four sources of social power.

Mann does engage in an explicitly comparative exercise when he looks at other world religions, including Confucianism, Islam and with a main focus on Hinduism (Mann, 1986: 341-363). I do not know enough about either Islam or Hinduism to comment on those sections but, with regard to China, it is worth noting that Mann states that for his understanding of Confucianism's relation to the Chinese Empire he is following Weber's *The Religion of China* (1951). This, however, is somewhat problematic as Weber's own understanding of Confucianism and its relation to the empire was partial: he relied on the classical texts of Confucius and others, who predated the Han unification in around 200 B.C., descriptions of the establishment and early years of the Ming dynasty, established in 1368, accounts by nineteenth-century travellers, missionaries and other authorities on contemporary China and he, essentially, took the similarity between the accounts to be an indication that not much had changed in the meantime. Likewise Weber also relied on works of Confucian scholars from the 1600s and 1700s, who had a great interest in downplaying the roles played by other religions, particularly Buddhism, in the history of China (Collins, 1986: 58-59).

Whilst this does not affect most of the general and brief comments that Mann makes on the relation, other than leading to the somewhat strange statement that

Taoism was only a small cult, despite its evident power and influence in the history of China (Bryant, 2006: 96), but it should give some pause. Particularly it might lead to the belief that Confucianism was more secure amongst the elites and more ideologically secure than it was at points. In the reign of Zhu Di (1402-1424) the Confucians' power was considerably diminished in favour of the eunuchs, the administrators who ran the Imperial court, and, indeed, the Confucian ideology proved remarkably flexible; despite Confucius being against trade, fairly explicitly, passages were found by the Confucian scholars at court that showed support for it when the Emperor wished to send out his Dragon Fleet[43] (cf. Levathes, 1994 for the fascinating history of that period).

Bringing this back to the central point; the limited comparative element is an issue. Whilst the historical method that Mann employs works for his purposes there is a wider need to be able to understand why it is that other places, with similar developments, did not arrive at the same destinations. A challenge to theory is to be able to explain this, and Mann does point to some areas in his response where his own can (Mann, 2006). But a more filled out excursion on it would be useful, both for establishing the respective importance's of the sources of social power and whether it is the case that there is no primacy amongst them. It also points in a similar direction to the criticism of Wallerstein, of Mann being too onotogenic and Eurocentric in focus. A broadened scope, incorporating the greater connections

[43] This may, of course, simply point to something about all ideologies; those with explicit and easy to understand guidelines on dos and don'ts are not necessarily going to be ones that proliferate amongst rulers. After all there may come a time when a ruler needs to break with doctrine, for either honourable or base motives. It could be contended, then, that the most successful ideologies will be those that contain contradictions and fuzziness within them, or at least those that contain enough to muddy the waters when necessary.

between places (Subrahmanyam, 1997) would arguably improve the strength of his argument, as it would show the greater connections and networks between the four powers. As Subrahmanyam (1997: 759-761) there was a spread, across Eurasia, as far as South East Asia, in the 15th to 16th century of millenarial beliefs, that the world would be coming to an end with the new millennium. This was a powerful ideological motive, across portions of the world, but the connection can only be explained by looking at the way ideas are transmitted, via other networks (in this case most likely through trade, so political and economic power joined).

The second large criticism is that Mann does not place as much weight as he should on ideological power. Some of this is misplaced, in the sense that Mann's view of networks and power means that he is interested in the real world effects of ideology (which in many cases tends to rest on the notion that they create a sense of social cohesion (Mann, 1986: 22-23) and less so in the subjective effects of the ideology on the people who hold them (Bryant, 2006: 87). Some of it, however, is on point, particularly the other side of the coin that there should be an explanation for why certain ideologies resonated with people (ibid). After all explaining why an ideology resonated with people is surely a crucial part of the component in explaining how it obtained power and influence in the first place.

One of Mann's focuses is on the role that Christianity played as a transcendent ideology. Essentially his claim is that Christianity solved some of the contradictions caused by the Roman Empire and that it proved to be transcendent as a result of its universal appeal, and thus crossed various boundaries and was part of the glue which helped to create a European civilization (Mann, 1986: 337-338). It emerged interstitially, on the back of achievements of economic, military and

political power, namely those of literacy and networks of trade through which it could spread (ibid: 363-364). It then had a resulting power in creating an immanent, intensive, morale that helped to motivate the believers and craft new societies (ibid: 367).

Bryant (2006: 88-92) however criticises this story by pointing out that Christianity's growth pattern was very uneven, going against the idea of it being universally accepted and it having a rapid early growth. Likewise Christianity did not really solve the contradictions of empire: it had its own internal problems and tensions and could not really be construed as being egalitarian, universalist or civilizing (at least at the outset). Also, he points to the fact that the bursts in membership to Christianity occurred following the Decian Persecution (around 250 A.D.) and Constantine's conversion in 312 (ibid: 91). This is, perhaps, Bryant pointing to the fact that to account for the success of its spread in a way that pairs with the historical information it is necessary to have an understanding of ideology and is persuasive power from a subjective perspective, rather than just in looking at how it affects things as in Mann's view.

Another criticism comes from Hobson (2006: 162-164) who, alongside criticising Mann for having a realist view of geopolitics, also points to the fact that Mann does not use ideology as effectively as he could for understanding changing beliefs. Hobson, essentially, points to Mann's realist perspective as a way in which he traps himself into the belief that people are all the same throughout time, that they have the same goals, so we need not concern ourselves with looking at how society and culture can influence and change people's goals in different time periods. Hobson argues that, were Mann to take a more social constructionist perspective, he

would see how ideology can come to change people's behaviour by changing what they consider to be of value and the goals that they have.

Mann accepts that he has not paid enough attention to the emotional content of ideology, often treating it as too rationalistic a framework particularly with regards to Christianity (Mann, 2006: 345-346). However he rejects most of Hobson's criticisms, regarding him as not quite gathering that his theory, and all his networks, are all part materialist and part idealist in content - that is they all have ideas behind them but they all need to work through something in order to have influence (ibid: 346). And, as previously mentioned, Mann defines goals in a very general way and it's doubtful whether those general goals have changed much throughout history (Kiser, 2006: 66). Hobson's critique is also problematic in the sense that there is no real way of knowing whether people's goals and desires have changed over time and it would be problematic to generalize any theory where this was a core assumption.

A Darwinian Social Evolutionary View

I want to begin this section by first looking at the work of Dinxing Zhao (2013), who takes on Mann's IEMP theory, but reformulates elements of it and changes some emphases. Zhao's main difference with Mann's model is the emphasis he places on competition as the driving influence (Zhao, 2013: 33). Whereas Mann, so Zhao argues, defines the four sources in relation to their function, Zhao instead sees them as particular sites of competition, giving more emphasis to "the patterned behavior of *social actors*" (ibid [emphasis in original]). Humans "are competitive and conflict-prone animals who compete individually and collectively for dominance

via political, military, ideological, and economic means" (ibid: 10). In his account of the difference between the development trajectories of Europe and China, Zhao (2013: 12-15) places an emphasis on the way competition developed in the respective environments: in Europe there was a plurality of actors and, consequently, the military and political conflicts between them lead to greater development of economic power to try and find ways to out-compete the other polities. In China, by contrast, after the Qin's rise and fall, the Western Han dynasty created what he dubs the 'Confucian-Legalist state', that fused political and ideological power, made use of military power and marginalized economic power. This arrangement had the effect of stabilizing the system, and making it so that any would-be conqueror or usurper would adopt the system, but also prevented development of industrial capitalism as in Europe (ibid: 16).

Zhao argues that competition operates on the cultural level, and that he understands the dynamics of culture to follow Lamarckian processes (ibid: 29). However, as Hodgson & Knudsen (2010: 75) point out, Lamarckism is incomplete and cannot work without Darwinism, having to rely on the concept of selection in order to be able to explain why certain characteristics persist over others, a position that was actually supported by Herbert Spencer, who however inverted its meaning to argue that Lamarckism was a general theory of evolution, over Darwin's 'special case' (Bannister, 1979: 44-45). Lamarckian processes, as they exist, are therefore also Darwinian in character.

Zhao provides a jumping off point for discussing the way in which Darwinian social evolution approaches these questions. The division of the powers, as Mann understands it, is I think very valuable and I am in agreement with his view that

political and military power should be separated, as I believe that this is a useful analytical distinction. However, I believe that Zhao is right in specifying that there needs to be an emphasis on the four powers as sites of competition, as this provides a greater analytic power and avoids running into the problem that Zhao (2013: 34) criticizes in Mann, of his accounts failing to specify how history unfolds and changes from one state to another. My view is that Darwinian social evolution provides the frame for understanding these competitions and why certain power configurations occur in particular places and contexts.

First, it's worth drawing on a theoretical link between Mann's concept of interstitial emergence and punctuated equilibrium. Mann's concept is that new societies emerge out of old ones, when pressures from within build-up to a level that allows one of the powers to take the lead from a combination of the others. Thematically this is quite close to what punctuated equilibrium asserts, particularly with ideas of relative stasis followed by some rapid change emerging out of the previously static formation[44]. Punctuated equilibrium, to give a fuller explanation, is the idea that evolution does not proceed by a gradual, on-going, development but rather proceeds by rapid bursts followed by periods of relative stasis (Gould, 2007: 242-243). The rapid changes occur for a variety of reasons. Typically what is happening is that there is a 'wobbling' around a mean, some small differences here and there but nothing wholly different (Sterelny, 2001: 76). There is a build-up of potential, but without any directional change. Subsequently there is then a point where the change rapidly occurs, either due to an endogenous change that makes an

[44] Of course when I say 'static' this is in relative terms, small changes are always occurring but just not in any given direction. When the punctuation occurs it is as a result of an adaptation being much better than the others in an environment that then leads to a directional change.

element more competitive or due to an exogenous shocks can also account for the change, such as a meteorite strike or a volcanic eruption that brings about a rapid change in the environment, making an adaptation highly successful (Spruyt, 1994a: 24).

This is a potential area for cross-fertilization, but it also provides a way of thinking about interstitial emergence in relation to the question that Zhao raises regarding competition. The key in punctuated equilibrium is that there are different variants being generated, but no one of them is out-competing the other with respect to the environment. When there is a change in the environment, or when one variant acquires a competitive edge, then the change occurs. This is important in the context of the point that Zhao (2013) is raising with regards to Mann's theory: there needs to be an understanding of what is driving the human action and therefore creating the use of the four powers and their combinations. Darwinian social evolution locates this in the competition for resources, within the struggle for existence, and the coevolution between organizations, institutions and their environment (Hodgson, 2010). The four sources of power, combined in different ways, are therefore different strategies to obtain resources and prevent degradation.

The IEMP needs to be understood within the context of a Darwinian population (Godfrey-Smith, 2009: 6), or a "complex population system" (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 26), both of which outline that evolution by natural selection occurs when there is a population of entities that interact with each other in an environment, and apply the principles of variation, inheritance and selection.

This can be addressed through an engagement with the question on how Christianity spread in the Roman Empire. A criticism levelled by Bryant (2006) and Hobson (2006) was that Mann was focusing too much on the instrumental rationality of people to carry things through and his use of goals was highly abstract, which mostly avoided the pitfalls of ad hoc reasoning but left things vague at a more micro level. Obviously there are some reasons for this, namely that data from the distant past is harder to collect about people's motivations, whereas in the present day it is easier to gather diaries and other documents that can reconstruct it, as Mann has done for *Fascists* (2004) and *The Dark Side of Democracy* (2005) (Kiser, 2006: 66-67). Zhao (2013: 33-34), as stated above, has also criticised Mann's account for failing to specify how changes come about, and placing too much emphasis on unintended consequences rather than actors actions.

The concepts provided by Darwinism can, however, give us a better understanding at how competition, understood to be the competition for limited resources, drives change, through the differential replication of replicators housed in interactors. Runciman (2004) gives an explanation that shows how the belief system and actions of the Christians allowed the spread of the doctrine in the environment of Rome in the 3rd Century A.D. Christians here can be understood as group in the sense of being an interactor (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 170); the beliefs that they carry are then understood as replicators, in the sense of being a worldview, a network of connected ideas that provide a structure to the mind (Gabora, 2004). Christians can be defined as a group under the terms of multi-level selection, where the group is screening-off lower levels from selection acting on them (i.e. it is not operating on individual Christian members) (Brandon, 1998: 182-185), with the groups

cohesiveness and solidity being maintained through the effect of strong reciprocity, whereby members of the group are punished by other members if they are perceived to be defecting, breaking the norms of the group, or not being fair in their contributions (Runciman, 2004: 10; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Gachter, 2002).

The key factors were that the Christians were willing to help those who were not their 'in-group', that is they were open to offering help to all peoples regardless of whether they were Christian or not. This was down to a key component of the Christian world-view being a necessity to ‘save’ others from the damnation of Hell, regardless of whether they believed in the Christian God at that point or not. This was quite an unusual position to have at that time, with most other religions on specifying that members should help fellow members and no others (Runciman, 2004: 6-7). This led to them helping the sick, regardless of whether or not they were Christian and, even if in some cases they were unsuccessful, in enough cases the person would get better, which would help facilitate the notion that their God was helping (ibid: 12-13). The world-view then begins to replicate: through diffusion via word-of-mouth, but also through direct teaching of the beliefs to those being healed. Even if the people do not come around to the Christian viewpoint, the world-view has still replicated: the people are now aware of it and it is contained within the structure of their mind, connected with other ideas already there to create a new network and possibly a new world-view (Gabora, 2004).

As Sperber (1996: 71-72) explains, humans have an ability for meta-representation, that is being able to fill in the blanks behind a cultural idea, or belief or information that they come across, which makes them susceptible to mysterious

notions, such as those found in religion. The evocative character of the mystery makes it memorable, and also engages the brain in filling in the blanks (ibid: 73-74). This process of engaging with it, of transforming and interpreting the representation when it is received and making it memorable (ibid: 34) is what then helps it propagate (ibid: 25), alongside any environmental advantages the idea might confer. Obviously as people related the stories they would likely grow more exaggerated and then gain even more power for that, as the stories would seem to confirm that there is a God at work and he appears to favour Christians.

The stable nature of the Christians as a group, due to strong reciprocity, also made them fare better as an interactor as against other groups; essentially the Christian group had a stronger fusion between political power and ideological power within the group. Strong reciprocity helps to stabilise the group, even when it is acquiring new members, particularly in situations where the environment presents no real better alternatives. If the rewards for joining a group and behaving 'well', that is according to the groups norms, are good then that will see people join and also seem to behave in a 'benevolent' manner, again according to group norms, with those who do not being punished. This creates a stable group, with expanding members who stick to doctrine and present a good face to others. If the environment does not provide better alternatives it would also stop people leaving the group to join others (Runciman, 2004: 10-11).

The Christian interactor is, therefore, better at competing for ideological and political power than the alternative religious groups interactors. Though Christianity's inducement to help others may have led to a squandering of resources on those who were not Christian, and did not join, it helped spread the replicators for

the world-view to a wider area than just within the group. This perhaps made them appear a more attractive option that other pagan religious groups. Indeed the Christians occasional treatment of pagans could help the spread of the religion, as it would build a social connection and, as the story was related, might induce subsequent generations to seek out and convert to Christianity (ibid: 13). In the competition for limited resources (converts, and the help with spreading the message and finances that they bring), Christianities habits, routines and practices of helping a wide variety of people, regardless of what they offered in return, opened them up to a wider range of individuals who could be brought into the fold.

In a social and cultural environment where helping others regardless of whether they were part of your group was unusual, it meant Christianity could acquire converts at times of disease and sickness, particularly with outbreaks of plague in the period between Aurelius and Diocletian (ibid: 12), the interactor being better adapted to the particular environment where there was a plethora of different religious groups, but not much in the way of easy to access medical care. Thus, in the selective environment, there is a pressure towards gaining converts, which is leading to a selection for the particular routines and practices, through the selection of the Christian interactor, as the interactor is more successful in the competition for resources than the alternate variants, causing the differential replication of the Christian world-view.

The high-profile conversion of Constantine to the cause also helped; being an authority figure his acknowledgement of it would have added weight to the belief behind it (Sperber, 1996: 72) and would have also seen people sign-up, particularly perhaps at an elite level, if only for self-interested reasons. This then brings in a new

selection pressure, where converting is a way to get ahead and have influence in the society: the environmental change has led to a change in the configurations of ideological, political and (also) military power that begins its development towards a new social configuration.

This is a demonstration of how Darwinian social evolutionary theories concepts can take forward Zhao's (2013) reworking of Mann's theory, demonstrating the way in which different configurations of the IEMP can come about within a society, with reference to actions taken by social actors, in a particular environmental context, in a competition for resources within a Darwinian population (Godfrey-Smith, 2009; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010).

The Functional History of Ernest Gellner

Some nations have navels, some achieve navels, some have navels thrust upon them. Ernest Gellner (1997: 101).

Ernest Gellner's position in sociology is, perhaps, unusual. Despite numerous publications covering a whole variety of different issues (from sociological studies of philosophy, to anthropology, to the large-scale, to the small-scale) and being a hallowed rarity in academia in combining readability, a genuinely funny and wicked sense of humour, with detailed and profound reasoning, the primary focus is on his work on nationalism, and in particular the book *Nations and Nationalism* (2006). Given the sometimes clubbish mentality that can beset social sciences this is odd, and perhaps worthy of an investigation in its own right. Quite possibly the wide range of Gellner's thought worked against him (Farrell, 2010).

This chapter is in some ways following this trend and in others going against. Whilst the focus is on Gellner's theory of nationalism, it is focusing on it relation to industrial society and the transition from agrarian society to industrial society, a relation that is an important focus throughout Gellner's work (Gellner, 1964; 2006[1983]; 1988; 1997; c.f. Meadwell, 2012). In particular the chapter will explore some of the differences that exist between Gellner's conceptualization as found in *Thought and Change* (1964) and *Nations and Nationalism* (2006), placing this in the wider context of his thought on the emergence of the modern world that he outlined in *Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History* (1988).

This chapter is divided into three sections as follows: in the first section there will be a brief outline of Gellner's background and a fuller outline of his theory of nationalism and the emergence of the modern world. The next two sections will then concern themselves with a focus on two main criticisms of his work and will discuss them in relation to social evolutionary theory. The focus of the second section will focus on the charge of functionalism in his work, as this will serve as a wider look at what functionalism is and how it relates to but is differentiated from Darwinian social evolutionary theory. The third section will then address the question of continuity in relation to understanding the emergence of nationalism, though the lens of Gellner's debate with Anthony Smith in the Warwick debate (Gellner, 1996; Smith, 1996a; 1996b), and a more recent criticism of centrality of the concept of necessity in Gellner's conception of nationalism and its relation to industrial society (Meadwell, 2012; 2014; 2015). Darwinian social evolutionary theory will be critically used both to criticise Gellner's formulations, and also point to how the theory avoids some of the pitfalls Gellner's theory falls into.

Ernest Gellner: Background and Theory

Gellner's Early Life and Intellectual Formation

Visiting a friend, Anatoly Khazakov, in Moscow Ernest Gellner handed him a copy of *Nations and Nationalism* and remarked that it contained his life. His friend read it and, when he saw him the next day, asked if he meant the part relating to the parable about the Empire of Megalomania and Ruritania (explained below). Gellner responded that, no, he had in fact meant the whole book (Hall, 2010: 307). Whilst

previous sections have avoided going into biographical detail on the respective theorists, given this account it's maybe worth taking a little time to go over some of the details of Gellner's life.

Gellner was born to Rudolf and Anna, in Paris, on the 9th of December 1925 (ibid: 6). His family was Czech, from Bohemia, and they lived in Prague until Ernest was 13, at which point they emigrated to England (under threat from the Nazi invasion in 1939) (ibid: 18-19; Musil, 1996: 25). Significant events had taken place prior to Gellner's birth, though. With the collapse of the Hapsburg regime Czechoslovakia was now being formed as its own national state under the direction of their first president, Tomas Masaryk. The Habsburg regime, and its fall, and the subsequent industrialization created a mess of competing communities and identities, particularly in Bohemia, where Gellner's family was born. The peasants were being turned into urban, industrial workers. Alongside this was the Czech national movement, who were turning the Czech language into a national language, which sparked off a conflict with those who wanted to impose a German identity. Jewish families, of which Gellner's was one, were caught in the middle as the censuses demanded that people put down their national identity, but only one, but Jew was not an option (Hall, 2010: 2-3). Czechoslovakia was the only democracy East of the Rhine to endure and had a vibrant culture as it attracted numerous artists to Prague in particular. It was not a full democracy though, rather it was a 'guided' democracy (similar perhaps to Singapore, or pre-1996 Taiwan), where the ruling party never lost an election (ibid: 10-11).

Ernest would have encountered the symbols and portraits of Masaryk at school, where they were very prominent. He was "one of the majority of Czech

students who accepted Masaryk's thesis that "the truth will prevail" and that truth in modern times meant democracy" (Musil, 196: 34-35). This is something that would persist. Indeed there's an extent to which *Thought and Change* (1964) is essentially a codification of this belief, if 'democracy' is instead replaced with 'industrial society'. Hall (2010: 15 fn.48) notes that Masaryk's full vision of history is strikingly similar to that that would be expounded in Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), a book Gellner was sympathetic towards. Whilst reading *Thought and Change* (1964) I myself couldn't help think that there were more than one parallel, in general thesis if not specifics, with Fukuyama's (1992) work.

Gellner went to university at Oxford, where he was greatly influenced by Karl Popper and in particular his masterwork *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (2011[1945]).[45] His other formative influence at this stage was encountering the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and his belief that it was all nonsense, culminating in Gellner's first published book, *Words and Things* (2005[1959]), which was an attack on the fashionable Linguistic Philosophy that emerged out of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (2009[1953]). It is notable as this book prefaced things that would be familiar with Gellner's work: placing philosophy within the context of wider society and changes going on around it (Hall, 2010: 109-110), and making jokes at the expense of Wittgenstein.

With these background details in mind, we can now turn to Gellner's theory.

[45] Elements of this influence are particularly prominent in Gellner's support of liberal democracy (the nominal 'open society') as well as his views on Hegel and Marx. It is perhaps worth noting that Popper's understanding of, in particular Hegel, is considered to be suspect (putting it politely) (c.f. Kaufman, 1951).

The General Theory: Philosophical and Neo-Episodic History

Before starting, it is worth noting that Gellner's theory, between his three main attempts to outline a general theory of how history happens (1964, 1983, 1988) he changed the emphases in many cases, as his ideas and theories developed: in particular there is an important change in emphasis in his theory of nationalism, between *Thought and Change* and *Nations and Nationalism* and the importance of its role for industrial society (Meadwell, 2012). For the moment, in this outline, I'm going to mainly concentrate on presenting the general framework of Gellner's theory, found across the three books, flagging up the differences but not going into detail with them. Following the outline the differences, and what they mean for the theory, will be discussed in more depth.

Across Gellner's writing on history there is a clear and consistent concern with the transition, or what he calls "*the* transition" (Gellner, 1964: 146) from the agrarian world into the industrial and modern world. Behind this is a general kind of theoretical understanding of how best to understand transitions and change, which, in *Thought and Change* he dubs the "neo-Episodic" view of history (ibid: 42) and in *Plough, Sword and Book* (1988) is dubbed "Philosophical History", though it is in a slightly altered form[46]. The two have slight differences, but the model is roughly the same. The background theory behind it is, for Gellner, the idea that history has patterns to it, or at least we will always see patterns in history, so we need to make our assumptions behind our understanding explicit and use a deductive method,

[46] Hall (1985: 3-9) provides a slightly different definition of philosophical history to Gellner's.

constantly matching and revising our theoretical assumptions against the facts and the actually existing historical record. By looking at the choices that were available to people at the time, the circumstances and constraints in which those choices were made, and why certain choices were made rather than others, we can better comprehend our own societies and their development and so, hopefully, make better choices in the future (Gellner, 1988: 11-15).

We've already encountered this theory to a certain extent in the previous discussion on Michael Mann, which given their design and running of the same seminar, makes sense. An understanding of it can be gained by looking at what Gellner was arguing against. When he first set out there were two dominating approaches to understanding the way history progressed: there was the 'episodic' conception of history and the 'evolutionary', or 'World Growth', conception of history (Gellner, 1964). Both of these have a reliance on the notion, common at that time, of progress in history being a form of secular salvation: that is the past is bad, the future good and the march of time and humanity is one of greater progression, in technology, morals, society etc., upwards (ibid: 3-4). This progress is also endogenously based, that is it is as a result and is inherent in the societies themselves.

As against this Gellner posits his own theory which in *Thought and Change* is dubbed neo-Episodic Growth. The neo-Episodic view sees each transformation, as it occurs in history, as being something which needs to be explained on its own terms. That is, it looks at specific changes and studies how they altered things with reference to the context in which it happened. The transformations are not universal and not part of some ongoing story of progress. It also maintains a critical distance due to not seeing it as being part of some ongoing goal with an end in mind. It

appreciates the complexity of social growth and social phenomenon, so is not constrained to the simplicity of the episodic view (ibid: 40-43). The transitions are non-repetitive, each one is something new and they do not look like the previous one (ibid: 66-68).

The vision of history given by the neo-Episodic view was one of a series of spikes, followed by plateaus of relative stasis. This, to Gellner, looked a lot like the actual historical record. It also enabled him to speak about progress; whilst there may be no overall move towards some higher goal, there are clearly instances where significant change happens. These were moments of specific progress that is evidenced from the historical record, but there is no ideal of general progress (everywhere is steadily progressing) (ibid: 43-45). "It [neo-Episodic theory] thus possess the merits of each [episodic and evolutionary theory] and the defects of neither" (ibid: 43).

History is, essentially, cumulative: that is more knowledge is acquired as the world goes on. The means of the transmission of this knowledge is through culture, with culture being a system of concepts and ideas that are made possible due to certain social circumstances. These circumstances, concepts and ideas are the preconditions that make possible later developments, though the preconditions do not necessitate the later developments (Gellner, 1988: 14-15).

What were these spikes of progress and plateaus? Gellner lays it out in *Plough, Sword and Book* (1988). For him there were three major periods of human history, three plateaus, and two major transitions: hunter-gatherer society; agricultural society, dubbed Agraria; and industrial society, dubbed Industria

(Gellner, 1988: 16-17). Each of these stages is successive, the one follows the other, and they cannot be done out of order (i.e. a society cannot leap from hunter-gatherer to Industria, because the necessary preconditions will not have been gained from the Agraria stage). It is not a necessity that societies move from one stage to the other, though, and they can exist alongside one another. Societies can slip back from one stage to another but this is rare (ibid: 17-18)[47]. Gellner's contention is that, once the benefits of the new societies are seen, people would of course choose to move onto that new type of society, hence Industria comes to diffuse itself.

There are then three concepts that go alongside this, that is the three key areas in which change can be understood and produce transitions. These are production, coercion and cognition (the plough, sword and book of the title). The three interrelate with one another, and change and transform over time and it is this that helps to explain a particular stage of history (Agraria, for example, is dominated by coercion, the warrior class, and cognition, the priests who are the holders of legitimacy). Between them is a general division of labour, but they also have specific divisions of labour among them (i.e. there can be competing forms of legitimacy and cognition within a society) (ibid: 21-22). It would be relatively easy to redefine the three in

[47] A note of caution might be entered at this point; although Gellner maintains that it is not a necessity that a society move from one stage to another, he thinks it highly unlikely that they would choose not to, if they know how to, because the new society is evidently better than the previous one. However this might be a case of a confusion of what 'we' think of as the good society, with what the society thinks of as the good society, particularly when the benefits of a new form of societal structure are not always obvious. For example quite a few hunter-gatherer tribes knew about food production and farming but opted not to do it, because the way of life did not look better than the one they had. Indeed it is actually the case that for many people who adopted farming enjoyed a worse quality of life, they worked longer and harder hours, and a worse diet than did their hunter-gatherer brethren (Diamond, 2005[1997]: 104-105; Diamond, 1987). Of course the more settled lifestyle of farmers, bound to one place, allowed for the emergence of the centralised societies that we have today, from which benefits flow, but the people at the time would not have known that.

terms of the classic division of economic, political and ideological power, however Gellner's terms, I think, capture a subtly that would be lost with the other use of the terms. Particularly with cognition, where what he's talking about is frequently the way in which people think, understand and engage with the world, rather than 'belief systems' necessarily (though there is an overlap between them).

Gellner's focus relies on the transition from Agraria to Industria, for basic practical reasons that we have more information relating to the transition from agricultural society to industrial society. His view on the transition stems from a look at how people cognitively understand themselves. In the hunter-gatherer world Gellner posits that people's understanding of the world was prefigured on a social basis; people had social concepts that they used to interpret the world, rarely encountering the physical world without the lens of those concepts (ibid: 50-53). This is product of their multi-faceted language wherein concepts serve two purposes: referential ones, which refer to the world around them, and also social ones, which provide coherence to that world (ibid: 54-57). With the arrival of writing, there is a streamlining of the multi-faceted system into a single-strand system and the language then refers to a general set of concepts. However, in Agraria, the system becomes codified to subordinate the physical world, that is, the referential concepts, to the social world, that is the social concepts. The system thus explained natural, social and moral order but was not strongly related to the physical world--though there was knowledge of the physical world that could be accurate, such as the movement of stars and agriculture, this was not integrated into system for understanding the world (Hearn, 2012: 33). By codifying doctrine, through writing and script, what Gellner

calls the clerical class, exerts authority and lends authority to the concepts that are codified.

Concepts are given an ideal type, i.e. what the pure figures would be as created by man, and this is then compared to the actual, messier, reality around them (lending authority to the notion of their being the ideal types that can be imagined, and also to the idea of a fallen world). This was also backed up by notions from astronomy, which saw the planets in the heavens as being perfect spheres, moving in perfect arcs, and geometry, which imagined perfect shapes crafted with mathematical precision (such perfect shapes, of course, do not exist in the world of nature) (Gellner, 1988: 71-84). This codification became possible in Agraria, as opposed to the hunter-gatherer societies, as the invention of farming made it possible to store food surpluses, that allowed a ruling and ritual class to come into existence, expanding bureaucracies, who could create centralized states ruling over local, autonomous communities. Due to the nature of the social concepts, the development of literacy and crafting a literate high culture enabled the ritual and ruling class to support one another, using literacy and the high culture to infuse themselves with authority within the moral system and order (ibid: 70-71).

Agraria is a stagnant condition, where innovation and technological growth happens only rarely, as a result of this divide. It is ruled over by the authority of the warrior (the sword; coercion) and the authority of the priest (the book), who ascribe legitimacy to the regimes of the warriors, and thus play a crucial role in determining which warriors get to be the leaders and kings. This balancing act creates the uneasy coalition into which the stagnation sets (ibid: 99-100).

How then did society break out from the world of Agraria? As Gellner makes clear it only happened once and only due to a whole host of possible circumstances, essentially so many unlikely elements coming together that it was a "miracle" that I happened (ibid: 158). Chief among them were perhaps the diffusion of power in the societies in question and between them (Hearn, 2012: 115-116). Allied to this was a change in cognition. Exemplified by Descartes investigation of the cogito, the radical scepticism that said that all that could be believed was a person's own existence, mixed in with the rise of Protestantism, which taught that God was diffused in the world and people could only understand it by investigating it themselves, and finally completed with the arrival of empiricism, the notion of the social concept was dethroned and the individual was placed at the centre of cognitive understanding. Protestantism's character frees people from the duty to become a warrior, a ruler or a priest and so they could pursue their own vocations as they wanted, which led to a rise in innovation. Empiricism deals the final blow by eliminating the notion of ideal-type concepts altogether: empiricism taught that there was no innate knowledge, the only knowledge was what we acquired for ourselves by observing the world. Concepts are now divorced from the notion that they are what 'good', that is authoritative, people say they are (Gellner, 1988: 100-128).

Thanks to this, there is the necessary ability to escape from Agraria (though in a set of favourable contingent circumstances). People, mainly those artisans and merchants living in towns, are now capable of investigating the world through their own sense, thus better understanding it and enabling a new set of innovations. This occurred mostly in towns, as these areas were mostly free from feudal obligation and the people within them were not required to work as warriors, as they could hire

mercenaries, and so avoided being distracted from their own work. Thanks to this they could specialize and be productive and so could lead to the origins of the industrial revolution, which would cause the break-out from Agraria (ibid: 151-153). Interestingly, though Gellner does not use the term, his thesis in this area reflects Mann's (1986) notion of interstitial emergence: that is, in Gellner's theory, the new society emerges from the cracks created by the balancing off of the two dominant forces, the warriors and the priests, in the old.

It's at this point that nationalism enters the scene.

The Special Theory: Nationalism

The role of nationalism in Gellner's theory changes somewhat, and is perhaps the largest difference of emphasis between his earlier version of the theory in 1964, and the one he developed in *Nations and Nationalism*. The key difference is that, whereas in *Thought and Change* nationalism was important for industrial society, resulting from industrial societies uneven spread and diffusion, in *Nations and Nationalism* Gellner argued that nationalism was *necessary* for industrial society (Meadwell, 2015: 271). For Gellner nationalism, the nation-state and industrial society are linked together. Industrial society creates a new social contract: that the society "is bringing about, or successfully maintaining, an industrial affluent society"; and that "those in authority are co-cultural with the rest of the society" (Gellner, 1964: 33). Provided the society maintained its industrial character, and its affluence, and the leaders of the country were co-cultural with the society, and major divisions in social power were not a result of cultural differences, or seen to be such,

then the order and legitimacy would be maintained in the society. The system of values is strongly conditioned by the economic forces (Hearn, 2006: 68). Any society that did maintain these two factors was likely to survive irrespective of whatever other deficiencies it might have (Gellner, 1964: 33).

This is the moment when nationalism enters the picture, with point number two: nationalism is the "political principle, which holds that that the political and the national should be congruent" (Gellner, 2006: 1). Nationalism, like the state, is a contingent idea, in that its rise was not predestined, is not universal, and is not necessary. However, although the state and nation are two separate contingencies, and states could and did rise without nationalism, the existence of nationalism is predicated on their being a state. Nationalism, and nations, cannot exist without a state and some form of defined territorial boundaries. States are essential to the functioning of industrial society, only they can coordinate the necessary resources, so, for his reason, nationalism is a condition of industrial societies, and industrial societies alone, but it only arises for some states, not others (ibid: 4-6).

The way that industrial society is, is what predicates the arrival of nationalism. Industrial society has two requirements: continual cognitive growth, and continual economic growth, with the two being linked to one another (ibid: 23-24). Because of this the new industrial society is different, it is more fluid in terms of roles and occupations (Hearn, 2006: 68). This is due to the assumptions of growth: in order to innovate people need to move around, and be able to hire others for work as and when it is needed. This division of labour, necessary to increase productivity, also strikes at the structures of society. It requires society to be more mobile, which makes it more egalitarian (or at least more egalitarian and more mobile than Agraria)

as when jobs and roles have to be reconfigured quickly, structural arrangements of people's positon being defined by their role becomes an impediment (Gellner, 2006: 24-26). It is also required that all people have a basic kind of education and training that will allow them to fulfil their roles. For this reason the high culture (the culture of the clerics, warriors and rulers in Agraia remember), becomes the new generalized culture of the society. This is important. With the generalized culture, taught through mass education in schools, people, of all stratums of society, are now capable of communicating with one another and understanding one another. This adds to the mobility, and allows them to switch jobs, do different tasks and be effective at performing tasks that their generic training has given to them. Only the state has the ability to provide the necessary training and education, as only it has the resources necessary, and from this, and the spread of the high culture, springs the notion that the culture and the politics are linked together. And from this springs the principle of nationalism (ibid: 34-37).

As Gellner puts it, "in modern societies, culture does not so much underline structure: rather it replaces it" (Gellner, 1964: 155). What this means is that nationalism, in the sense of a shared culture, becomes the political principle that legitimises the new society. It is the glue that provides the background for holding the culture, and the society, together (O'Leary, 1998: 42). Nationalism is distinctive to industrial societies, as it is connected to the mode of production of those societies. Nationalism is, in effect, a functional equivalent of the world religions, in which the people, rather than worshiping a deity, are instead worshiping themselves (ibid: 47). Nationalism is not, however, for Gellner a strong force, or at least not exclusively so. This is because there are many more potential nations, many cultures that could be

turned into nationalisms and become nations, than are or will be realized. On the other hand it is a strong force because of its role in providing legitimacy, of the units, both domestically and internationally (Ozkirimli, 2010: 102).

How and why does nationalism emerge from non-national states? Nationalism is both a unifying and a divisive force and this accounts for the explanation of how it emerges (Gellner, 1964: 163-164). This is the beginning of the parable alluded to earlier, that of the Empire of Megalomania and Ruritania. A version of this, less systematic, is contained in *Thought and Change* (1964: 164-171), but it is given its fullest account in *Nations and Nationalism* (2006: 57-61) and that is the account that is being given below.

Once upon a time, there existed a land. This land was ruled over by the Empire of Megalomania. Within it was a community of peasants, called the Ruritarians, who lived in a section of the empire called Ruritania[48]. The land generally was peaceful, though there were ructions. The Ruritarians had experienced the oppression from Megalomania, and this was variously recorded in folk songs, campfire tales and stories told to children documenting this history. During a period of time, in the nineteenth century, however, Megalomania undergoes a period of industrialization, however the industrialization spreads unevenly with some regions and urban areas getting most or all of the industrialization and other areas not getting it. An education programme is begun, that Ruritarians can attend, with the cleverer of

[48] It's worth making a slightly ironic point here. For all Gellner's fulminations against Marxism and class conflict as the driver of the world, his parable could quite easily be rewritten as being a class based conflict, not a nationalist based conflict. In that case it is less, as Gellner claimed, that a horrible postal error meant that a message for classes got delivered to nations; rather that the letter reached the right destination, but through a horrible *translation* error the message was taken to mean nations, not classes.

them migrating into the cities to learn at the universities. This gives them the tools and language to understand what is happening, an understanding they can bring back to their own lands. The differences between the Ruritanians and the Megalomanian's distinct parts seems to become more acute. Deploring the squalor they see there they begin to promote the idea that Ruritania should also industrialize; this way it can enjoy the fruits of industrialization on its own terms and for themselves. The folk songs and traditions are written down, they become something bigger, they become part of a history. The language and culture they have gained from Megalomania has "enabled them to conceive and express their resentments and discontents in intelligible terms" (Gellner, 2006: 60-61). The only way for Ruritania to fully enjoy all the fruits of industrialization is if they become an independent region and break away from Megalomania.

In short, they become nationalists (or more precisely, nationalist separatists). Eventually Ruritania splits from Megalomania and becomes its own nation. "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist" (Gellner, 1964: 168).

In addition to this there is what Gellner dubs "entropy-resistant" attributes (2006: 63). In the case above, for example, there is a scenario where Ruritania could be absorbed into a new Megalomania nation. However there is a possibility where the people of Ruritania might have a trait that prevents them from advancing in society. Gellner gives the example of 'blueness' (ibid: 63-64), imaging a scenario where people have a blue skin pigment. Although Gellner is using a biological attribute, presumably because such things are more fixed, it should not be taken to mean that this is the sole type of trait that are entropy-resistant. The trait is entropy-

resistant if it does not have a chance of being evenly dispersed amongst a population and so is almost completely associated with one area (so height would not be an entropy-resistant trait whereas an accent could be). In this scenario the Ruritarian's, particularly their elites, can do well in the society but they will always have their paths to the very heights of it (the seats of power etc.) blocked because of the trait that they cannot, or cannot easily, shed. This, mixed with the other factors, encourages nationalism: the Ruritarian elites could obviously do better in their own 'nation' as then the traits they have will no longer be a factor. That begins the nationalist movement (Gellner, 2006: 63-71; 168-171)[49].

That, broadly, is Gellner's theory of nationalism and his theory on the origins of the modern world, as it relates from the transition from Agraria to Industria. Gellner's theory has been criticised from numerous angles (of which a collection on specifically nationalism is in Hall, 1998; on his wider social theory there is Hall & Jarvie, 1996, and Malesevic & Haugaard, 2007). We're going to concentrate on two: the criticism of the functionalism inherent in the theory; and the more detailed criticism of Gellner's downplaying the need for history to understanding nationalism and the role of necessity in his theory (Smith, 1996a; Meadwell, 2012).

[49] Obviously this can only be taken so far and there are a couple of qualifications: such movements would only be possible, really, if the trait is associated with a particular people, who are from a particular region. The nation requires some defined territorial boundaries that can be struck off. There is also a limit to the traits that will cause such things. The Ruritrarians, after all, could have differences in being 'light blue' or 'dark blue' but on this a separation would not, I think happen. An ethnic cleansing might, as this is the unfortunate reality of how many nations created their homogeneousness (Gellner, 2006: 2; Mann, 2005), but that is a slightly different matter.

Functionalism

The first issue to clear up is that by functionalism the angle being taken is not that Gellner was teleological in his reasoning. As he makes clear:

> I accept entirely this repudiation of teleological explanation: I have many needs which, whatever their urgency or intensity, nature has not deemed fit to satisfy. Bitter experience, quite apart from the canons of scientific propriety, have taught me this unpalatable truth. Needs engender no realities. But my theory does not sin against this. It is straightforwardly causal. Political and economic forces, the aspirations of governments for greater power and of individuals for greater wealth, have in certain circumstances produced a world in which the division of labour is very advanced, the occupational structure highly unstable, and most work is semantic and communicative rather than physical. This situation in turn leads to the adoption of a standard and codified, literacy-linked ("High") idiom, requires business of all kinds to be conducted in its terms, and reduces persons who are not masters of that idiom (or not acceptable to its practitioners) to the status of humiliated second-class members, a condition from which one plausible and much-frequented escape route led through nationalist politics (Gellner, 1996a: 627-628).

I've quoted that passage at length, not only for its indication of Gellner's repudiation that his theory is teleological, but also because it is, in his own words, one of the clearest and shortest summations of his actual argument. It presents the causal links, as he sees it, between the various pieces of the argument. Nevertheless, even if the notion of teleology is rejected[50], the argument is not straightforwardly causal in the manner Gellner's supposes; nor does eliminating teleology from it remove all the problems with functionalism.

First, though, a brief diversion on to what functionalist argument is and the general problems with it. Functionalism arises out of biology and natural selection (Elster, 1983: 49-55; Cohen, 1978: 269-271), so there is a value in exploring it in relation to this thesis arguments for Darwinian social evolution. The general

[50] McCrone (1998: 81) is sceptical on the score.

argument for functionalism is that a valid explanation for something existing is with reference to the function that that something serves. So, in the biological context, birds having wings is explained with reference to its function of providing flight, which can confer an advantage on the creature in question.

The general character of functionalist explanations can be stated as "consequences are used to explain causes" (Cohen, 1982: 28). However, the example of birds having wings that I've picked is deliberately more complicated than this and it exposes the difference between functionalist explanations as they work in biology and as they work in social theory. In biology the functional explanation is valid because there are explanatory mechanisms behind it--that of genetic mutation, which produces variation, and selection, which sorts between different variants selecting the ones that are most advantageous within a given environmental context. These changes also work incrementally until it reaches a local maxima (a point at which any change would be downwards) and then it achieves relative stasis, until such a time as the environment changes (Elster, 1979: 4-9). Although there is not much use for half-a-wing, the feathers on the wing can provide warmth for thermoregulation of the body. Additionally they could be used for gliding (as was the case with some dinosaurs). So, although there is no immediate jump from flightlessness to flight, each step on the way has a mechanism behind it that is conferring an advantage that then arrives at the outcome of wings and flight.[51]

[51] This is a simplified, and straightforwardly adaptationist, account of the process that is ignoring a lot of other factors (such as genetic drift, punctuated equilibrium, epigenetics, spandrels, exaptations and such). However, for the purposes of explanation here, and the relation of the social and biological functional explanations, there's no need to bog down the account with the additional factors.

With that brief run through in mind we can now turn back to Gellner's theory. Gellner's theory is a functionalist one (O'Leary, 1998: 51). This can be seen by looking at it: for Gellner nationalism comes along because there needs to be a high culture that binds people together in the wake of the destabilising effect of industrialization. It can also be seen, to some extent, in his thoughts on cognitive change. The arrival of more individualist thought in philosophy serves to create a more open investigation into the environment which serves the function of bringing about the new industrial economy (Gellner, 1988: ch 4 & 5).

Here we arrive at what has been dubbed the 'Ernest Gellner Problem' (Hearn, 2006: 99-100). Essentially, Gellner seemingly has two theories of nationalism: the story that industrialization led to nationalism, as a means of providing everyone with a high culture; and the story that the increasing reach of imperial power, and exclusionary policies, led to oppositional nationalist movements. These, to some degree, break-down into 'pristine' and 'secondary' examples of a process (ibid: 101)[52], but the compatibility of them, within Gellner's theory, is not obvious. This problem, basically, stems from the fact that whilst Gellner is pointing out that the arrival of nationalism is contingent, he nonetheless appears to view nationalism as the only possible successful result, once the processes get underway. This is, to some extent, a result of the tension between his earlier (1964) theory, which emphasises uneven development and spread, and the later (2006) version of the theory, which places more emphasis on the necessity of nationalism to bind industrial society together. This will be discussed in more depth shortly.

[52] More on this in the two comparative chapters

What's worth noting, here, in terms of the functionalist nature of the argument is that his map of stasis and breakout progression seems to go against the notion that there are other options. To take another example he postulates that the nation-state had to come into existence, as only the national state would have the resources to educate the people in the nation. This is certainly true; but it is only true if it is accepted that the nation-state was the only possible outcome. Cities would not have the resources to educate nations, but they could have certainly educated city-states. Hong Kong and Singapore would be examples of, effectively, city-states that provide for their populations. Indeed they even have their own distinct identities. The point is that whilst there might be good reasons why the national-state and national identity came to be the dominating one (Spruyt, 1994a goes over some reasons), this need not have been the case and that strikes at Gellner's assumption otherwise.

There are other problems with it as well, in historical terms. As stated for Gellner the link between industrialization and nationalism is a key. The one begets the other. However this is disputable. Michael Mann points out that industrialization "arrived too late and too unevenly" and that the arrival of nationalism is better explained by the arrival of the modern state under geopolitical pressures and the emergence of commercial capitalism and social classes (Mann, 1992: 162, quoted in Hearn, 2006: 84). Nicos Mouzelis (1998: 160) essentially makes the same point. O'Leary (1998: 64-65) points to the fact that Gellner's theory would exclude multinational and multi-ethnic polities, but this is plainly an empirical anomaly - cases like Switzerland demonstrate that it is possible to have a people who are unified by something other than a shared sense of language or culture. To some extent modern European nations are also a demonstration against it, seeing as they

are largely multicultural but still have shared senses of identity (though there are long running debates about which communities and people should be included under the heading). Tom Nairn (1998) argues that nationalism was not always about industrialisation and there is no easy link between the two: using the example of the Khmer Rouge and Cambodia he gives an example of a group whose nationalism was based on returning to a rural state, rather than advancing to an industrial one.

In response to these criticisms Gellner did make some alterations, most particularly in downplaying the link between industrialization and nationalism, whilst still maintaining that there was a functional link between the two (O'Leary, 1998: 72-73). Of course, in such a case, downplaying the link is somewhat damaging to the theory. Allowing that there are other possible explanations for it is moving some way to admitting that there might be an object C that is the mechanism behind it, rather than either A or B. Likewise Gellner made the claim that industrial society "cast a long shadow" before it comes into being (quoted in Ozkirimli, 2010: 130). What was meant by this was the idea that industrial society's consequences can be anticipated by pre-industrial groups and they can respond accordingly (O'Leary, 1998: 73). This formulation is slightly suspect, though. As O'Leary (ibid) points out it is consistent with a filter explanation, a quasi-functional explanation where people, elites normally, are capable of filtering between sets of ideas and choosing the ones most suitable for themselves, without necessarily intending the consequences that result (Elster, 1979: 30), but it is not itself a purely functional explanation.[53] The filter explanation, in any case, would need to be set in a theory that explains why

[53] I might also point out that the language of the metaphor used rather uneasily points us back towards teleology, though that was not Gellner's intention.

particular groups, be they elites or others, would choose a particular set of ideas over another set.

These are some strong arguments against the functionalist nature of Gellner's theory. Both O'Leary (1998) and Mouzelis (1998) contend that it can be saved: either by adopting a filter explanation, or else by redefining industrialization to mean modernity and treating the theory as being an 'ideal-type', along Max Weber's lines, that suggests an elective affinity between nationalism and modernity, rather than a straight up functional explanation (Mouzelis, 1998: 162-164). There's some merit to these positions, though even a change to modernity complicates things when we consider that modernity itself is subject to contested definitions (c.f. Eisenstadt, 2000 and Ichijo, 2013). With that said, for whatever reason(s), modern nationalism arrived on the scene at roughly the same time industrial society did so it makes sense to investigate what relation there might be between them.

So what can Darwinian social evolution add to this, build on this, or improve on this? As mentioned above, the issue of functionalism is relevant to Darwinian theories, as they do have that element to them: however, as alluded too, Darwinian theories have a way of answering them, particularly in having an understanding of mutation process that generate variation and selection processes that sort among them in a differential manner (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010; Runciman, 2009; Richerson & Boyd, 2006). In addressing these points, in the context of Gellner, I will also look at the criticisms made by Smith (1996a) and Meadwell (2012, 2014, 2015) and Gellner's own, later, revisions to his theory (1997; 1998).

The Prior History/Structures and Their Effects

Smith and Gellner clashed in the Warwick debates which were then published in the journal *Nations and Nationalism* (Smith, 1996a, 1996b; Gellner, 1996b)[54]. Smith's (1996a: 361) view is that Gellner, and modernism as a theory in general, fails to account for nationalism in three respects: 1) that the theory is too general, and too abstract, so it can't work with specific cases and always requires *ad hoc* additions; 2) the content and intensity of particular nationalisms cannot be readily explained by either the dynamics of relative deprivation or the workings of global capitalism; and 3) that the commitment to nations and nationalism being a product of modernisation overlooks the persistence, and importance, of pre-existing ethnic and cultural ties. In this I want to focus on points one and three; these are the most relevant for the direction the discussion will be taking and I don't think that point two is as difficult to explain as Smith thinks.[55]

Gellner's response (1996b: 367) is to insist that the past is not necessary for explaining present day nationalism. He presents the idea in terms of whether a nation has a navel, linking it to the idea of the Biblical creation of Adam. If Adam was

[54] Note: this was part of a long-standing debate about whether nations existed before modern times, or whether they are purely modern phenomenon. I will not be going into that debate here. Smith has his own approach to nationalism, ethno-symbolism, which is not so much a theory as a collection of tools and principles for understanding nationalism and its emergence (summaries can be found in Hearn, 2006: ch. 8 and Ozkirimli, 2010: ch. 5; a statement of his own position is in Smith, 1989). Note also: the way debates are they tend to polarize a lot more than is normal, so the positions as outlined here are probably firmer and more distinct than in actuality (as Gellner more or less winks to the audience when he says that he and Smith get pitted against one another as representatives of modernism and primordialism)

[55] A commonly made criticism of Gellner's theory is that it can't account for the emotional pull of nationalism. I think this is an error, though, in that the pull occurs as a result of psychological dispositions that people have. That is, once nationalism exists it will exert an emotional pull simply by the nature of being there. People, after all, have the passions aroused by lots of things – some of them explicitly imaginary in a way that nations aren't (as anyone who's ever been engaged by a novel or a film can attest).

created by God then he would not have a navel, as he did not go through the process to acquire one. But, irrespective of whether or not he has a navel, it is not important to understanding Adam or the world he inhabits. So it is with Gellner's view on nationalism; he is a 'creationist' in believing that most nations were formed in the 18th Century and they did not exist before then. Whether they had pre-existing ethnic or cultural traits, a navel, is irrelevant to understanding the modern phenomenon. As Gellner (ibid) remarks, "If it [modernism] tells half the story, that for me is enough, because it means that the additional bits of the story in the other half are redundant". He also asserts that it cannot be predicted in advance what cultures or groups will become nations, only certain factors that might lead to a group becoming a nation, such having a certain minimum size, can be indicated (ibid: 369).

What's problematic in this response is that it skips past the idea of contingency, or more fully, the role that contingent events can play in producing outcomes. Gellner's theory is of a general kind but its abstractness means that it doesn't always fit with specific cases. In such instances there is a requirement for a more detailed examination, particularly at a political level, in order to understand how and why something turned out the way that it did (Breuilly, 2006: xliii-xliv). A point of criticism that Meadwell (2015) makes is that, contrary to his argument for revising assumptions when looking at the factual record, Gellner often does not do so and, in the case of looking at how people in agrarian and pre-agrarian societies thought, just states that they 'must' have thought in this particular way, without actually empirically supporting his case.

In addition, whilst Gellner is always keen to stress that nationalism is a contingent phenomenon, he seems to have a belief that the way things turned out was

the only way that it could have gone, once the various preconditions had been met and the transitions were underway. “Although Gellner stresses the contingency of the particular nationalism, his fatalism about nationalism ‘as such’ in practice translates into a fatalism about the actual, successful cases of nationalism” (ibid: xliv).

This fatalism that Brueilly identifies is what Meadwell (2012) notes as the big change between *Thought and Change* and *Nations and Nationalism*: namely that nationalism changes from being part of the process of industrial society, to being *necessary* for industrial society. This, in itself, might not be a big problem: after all many things are necessary for industrial society to happy (industry being one), so why can’t nationalism? Well, Meadwell’s (2012: 572) argument is that Gellner doesn’t actually prove that nationalism is necessary for industrial society. Meadwell (2012) runs through a series of different forms of necessity argument and notes that the concept is not one that Gellner engages with, nor does the empirical data support the claim that nationalism was necessary for industrial society. The best that can perhaps be argued is that there is a “practical necessity” for nationalism, but that this weakens the case; it suggests that there were alternatives, or substitutes, that could have been used instead of nationalism (ibid: 574). Ultimately, Gellner’s argument is a form of “special pleading” (ibid: 569).

Meadwell (2014: 27) further points to the fact that, in Gellner’s later writings he “inverts the putative relationship between nations and industrial society”. This is because Gellner has made the concession that, in his words it “just so happened”, there were a series of strong dynastic states along the Atlantic coast, which could be seen as proto-nations, which points to the fact that there were existing structures that are important to nations, prior to the advent of industrial society (Gellner, 1998: 29).

This is an important point to delve into, and one that points to what Gellner's theory is missing and what Darwinian social evolution adds.

In *Conditions of Liberty* (1996c) and then in the posthumously published *Nationalism* (1997) he uses the metaphor of 'time-zones' and marriage to outline how, in fact, the arrival of nationalism is dependent on certain characteristics being present. The two key characteristics are a high culture and a state, which are treated as the bride and groom respectively. He then divides Europe into four time-zones, moving from West to East, with each time-zone having a different combination of bride and groom and noting that these different combinations lead to different outcomes. Only time-zone one, roughly Western Europe, where there already was a high culture, bride, and a state, groom, did nationalism emerge. In the other zones there was either a bride of high culture, but no state, necessitating the creation of a state out of a patchwork of other local states (e.g. Prussia into Germany) a state but no high-culture, or neither. In these other time-zones, there is thus the creation of nationalist like-movements, or movements that are not nationalistic and with the focus elsewhere. This idea, or its proto-formation so to speak, can be seen in *Plough, Sword and Book* of there needing to be preconditions in place before an emergence (Hearn, 2012: 116).

What Gellner is noticing here is that the environmental context matters. Or, to put it another way, what Gellner's argument for nationalism can be rephrased away from saying that it is 'necessary' for industrial society, to its being the most 'adapted' for industrial society, given the selective environment that industrial society was birthed into.

As mentioned before, the problem with functionalist theories as they traditionally run is that they lack a specification of mechanisms by which the functional outcome is achieved. In Darwinian social evolution there is a recognition of how this happens: through generative mutation and selection (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010). As discussed, there are replicators and interactors and in the case of replicators the changes that occur in them result from variations, generated through transmission of information in relation selective environment. These routines are then bundled in interactors, which interact with the environment in such a way that differential replication of the replicators occurs. As Spruyt (1994b) points out, there was no easy continuum to the dynastic states that Gellner was talking about: rather those sovereign states were just one among several different state variants that existed, with city-states and city-leagues being other competitors. However the environment was such that sovereign states won out as they were better able to mobilize resources, having clearer lines of authority, territorial demarcation and being compatible with other forms of sovereign state. City-states and city-leagues, as interactors, were selected against with a selection-for the sovereign state, and the differing habits, practices and routines that went into it (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010; Runciman, 2009).

This is all occurring within a specific local environment, consistent with how Darwinian social evolution works: "Natural selection can forge only local adaptation" (Gould, 1996: 140).[56] The principles behind social evolution provide a means for understanding why an X beat out a Y in environment Z, but it doesn't

[56] Although, it is worth noting, that in the social environment case the definition of 'local' may well expand as communication technology improves and, effectively, shortens distances.

proclaim that this would always happen regardless of environment. Indeed, as we will see in the case-study of Japan, having proto-industrial and proto-national state features did not automatically lead to the next step, as Gellner's theory would surmise.

In this sense nationalism does not need to be the only principle that could have organised people *en masse,* or made use of the high culture, it only needed to be the most 'efficient', or 'easiest' possibility. There were other factors that meant that nationalism could take over the high-culture. As Smith (2015) and Hastings (1997) have pointed to, Biblical ideas already posited the idea of nations. Whilst this was different to how we would understand the modern nation, it does mean that the variant was in existence and the possibility for its use and mutation, through interaction with other ideas (Gabora, 2004) including industrial society, but also the worldview and mind-set of Protestantism (Ichijo, 2013), as Gellner recognized (1988), enabled further transformation towards the form that is understood today. Conversi (2007) also points to the fact that many of the rituals and routines associated with nationalism have their origins in militarism, which predates industrialism. Indeed military organization was already leading to homogenization drives at both a cultural and ethnic level (Conversi, 2007: 380-383). Nationalism and modern nation-states did not arrive fully formed, they developed over time and in different ways in different places; in adjustment with different states selective environments (Greenfield, 1992). This is something that Gellner recognizes with his notion of different 'time-zones' (Gellner, 1997).

The change of emphasis, in terms of Gellner's theory, is subtle but important. For Gellner industrialism and nationalism are linked together, industrialism needed

nationalism in order to bind the people together and so it necessarily followed. In the Darwinian social evolutionary version it only needs to be that, in the first instance, nationalism happened to come along at the same time as industrialism. Because the two appeared to be linked when industrialism came to spread, nationalism would go with it, as people looking in would not be able to tell which of the two factors was providing the great success so would just copy them both, putting them together to view them as both being indispensable as the process of modernization.

Although rapid changes do happen, in spikes or punctuations (Eldredge & Gould, 1972), they are constrained by impositions from the past and the external environment. This is something that Gellner was recognizing and perhaps moving towards in his own theorizing. In this sense Gellner's theory has the closest essence to Darwinian social evolution, but is still missing the crucial elements for explaining the generation of new variants and their selection. Crucial to this is being able to recognize what environmental constraints and pressures were in operation, and how this affected and limited the choices that actors could make and the way organizations could develop. Or, to paraphrase Marx (1977[1852]: 300), 'nationalisms make nations, but they do not make them just as they please; they do not make them under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.'

This concludes the engagement with different theories of social change from a Darwinian social evolutionary perspective. The next part of the thesis will look at two case-studies, centred around nationalism in England, later Britain, and Japan that will seek to demonstrate the practical benefits of social evolution as a comparative theory.

Part Two: The Case-Studies and Comparative Analysis

Continuity and Discontinuity: Nationalism in England

Introduction

The following chapter opens the part of this thesis that deals with two case-study examples, as a means of applying the Darwinian social evolutionary theory, developed over the last half of the thesis, and so illustrate the ways in which it can illuminate questions concerning social change in a historical and comparative perspective. This chapter deals with the development of nationalism in England; the next will look at the same process in Japan; and a final, third, chapter will look at the two comparatively. It is in the third chapter that most of the theoretical discussion will take place, although pointers will be made in each of the two chapters developing the case-studies.

In this chapter, on England, I will first introduce the subject and lay out my general philosophical approach to the question and view on nationalism. The next section will then discuss the idea of continuity and discontinuity, picking up on a 'selection game' formulated by John Breuilly (2005) and the questions it poses in deciding when something 'new' can be said to emerge (e.g. at what point has a monarchical state become a national state?). The final section will then look at the development of nationalism in England, following it from mediaeval times, to the Reformation to modernity, discussing how each period brought something new that enabled the final leap into nationalism.

This discussion is slightly different from the one on Japan. Whereas, as we will see, the Japan chapter is able to point to a time when nationalism emerged, this is not the objective with this chapter. This might be seen as cheating, but there are reasons for this as I will elaborate on in the next section. Part of the reason for this is a complexity to do with the distinction between England and Britain (Kumar, 2003; Langlands, 1999) and how much one is a different identity from the other. The main purpose of this chapter is to illustrate both the importance of continuity and discontinuity for the production of new social formations; the case of nationalism in England provides a useful example of this as there are longstanding claims for it being a 'nation' in several different time-periods (Breuilly, 2005), alongside arguments that it was the first nation in the modern sense, with claims made for different time periods (cf. Greenfeld, 1992; Hastings, 1997). I'm going to largely avoid this debate. This is a question for which I don't think a reliable answer can be found. Trapeze across the world and, undoubtedly, you'll be able to find that everywhere there is someone who can make a case for their nation being the first one (some more convincing than others: plausible first candidates are usually taken to be Ethiopia, Ancient Egypt, France, England and Japan, with everywhere else a bit Benedict Anderson).

This is, again, due to the problematic of defining a nation: depending on the definition used a nation can be found at almost any point in history, in the same way that a card shark or magician can always flip up the card they're needing from the top of the deck—how things are set-up has a lot of influence on what the result is. So here we're not concerned with whether England is the first nation. What can be said is that it is one of the first modern nations and it is an example of one of the routes of

arriving at the nation-formation. France is illustrative of another route. As ever, the Darwinian theory is not interested in crafting particular types and then arguing for which type appeared here, or is represented at that time; rather it treats the entities as individual entities, with variations, that can have an abstraction (Mayr, 1975). No particular nation is necessarily more correct, more civil or ethnic or more first than the other: they are different and this difference are largely due to their respective environmental conditions.

Lastly, a note on terminology. There is a certain difficulty that comes into writing a study like this and that's avoiding the problem of teleological speaking. As I am on one side of history, wherein England and Japan did develop into nations rather than any possible alternatives, it can be hard to avoid the problem of speaking in a way that suggests inevitability. This can be as simple as using the term 'nation' (or even 'England' and 'Japan')[57] for an earlier time-period where it would not normally apply (even, for example, using the term 'islands' or 'isles' can be suggestive - it might suggest the entity of 'Britain' before such really existed, or cause confusion as to which islands are being included in the case of Japan, where for most of its history Hokkaidō was a separate polity from the rest of the other islands). For conveniences sake I will use England as a designation for the polity under discussion through time, whilst bearing in mind that the size of that polity changed over time and will try to keep any teleological edge from being present but it may, at some points, creep in for which I beg indulgence.

[57] Even 'Europe' might qualify, with Christendom being perhaps a more appropriate term for much of the medieval period at least.

What then, to say of my views on nationalism? My thought is this: following on from Walker Conner (1994: 218) the question of 'when is the nation' is one that is very hard to answer, as it is very difficult to date the precise moment when a nation emerged. Part of this difficulty also resides in the fact that the answer to the question can change depending on how 'nation' is defined. The analogical idea would be the question of when time-travel is said to be invented: is it when the machine travels in time? When the machine is built? Or when the engineer comes up with a workable design? Any one of these can be plausibly seen as the right answer, depending on what the criteria being used to define 'invent' is.

So it is, in some senses, with nations. Are nation's mass phenomenon, in which case the dating is potentially into the 20th century (Conner, 1992)? Are they associated with certain features of modernity, intuitional and political structures, in which case they can be said to emerge around the 18th or 19th century with the arrival of industrialization (Gellner, 1983; Breuilly, 1993)? Or are they elite phenomenon, in which case they can be said to emerge anytime from the 10th century to the present (Hastings, 1997; Smith, 2009)? Or, even, is it a particular form of citizenship and identity, associated with territoriality, in which case nation like formations could have come into being in the ancient world (Grosby, 1999; Grosby, 2003). Or perhaps nations, in the sense of an identity, don't even exist at all (Malesevic, 2011)? As Breuilly (2005: 16) notes, nations do not have an existence outside of their definition, something that is arguably largely true of all large scale political units, in the sense that the borders that define them are not physically there—except for a few cases where geography matches the exact boundaries and these are normally the exceptions that prove the rule. How they are defined is thus, quite important. In light of this, I

will be offering my view on what nations are, that attempts to be comprehensive and consistent if a bit loose around the edges, whilst also bearing in mind the effect that this definition is potentially having on the drift of my arguments.

My view on nations is this: that they are modern phenomenon and emerge as a product of what modernity and industrialization happens to bring with it - a greater degree of communication, education and state penetration into everyday life leading to a firming up of identity and, more importantly, a firming up of distinction, whether real or imagined, between groups of people. This is broadly similar to that of Benedict Anderson's (2006) emphasis on the importance of the horizontal nature of relationships, and the importance of expanded communication in creating this 'imagined community', with a dash of Gellner's (2006) emphasis on the features of modernity and education to create a new sense of state and culture, alongside Steven Grosby's (1995) emphasis on territorial boundedness and Walker Conner's (1994) emphasis on the subjective nature of the experience. However, I do also agree with the view of ethno-symbolists that there is a process of development and continuity, even if it is less than pure, that is important for generating the culture and environment that makes nationalism possible (Smith, 2009; Hutchinson, 1994). Nations, in other words, do not spring out of nothing.

Is this argument tautological, as some have argued (c.f. Smith, 2007: 188; Colls, 2007: 192-193)? That by defining nations as modern products it confines them to modernity by fiat, rather than by historical fact? Yes, in a way. But it's only tautological in the sense that modern teeth whitening procedures is a tautological definition; the technology did not exist previously for teeth whitening procedures, thus there could not be any. Whilst I believe that there can be proto-national

movements and formations before the modern era, and this is what Anthony Smith's (1989) concept of the *ethnie* covers well, they cannot be modern nations because that requires an advent of technology and communication that did not exist in those eras.

There is, perhaps, a certain amount of unfairness in this, historical record wise. The bias towards modernity is likely in a part a result of the fact that only certain records have survived from the past, and those records that did survive tend to be biased towards the elite. Consequently, it could well be possible that, e.g., Ancient Egyptians were waving flags and celebrating being Egyptians, but if no record of it survived, or nobody thought it important to record, we would have no knowledge of it. However, I think there can be an informal argument against it: that in order for a shared feeling to expand to all people within a territory there would have to be the technology for such a mass communication, and for all the technological wonders of the ancient world such a means of transmission was simply not there. There may be methods of communication and transmission of information, but the speed of this is also important, for maintaining a sense of connection, particularly towards a centre that defines the outward identity.

I am sensitive to what Susan Reynolds (2007: 183) points out, though, that as nations are objects of belief, and so subjective, what constitutes a nation, what units it comprises, can mean different things at different periods of time. Different political ideas and structures inform how peoples of those time periods understood themselves and their ties with others and this is worth paying attention to when investigating them. Reynolds is not making a call to claim that nations have existed through all time, but is rather making the point that we should understand things in their social and political context and be careful about applying criteria from the present back

onto the past. Modern nations may not have existed in the past, but variants of the concept could do so. I am also, to some extent, in agreement with Adrian Hastings (1997: 9) view that nationalism should be separated from modernity, in the sense that it was not the only road to modernity or only ideology compatible with it. In some cases (but not necessarily Japan as we will see) it is a good idea to try and see nationalism apart from modernity. Indeed, the question of modernity itself can be seen as tricky one, with it being regarded as Eurocentric in character, that thereby diminishes, or ignores, the interconnections between different polities in the world and how they influenced one another (Bhambra, 2011).

The case-study of England is going to focus on the process of nationalism's development, through the ages, noting the elements of continuity, but also the environmental changes, socially and culturally, that saw the cultural concepts mutate and develop. In the next section, I will first look at the issue of continuity and discontinuity in greater depth, looking at a thought experiment devised by John Breuilly (2005). This will also serve as a platform for discussing the issue of how and when we can decide when a phenomenon has changed into something new, or in Conner's (1992: 159) words, "At what point in its development does a nation come into being?". The final section will then look at the development of the idea of nationalism through England's history, noting the elements of continuity between the mediaeval times and the Reformation period and how discontinuous changes altered the development of the cultural and political idea of a 'nation'.

Continuity and Discontinuity, or is Roger Federer still Roger Federer?

In criticising the ethno-symbolist conception of nations, that sees the importance of continuity in names and shared cultural history, symbols and mythology for a community, John Breuilly (2005: 17-18) offers this thought experiment:

> Imagine a knock-out competition involving 128 competitors. Each competitor has a name and a distinctive marking. The competitors are divided into sixty-four pairs which decrease to thirty-two pairs in the second round and so on, until a winner is declared after seven rounds. The nature of the competition varies from round to round. Sometimes it is a contest of chance such as the tossing of a coin. Sometimes skill or strength determines the result. We know in advance that there can only be one winner […] Once the competition is finished and we look back over the successive rounds the name that will stand out as it figures in every round will be that of the winner. So will the winner's marking.[58]

Breuilly's point in this example is that just knowing the name and marker (cultural, mythological symbols) will not actually tell you why a certain name (for instance England) persists in history. "[U]nless one can show the same causal mechanism at work in each and every generation, continuity cannot be related to one dominant factor" (ibid: 18). Or, in other words, unless the success of a particular name or marker can be attributed to that name and marker then it cannot be said to have a causal effect in its success. Its success is just random selection. This is not, incidentally, an unimportant point. Due to the nature of evolutionary reasoning it can sometimes come across as having a seemingly progressive edge to it, of explaining changes as if they were directed towards some final goal; this, is incorrect, in so far as the concepts of variation, inheritance and selection explain the changes without

[58] A point to make about this analogy, at least for social evolution, is of course that it has a format that necessitates a definitive winner. In the actual world, and this is something that social evolution pays attention to, there are no definitive winners and everything is constantly subject to a process of change over time.

there needing to be a final goal or endpoint to the process (Mayr, 1992: 131). "[It is a] fallacy that evolution embodies a fundamental trend or thrust leading to a primary and defining result, one feature that stands out above all else as an epitome of life's history" (Gould, 1996: 19). This is as true in the historical world and it is important to not fall into the trap of thinking that because 'something *happened* to happen this way, it *must* happen this way'.

What Breuilly has described here is a selection process, so, in some ways his arguments against it, which he deploys against ethno-symbolism, are also arguments against social evolutionary formulations. So is he right to suggest that we cannot get any meaningful information from a selection process of this kind? Daniel Dennett (1995: 54-55) provides something of an answer. As he notes, a tournament that was set-up as a coin tossing competition would not tell us anything interesting; whoever wins the tournament will have achieved a remarkable feat of winning ten-coin tosses in a row but there's nothing in that that predicts that they will have a good chance of winning the next toss. It is just luck. In a competition like a tennis tournament, however, we can make certain predictions[59]. Because a tennis tournament is based around skill we can say that, statistically, a player who has already won a tournament, or who is ranked higher, is more likely to win than a lower ranked player. Their performance gives some predictive power to how they will continue to perform. Naturally there are still matters of luck (having a bad day, being ill, lucky net cords etc.) that can affect the result, but luck and skill can often be intermingled in a competition setting. Selection processes are more like the latter, than the former. In which case the tournament structure looks different to Breuilly's model, wherein

[59] More on this analogy, in a more tortured form, in a moment.

the competition changes in each round. As Dennett (ibid: 85) states, "there has to be some measure of uniformity in the conditions of the competition for there to be any *interesting* outcome to a tournament".

Breuilly's tournament does not involve uniformity; rather in each round the conditions change such that luck plays a determining role in pretty much every round.[60] This is part of Breuilly's philosophical view on nationalism that is "It is not continuity but discontinuity… that needs emphasis" (2005: 34). The tournament structure replicates this: each round is different, representing the different discontinuous conditions. Thus what was useful in a previous round may have no use at all in the next round. The analogy to draw is that the cultural symbols, myths, and understanding of one group that is useful in a certain time and place, may not be useful in a future time and place when conditions change. The question to ask, then, is to what extent does discontinuity prevail over continuity?

Firstly, it might be said that it is not necessarily the case that an advantage a group builds up in one round is rendered completely useless in the next round when the conditions change. We can draw on Michael Mann (1986) and Pierre Bourdieu (1985) to answer this. Both are, to some extent, concerned with power and what power enables groups and people to do. Mann looks at four linked conceptions of power, as outlined previously, whereas Bourdieu has three conceptions of 'capital' that operate within particular 'fields'. In both cases neither one is saying that one power or capital has absolute dominance over the others; the environment, or field, might change such that one, or one particular combination, has more influence than

[60] Assuming, of course, that one competitor is not so absurdly gifted that they are proficient in every element of the competition.

another in that particular place and time. It's a constantly changing situation. But, and this at least is Bourdieu's (1985) point, having a build-up in one field can enable a group to better cope with a change. Having a lot of military power (to bring in Mann) could make a group very powerful in a militarily orientated society, but it doesn't become completely useless in a more economically orientated society. Indeed they may well be in a position to ally with the new power and so roughly maintain their status. For example, the British aristocracy has been remarkably successful at persisting over time, despite many of the changes, political, social and economic, that have occurred throughout history. Part of this may well be due to what has been accumulated in previous times, be it status, money or an ingrained position in general culture. As noted earlier, power, to a certain extent, is an ability to adapt to changing circumstances.

This brings us onto the next point. The tournament structure presumes that a competitor is the same throughout the tournament. But is this a fair assumption in itself? Could a competitor not mould themselves, altering their game, way of play, tactics in order to be better able to compete? This would seem to make sense, but the elements of Breuilly's thought experiment seem to stand against it. After all, if the name and marker does not represent what it originally represented at the start, how can it be said to be continuous through time?

This is a problematic question and one, in keeping with the spirit of tournaments and tennis that we will address as follows: is Roger Federer still Roger Federer? Consider: at the start of his career Federer was a particular kind of player. His precision serving, powerful forehand and quick reflexes virtually inaugurated the era of baseline domination in the game of men's tennis and virtually ended the

previously dominant serve and volley. There were elements of environmental change that enabled this: changes to the balls and courts meant that they were slower (partly in a response to the domination of strong servers such as Pete Sampras), and racket technology changes meant a player could strike deeper into the court from further back, making it harder to approach the net. Now, however, Federer's gameplay style has changed: he is now known for bringing serve and volley back into the game. This is in response to further environmental changes; his own age makes it harder to maintain a high level over a long game and the arrival of players like Nadal, Djokovic and Murray (who have high levels of stamina capable of running and rallying for long hours) means that he is no longer able to keep up with baseline rallies. Consequently he has adapted his game to shorten points and to take advantage of the quickening of the courts and balls as more tinkering goes on with the game. Given that the style of play has changed so much, can we say that this is still the same player?

There's an obvious unfairness in my saying that Breuilly would say no; his analogy is meant to point to a process that happens over many hundreds of years, whereas this analogy points to something happening over years. Nevertheless it does point to the fact that, even if something changes, perhaps radically changes, over time continuity can still be found within those changes. The causal element for the success of a particular name and marker may not be found in the name and marker itself but rather in the name and marker's capacity to change itself in response to changes around it. That is, its adaptability might well be what gives it 'successes' over another group. This doesn't necessarily mean that the cultural elements they have are what gave them success in terms of providing them with the means

necessary to triumph at all times. Rather it could just meant that the competitor, as an interactor, carried with it replicators of cultural forms and information that did not impede changes to different circumstances, whereas other competitors cultural forms did. As well, a particular group may have had advantages that enabled it to persist through time that others did not, as although there were discontinuous changes they were not enough to invalidate what had previously been built up. It could, of course, be entirely down to drift, or luck (Godfrey-Smith, 2009); but if one's opponents keep getting hit by lightning, or avalanches, or disease etc., whereas the other competitor does not it may well be worth considering that they have some properties that are enabling them to avoid disaster.

For example, in the case of England, Breuilly (2005: 23-25) notes that the Normans did not remodel English society, rather the Normans over time became English, despite conquering them. He attributes this to demographics: there were more Anglo-Saxons than there were Normans so the institutions that had been set-up endured as the Normans had to rely on local connections in order to enforce their rule. Consequently the English customs, laws and language endured. It also helped that England was more valuable, being richer and larger, than Normandy so they had less interest in their holdings in France. But this also works as an example of continuity: the stronger state-structures were set up by Alfred the Great, who put great[61] effort into attempting, at an elite level at any rate, to build-up a sense of cultural unity, through promotion of a common language and a common identity, leading to a building up of state structures (Foot, 1996). What purpose Alfred had behind this, whether political, national or religious, essentially does not matter.

[61] No pun intended

Kumar (2003: 47-48) points out that we can say that an English state came into existence under Alfred but not a nation state, but we don't need to claim that there is a nation-state at this point to demonstrate the important element of continuity. Because there was a state, which had built up certain institutions in order to rule, it meant that the Normans were capable of taking over England and imposing their rule, but were not capable of imposing their identity. In this sense there is an important discontinuity - the Norman Conquest which alters the environment and history - but also an important continuity, that means that a separate cultural identity absorbs the conqueror rather than the other way around.[62]

In sum, then, it is important to note the effect that discontinuity can have and the ways that this can lead to changes occurring for social and cultural evolution. We should not be quick to assume that just because something shares a name that it is necessarily the same thing or the same phenomenon throughout the ages. Similarly, however, we should not be quick to assume that the past does not matter for understanding a present phenomenon or how it came about. Whilst it is important to recognize discontinuity and the effects this can have in producing new formations and evolutions (cf. Gould, 1980c), it is also important to recognize that "nothing can be understood *ahistorically*" (Sober 2000: 7). This applies to social phenomenon and evolution just as much as it does to biological.

[62] This is not something unique to England; China, for example, maintained a cultural tradition over time, despite numerous outsider conquests, precisely because that cultural tradition looked a lot more refined, educated and nicer than the conquering groups own culture, and the state structures meant that any invader would have to fit into the system in order to be able to rule effectively (Zhao, 2013). Having a myth of 'the will of heaven' consequently meant that China could endure conquest and maintain an identity by accepting the conquerors and their rule, and then changing the conquerors to fit with their own traditions rather than the other way around.

The next section will now look at the case of England, tracing its path from Medieaval times to modern times, noting those areas of continuity that are important for understanding the genesis of the idea of nationalism and the nation-state, whilst also noting the importance that discontinuity played in the adaptation of the cultural and social idea to a new environment.

England and the Genesis of Nationalism

Medieval England

In discussing the rise of nationalism in England it is, in a certain sense, both wrong and unavoidable to start with the Venerable Bede. Wrong because, as will be covered, he was likely not promoting a sense of national identity and was far more interested in religious matters; unavoidable as he does generate a lot of the mythology which the nation and its identity would come to be based upon (like all good mythology this doesn't necessarily have to be the truth, but there's a kernel of truth contained within it).

Bede wrote his book, *An Ecclesiastical History of the English People*, around about the year 730. In that book he took three levels of unity for granted: 1) the unity of Britain as an island (united by religion, loyalty to Rome and the leadership of the English[63]); 2) the unity at an ecclesial level (the Archbishop of Canterbury had supremacy over England); and 3) that the Germanic tribes formed an English nation, that was distinct from Britain, meaning in this instance Britons (Hastings, 1997: 36-

[63] The rest of the island may well have had robust and foul-mouthed disagreements on this point…

38). Bede's importance, in this case, is that he "gave the idea of Englishness its particular power; Bede demonstrated that the Church not only created but named this new communal identity and made the *gens Anglorum* a people with a covenant, like Israel" (Foot, 1996: 38). For Bede the Anglo-Saxons were one people, the English, and shared an identity. He also gave the English a mythical status, in particular a status as a 'chosen people' (Smith, 1990). Bede drew on the information from the Old Testament, in particular Israel. Britain was originally a good land, however the Britons proved unworthy of the status of a chosen people, as they squandered the legacies of Roman and Christian civilizations. Consequently the Britons were abandoned by God and their heritage was transferred to another group: the English (Wormald, 1994: 14). The Bible, such as it was, provided a model for nations: the New Testament recognized the diversity of nations in the world, whilst the Old Testament provided a model on which they should be run (Hastings, 1997: 195-196; Smith, 2015).

There is also, within this, an important link between ethnic identity and religious identity. The missionaries who were sent to England by Gregory the Great in the sixth-century described the people they found there as the 'Angles'. Thus it was that the church founded by Gregory's disciples became the 'English' Church in Canterbury and, consequently, all those who adopted the Christian identity became English. "[A] single English kingdom was anticipated by a single English Church. The very name of 'English' was one of its fruits" (ibid: 12-13). Bede's intention in writing his history, or at least one of his intentions, was to demonstrate that the Anglo-Saxons were one people, brought together by the shared religious faith, despite their different ethnic and political origins. Religion was a binding force, as

was language that defined the Germanic people against the non-Germanic people's with whom they shared the same island (Foot, 1996: 38-39).

What can be seen here is the origin of a particular set of replicators; which is to say ideas that are joining together, religious and ethnic, and becoming part of worldviews, a particular network of ideas that are combined and structure how we interpret the world (Gabora, 2004). This is also open to the possibility of spreading and being transformed (Sperber, 1996). The idea of nations has to come from somewhere, so the importance of the Biblical conception of 'nation', whilst meaning something different from how we would understand 'nation', has an importance, as does the persistence of Christianity in Europe (Smith, 2015). The same is true of the ideas of 'Britain' and 'England'; although meaning something different at this time, the replicators have come into being and are beginning to join up with particular institutions forming interactors which are set to compete, crafting particular routines and practices.

We can see this with the arrival of Alfred the Great on the scene, who was greatly influenced by Bede's work and had it translated into vernacular language (Hastings, 1997: 39). King Alfred used much of what Bede had written as a means to promote himself as a ruler of the 'English' people. Having captured London in 886, or a few years before, he promoted himself as the King of all English people who were not under Danish rule[64]. The Danes, at that time, were occupying large parts of the country. Part of the reason for Alfred's promotion of the 'English' people was to

[64] Danelaw was a region of the North of England that was under Danish rule from about the 9th century up until just after the Norman Conquest. Its influence was still largely felt in the customs of the region.

formalize a new identity: one that could bring Mercia and Wessex together in a more peaceful manner – Wessex having previously brought Mercia under their rule.

The purpose behind Alfred's rhetoric was to advance the idea that all his Germanic subjects were one people, the Englishkind, specifically in opposition to Danish rule; providing them with a sense of a common people, heritage, faith and shared history in opposition to an 'other' (Foot, 1996: 26-28). Following this Alfred heavily promoted the idea of a common language and laws binding the people together. He drew on the shared Christian faith of the people to craft the idea of them being a same people; in particular he pointed to the similarity of the Anglo-Saxon laws to the laws of Ancient Israel and used this as an argument that the English were a chosen people and one, to whom, he was restoring a state that had previously existed, not creating a wholly new state (ibid: 32). His appeal to shared memory, his programme of educational revival and reform promoted the idea of shared history that "sought to persuade them that he was restoring the English, whereas, albeit following a model provided by Bede, he was inventing them" (ibid: 33). Alfred's plans to unify the people were, more than likely, not universally popular however no record of resistance survives, demonstrating the failure of the opposition (likely as not because they did not have a means of formulating an alternative).[65] Another way of putting this is that Alfred put together a particular replicator-interactor, by mixing the world-views, language and laws and joining them to institutions of state, which was able to outcompete any alternatives that were put forward (undoubtedly superior military power played a role as well in promoting the political and ideological angles

[65] As discussed above, there is a certain unavoidable bias towards Bede and Alfred here, in that these are the records that have survived so naturally it gives a larger degree of emphasis and agency to them then is the likely actuality, which was almost certainly more complicated.

(Mann, 1986)). Joining together the religious angle with a burgeoning ethnic angle proved to be a successful combination that enabled differential replication of these particular ideas. Alfred's use of vernacular was important, enabling a wider diffusion of his codifications and ideas; translating the Bible into vernacular and distributing them, alongside codifying vernacular laws, would help to create a sense of political unity (Hastings, 1997: 40-42), and draw people into perceiving them to be part of a group.

As Foot notes, what Alfred was doing shares more than a little similarity with the processes of creating an imagined community (Anderson, 2006):

> In this case one useful model…is that of Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*. Alfred was indeed trying to shape the English imagination; by collating and presenting a coherent historical whole he invented an English community, implanting into the minds of his people a personal and cultural feeling of belonging to the *Angelcynn*, the English kind. Alfred presenting his subjects with an idea partly shaped by Bede, partly of his own devising, and he adopted a self-conscious way of promoting it through the education reform programme. Despite the differences in scale, this is similar to Anderson's argument about the importance of the mass production of print as a formative process in the creation of imagined nations. It is significant that Alfred used the vernacular in order that his ideas might be most accessible (Foot, 1996: 36-37).

Foot is, perhaps, being a bit cheeky with this remark, the difference in scale between what Alfred was doing and what Anderson's notion of print-capitalism is intended to cover, is very large. Nonetheless there is a good point being made about the way in which vernacular was used in order to promote a sense of shared identity, and the way that reading and education was utilized in this endeavour. Vernacular is, after all, an important component for the promotion of nationalism and a separate identity (Hastings, 1997: 11-12). As Foot elsewhere notes Alfred is, to some extent, an example of Gellner's definition of nationalism in seeking to align the political and

the national unit, in particular by defining it against other groups (ibid: 33-34). This is a point that Hobsbawm (1990: 91) makes, about the way that a set of enemies, or another group that can be defined against, can provide a feeling for solidarity and give impetus to national claims. Again, what is visible here is the formation of a group as an interactor, built from a set of habits (language) and routines and practices (laws, customs), that creates a shared identity and sense of a group that is defined against an outsider and so promotes within-group solidarity (Sober & Wilson, 1994; Choi & Bowles, 2007).

These were important developments and they did not subside following the Norman Conquest. Indeed, as noted above, the Norman identity, being customs, self-image, culture, was, in fact, absorbed and subsumed under the English identity. The major change was in literary culture, with French and Latin becoming the language of both the ruling class and the written language for the next one-hundred and fifty years. It was not wholly a one-way street, however, as Normans injected a sense of imperialism into the burgeoning English identity (Hastings, 1997: 43-45). Bede, again, proved useful in this; having provided a blueprint for a national destiny, the Conquest was seen as a product of the sins of the English and was, thus, a smart rap on the knuckles from God to get their act together (Wormald, 1994: 17). The chosen people status and sense of identity lived on, as, perhaps paradoxically, the status of being a chosen people was conferred by defeat and the suffering, as this was seen as enabling a similarity with Israel (Hastings, 1999: 391). Defeat and danger were warning signs from God for people to increase their devotion and be aware of their sins; likewise remaining true through suffering was a proof of faith. There is then, an interaction with the changing environment which has the effect of transforming the

replicators (Sperber, 1996); not enough to call them something different, people still had their religious world-view, but it has been modified to accommodate the changes (Gabora, 2004): there is a mutation, but it is still replicating.

The Normans expanded the state they had inherited from Alfred, and embarked on a centralization of both Royal power and noble representation. The power of the monarch was followed by the development of the collective institution of power from the feudal ruling class, which was parliament. Unlike other places in Europe, however, it was one single parliament rather than several regional ones (Anderson, 1974: 113-115). This was an important development: although people had local identities, from the 12th Century onwards the expanding royal court and expanding royal authority made people more aware of the King and the central government, breaking down some ties of localism and expanding a sense of awareness of others (Keeney, 1947: 535). This expansion of feeling and knowledge of the King was, of course, used by the royals to great effect; they would often appeal to these motives and people's sense of duty to the king and each other in order to expand their own prerogative, to extend the feeling of community and also to bring people into military service. The latter was greatly helped by the development of the long bow; a technological achievement that made it easier for free men to participate in combat, as they could fire further with less use of strength and were more accurate (ibid: 537-539).[66] At this time, under Edward I, there was a further increase in the sense of a common origin and even a feeling of national destiny (ibid: 536). "The English of the fourteenth century liked to think of themselves as one

[66] We can note a comparison here with the role the gun would play in Japan, in enabling the expansion of the military for similar reasons.

people with a fanciful common origin and a vague sort of destiny. They were thoroughly aware that they were Englishmen as well as Yorkshiremen; they disliked foreign foreigners more than they disliked the man from the next county" (ibid: 549).[67]

It is at this point that we insert the crowbar into this burgeoning story of the English nation. Despite myths of common origin and a sense of destiny, there was at this point no English nationalism, in the sense of a distinct sense of mass identity divorced from religious and patrimonial feeling. The local identities of the people likely had more pull; as Keeney concedes it was difficult to get people to sign up to military service, unless they were being paid well for it (Keeney, 1947: 547). This is borne out if we look forward a few centuries: in the 1700s the army and navy were still having to rely on press gangs to pressure, coerce, threaten, bribe and trick people into signing up. The troops themselves were not popular and were regarded with suspicion (Sharpe, 1987: 102-103).

With reference to religious identity playing a role it is worth noting that Bede's concerns when writing were primarily religious in character. He was concerned to convert the pagan Germanic invaders to Christianity. Consequently he had no interest in dwelling on the fact that the people he dubbed 'the English' were a variety of separate ethnicities (Angles, Saxons, Jutes etc.) with their own distinctive traditions. More to the point there was, as yet, no England – only a territory in the south of Britain that was not yet expanded to the borders that we would recognise today (Kumar, 2003: 41-42). In addition, whilst the New Testament recognized the

[67] Not much has changed in the interceding centuries.

diversity of nations, as Hastings' states, it saw this as a condition to be overcome, not as a good state of affairs. The outlook of the Church was Universalist; it was not until Protestantism came along that there began to be more particularistic approaches (Grosby, 2003: 11-12) (more on which below).

Thanks to Alfred's efforts of promotion England would have a, for that time-period, a centralized state and one that the Normans would inherit, but to say that there was a state is not the same as saying there was a nation-state (ibid: 43). In addition it is doubtful that there was a strong national feeling. A Danish dynasty, Cnut and his successors from 1016-1042, were able to rule without too much trouble, for all the propaganda that was marshalled against the Danes when Alfred was unifying the people, which would suggest that there was as yet no sustained sense of difference and national identity among the people (ibid: 44). Likewise with the nobles. Whilst Alfred's policies may well have been more targeted at his own entourage and peers rather than the common folk (Foot, 1996: 33), the fact there was no disruption from the upper classes, again, suggests that there was little in the way of national commitment (Kumar, 2003: 44). Alfred had attempted to use Bede's writings not to forge a new national community, but rather to assert his own legitimacy over the places he united and conquered. He was no more interested in ethnic transformation than Bede was and his efforts did not extend beyond his own circle. In the short-term these efforts failed as it was the Danish who became the political model that was followed (Breuilly, 2005: 19-21).

With the Normans there was a building up of a national government, but there is little evidence for a common identity building. Though shires and courts existed they were not regarded as anything other than local affairs with no cross

country communication, except among a small number of elites (ibid: 21-22). The people accepted the Norman Conquest without much of a care, it again played into the developed chosen people narrative, and William himself ruled as an English king (Kumar, 2003: 49). The institutions that had been developed maintained the sense of continuity. Consequently there was little in the way of an oppositional identity that built in response to the Normans, much as this would later be used. History and traditions of the English peoples pre-conquest were studied by historians, but this was used more to help integrate the Normans and the English than it was as a clarion call for a pre-conquest period (ibid: 48-52). There was a large increase in the use of vernacular language literature at this time but, although important, it cannot be taken as a sign of national identity. The legal and written language was still French and Latin, and would be for a while. And writers such as Chaucer, and others who wrote in the vernacular, were not all that popular in their time. Indeed, in the case of Chaucer, it is worth noting that he wrote in the vernacular less to express an English identity, but more to emulate the traditions of France and Italy who had a strong vernacular literature. Chaucer, effectively, saw himself as a European (ibid: 54-57).

So what continuities can be drawn from this period? Firstly, and most obviously, there was a state. It was not a nation-state but, at this point, it does not effectively matter; it contained a set of institutions which could be used to carry forward replicators (Hodgson, 2009), and it was also a territorial state, having defined locus of sovereignty in the King (Breuilly, 1993: 75-76; Spruyt, 1994a). Consequently, there was a state and there was a burgeoning sense of identity that was attached to it, alongside a somewhat communal feeling promoted by institutions

created by that state. Whilst there was no English nation, it is perhaps possible to say that there was a burgeoning English *ethnie*.

What is being seen here, as noted throughout the above exegesis, is the arrival of particular sets of interactors (Hull, 2001: 22) and particular sets of replicators. The state is one of the interactors; not as a nation-state, as it heavily linked with regnal identity (when people profess their devotion to the nation, or appeals are made on behalf of the nation, they are really professing devotion to the king) (Breuilly, 2005: 26-28).

Interactors, recall, engage with the environment in such a way as to achieve differential reproduction. This reproduction, or passing on, can occur in either vertical (parent to offspring) or horizontal (one person to another) forms of transmission (Hull, 2001: 34-35). The interactor contains a set a replicators that are important for later on, particularly with reference to continuity: these are, as noted before, the religious ideas of the Bible and Christianity; and the linking of this with a certain sense of ethnic identity as a people. The success of the state as an interactor ensures the survival of the particular replicators, which, thanks to Alfred's use of vernacular, are able to diffuse through the population in a stronger way than if they had been kept in Latin. The interactor is also capable of outcompeting the Norman interactor, which gets subsumed under Alfred's state, modifying it but not eliminating it, ensuring the persistence of the ideas and structures. It was not, as Brueilly would have it, a matter of luck, but one of selection. The selection of the interactor, the state, led to a selection for the particular routines, habits (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010), worldviews (Gabora, 2004) and roles and practices (Runciman, 2005: 143-144) that went into forming it. The state as interactor, and the replicators it

houses, are an example of a lineage (Hull, 2001: 35). Of importance here is that it ensured the survival of the link between the religious ideas and the ethnic ideas, keeping alive the Biblical notion of 'nations' and the vernacular idea of an 'English' people. These are two important components of continuity that recur and would be transformed through changing environment and interaction with those changes.

One such environmental change, that would give a boost to the concept of nationalism in England, was the Reformation.

The Reformation

Was there a nationalism in Elizabethan England, or more particularly Reformation England? Liah Greenfeld (1992) argues for this view, claiming that, in sixteenth century England, the concept of nationalism in its modern sense came into being: "in early sixteenth-century England – the word "nation" in its conciliar meaning of "an elite" was applied to the population of the country and made synonymous with the word "people"" (1992: 6). This new sense of the word, she argues, elevated the people to that of an elite – making them a part of 'the nation' or the elite. It was an emergent form, not bound to a particular country or community and would only later develop its more exclusivist sense (ibid: 6-7). This only occurred later on, when the term was imported to different environments. Greenfeld sees a somewhat evolutionary path behind the concept – it follows a zig-zag pattern of change where it arises out of other things. It was only when the concept was imported to new environments (France, America, Germany, Russia) that it gained its different, more particularistic meanings (ibid: 9-10). Before diving into Greenfeld's

exposition on this, it is already worth noting the importance of the 'nation' replicator surviving, through that religious link. Now that it is available, it is possible for selection pressures to act on it, mutating and adapting the replicator.

The transformation of the comment occurred through, by the 1500s, an equation of the word for 'country' with the word for 'nation' with both signifying a concept of 'the people'. This was possible due to an already existing concept of sovereignty – the 1533 Act of Appeals had defined 'Empire' to mean a temporally and spiritually sovereign unit, one that controlled its own territories and could have no outside, that is to say Papal, interference or control. The English empire was thus its own sovereign territory, in control of its own affairs (ibid: 32-35). We can, again, look back to Alfred's use of Bede's concepts to craft the notion of a 'people', linking it with the concept of a sovereign territory and state.

The concept proved to be useful for the new aristocracy, who required a justification for their promotion into offices of state and their new found influence. The concept of nation, and the idea that everyone subsumed under it were one people, was ideologically useful. Land reclamation and new wealth enabled a greater push for schooling and university helped to redefine the social hierarchy and create a quasi-middle class. This group was also in favour of the notion of nationalism, as it would enable them to advance themselves, and the concept was also useful to the King, who could use it to expropriate wealth from the Church in the 1540s (ibid: 47-48). Thus we can, here, see, similarly to the example of the spread of Christianity in the chapter on Mann, a link between political power and ideological power: there is a selection of the interactor that is carrying the replicators linking the nation world-

view with the particular push for power among sets of social actors with their own interests.

An important moment in this came with Henry the VIII and his break with the Church of Rome. This opened the door to the Reformation and to Protestantism. This sanctioned the development of a separate identity and a sense of pride: through the Old Testament there was a (re)discovery of the concept of the chosen people and the links to Ancient Israel; the vernacular translation of the Bible enabled all who were literate to read it and led to an increase in literacy; in the vernacular translation the Bible also used the word 'nation' to refer to a particular ethnic group, further spreading the idea of separate ethnic groups and territories (ibid: 51-54). This also helped to promote a habit of self-reflection, conducive towards crafting a series of cultural programs that were an important component towards forming the modern state (Ichijo, 2013: 48).

It was with Elizabeth I that the nationalist ideas would really advance. In particular it was strongly linked to Protestantism. John Foxe's *Book of Martyrs* (1554) proved to be extremely popular, telling the stories of the exiled martyrs and those who were put to death in Mary's brief reign and attempt to reinstall Catholicism. The religious and the national elements were put together, to promote the idea of the English as a uniquely religious nation. Elizabeth was not a nationalist herself but she did not stop the ideas and was glorified as a figure of the nation. Repeated success against the odds, particularly with the destruction of the Spanish Armada in 1588[68], was seen as evidence of God's favour. She also had a peaceful

[68] It did not, essentially, matter that the Armada, only one of several attempts, was mostly destroyed by weather before a shot was ever fired in anger. Propaganda did the rest of the work though, again,

relationship with Parliament, helping dissociate the monarch from the nation and leading to a developing national culture. The endorsement of this culture from Elizabeth was what enabled there to be a national identity at the end of the sixteenth century (Greenfeld, 1992: 63-66). Elizabeth's rule saw a greater reliance on parliament, who were more open about criticizing the monarch and opposing her. Elizabeth sold more church lands in order to build an independent fund to get around parliament, but this led to a further slimming of the bureaucracy. The military, at this point, was still weak with no real general army and a reliance on militia groups (Anderson, 1974: 128-130). But, the lack of strength of the army led to a pumping of funds into the navy. Begun by Henry VII, just before 1500, by the time of Elizabeth in 1588 she could boast of having the largest navy in Europe[69]. This enabled a dual purpose: most of the ships were also trade ships (the bulk of them merchant ships) that could be converted at times of war and at times of peace. Consequently the ability of England to wage war, and the ability of it to trade and generate income, had both been increased – factors that would be important to the empire (ibid: 133-135).

The monarchy, and finally religion, disappeared from the national picture with the English Revolution. Stuarts, and more particularly Charles, attempted to assert themselves more strongly on parliament with the eventual result being the civil war. The war split along national lines and, essentially, became a contest between those who saw the monarch as being integral to the image of the nation, and those who did not. Those who did not (Cromwell) triumphed and the monarchy was cast

---

we can note a similarity here between an intervention by the elements being interpreted as divine protection, and the kamikaze wind in the case of Japan, which was similarly interpreted (if it even happened at all).

[69] It, of course, helped that the Spanish fleet had been wrecked in a storm.

from the national picture. The result of the revolution also meant that nationalism became fundamental and no longer needed to be justified in other terms. As Greenfeld (1992: 74-77) sees it the conflict was largely one between the crown and the court, or the king and the nation, with the puritans having an emerging national consciousness that seeped into the rest of the nation. Consequently, after the revolution, religion became more secondary to nationalism, with parliament taking precedence even after the restoration. It is also, arguably, the case that the Reformation contained this contradictory nature within it. As Ichijo (2013: 49) puts it the Reformation promoted the idea of human agency and the spirit of scientific investigation, whilst at the same time combined with the notion of English 'chosen people' status with a universalizing impetus of the Christian faith. This created an almost secularizing tendency, in valuing human agency, whilst also promoting Godliness. But the division, the idea that this universalism could exist absent the Christian bent, was also present and, again, indicates its possibility for selection pressures to lead to adaptation.

So what can be said of Greenfeld's idea? Was there an English nationalism in the sixteenth century? Kumar (2003: ch 5)[70] is particularly scathing in his assessment. He argues, convincingly, that Greenfeld's argument, whilst raising interesting points and being a demonstration of a growing power and expansion of the state and patriotism, is not to be taken as an argument for the growth of nationalism. In the main he argues that much of what she recounts in terms of vernacular printings of the Bible were already in evidence in mainland Europe, Italy

[70] Albeit, it's worth noting that he has mellowed somewhat on the argument in a later piece (Kumar, 2010).

and Germany, before they occurred in England and that literacy rates in these areas were higher; similarly, contrary to Greenfeld's argument, the sense of patriotism that centred on the crown was an idea borrowed from France (as was, indeed, the idea of a chosen nation). He also points out that her argument regarding Cromwell and the civil war being nationalist in character is not correct. Religion played a heavy role, particularly with the concept of millenarianism, specifically the idea that the prophecies in the Book of Revelations were beginning to play out, having a strong grip on the mind-sets of the actors (ibid: 126). Cromwell himself, contrary to Greenfeld, identified with his religion first and England second and was primarily religiously motivated (ibid: 129).

The role of Protestantism in her argument, Kumar (ibid: 104) points out, is circular: it requires a sense of nationalism to already exist before Protestantism comes along, otherwise Protestantism could not have expanded it. Protestantism was mostly used to promote the monarch and propaganda within the kingdom. It was used to increase the sense of regnal identity. Later on, particularly in 1640, Protestantism was used in opposition to the crown but this was a proto-nationalism, having the structure of nationalist movements but none of the content (Breuilly, 2005: 28-30). If it existed, nationalism was only at an elite level (ibid: 31).

This does not mean that there weren't some important continuities at work, however. Though Protestantism was used to promote the monarch not the nation, it did enable a further marker of difference between England and other territories.

Kumar (2003: 101-102) also makes an important point concerning patriotism. The monarch and the state were identified as being one and people could have a sense of devotion to the monarch, certainly something that Elizabeth promoted, but

this was not a national sense. National belonging, such as it was, was a class identity that was restricted to those who were closest around the Queen and later King. There was no popular conception of sovereignty. But this needs to be looked at in context of environmental changes. The monarch's power is weakening; selling off of offices is, as Anderson (1974) noted weakening the monarch's power in relation to the gentry and nobles. The expansion of the navy is also an important element for future developments, it would be what would enable England and Britain to become so powerful and dominant in the future. And, as Breuilly (2005: 31) acknowledges, there was a sense of nationhood at the elite level. It is again, not modern nationalism, but there is a conception.

We can, again, trace the fact that the two concepts that were important previously, religion and the ethnic conception of people, are reoccurring again and linking together again. Now, however, there is a mutation, through adaptive pressure, on the concept of the nation: as Greenfeld (1992: 32-35) the concept gets attached to the concept of the people. Likewise religion, through the Reformation, goes under a transformation, away from looking to Rome and into a more personal sphere, allied with Henry VIII changes to increase his own power. But again, the notion of the nation has been detached. The changing cultural environment, with the rise of the more scientific mode of thought, placing more emphasis on human agency (Ichijo, 2013) is creating a mind-set and habits of thoughts that are altering worldviews (Gabora, 2004), whilst the changing geopolitical environment, in the battle with Spain and the associated propaganda, frames a stronger 'us and them' sense; one that would feed into the capacity to see things in terms of in-groups and out-groups (Runciman, 2005: 68-69).

Although this starts along religious lines, the split nonetheless creates a sense of an other and a unifying identity among an oppositional group (Hastings, 1997: 57-58). And Greenfeld (1992: 77) likely has a point in suggesting that the outcome of the Revolution would see a detachment of the concept of nationalism from the monarch; even if only among elite groups as it would be hard to maintain the sense of connection without the monarch. Indeed, it's arguably the case that the loss of the monarch leads to the rise of a new sort of interactor, one that contains sovereignty and the power of parliament, rather than monarchical sovereignty; again a worldview that perhaps gains a stronger potential to replicate and diffuse as religious thinking in general declines.

Other factors that were built up at this time, that would be useful for the later development of modern nationalism, were the continuance of common law across the region, the unification of language (after Cornish had died out), the fact that, geographically, England had no land borders with comparable powers, with Wales absorbed under Henry VII. Scotland was still there, and they played a destabilising role in the English Civil War, however they were not comparable to England and would cease to be a threat after 1746. In addition the conflict with Spain, again, promoted both Protestantism and the emotional pull of the religion in connection with a distinct identity; after the Armada of 1588 being English was seen as being Protestant (Sharpe, 1987: 114-117). London also expanded as a hub – news filtered out from there and provided a sense of expanded horizons and national consciousness (ibid: 117-118).

Thus, whilst nationalism cannot be seen as being fully there by the end of the sixteenth century, the elements are in place for it.

From Protestants, to Imperials, to Nation: England into Britain

One of the reasons why Protestantism, and latterly anti-Catholicism, was important was that it provided a unifying ground for the island formerly known as, and soon to be known again as, Britain (Kumar, 2003: 135). There were religious differences, mainly to do with structural and institutional factors that were important; one of the causes of the English Civil War was that Charles the First's attempt to impose religious uniformity across the three kingdoms, stirred up a rebellious backlash from Scotland and Ireland that subsequently led to his going to the English parliament for funds, which resulted in the Civil War (ibid: 131). Even before Britain was formalized, the interconnections between the countries was apparent. The dream of a union, and founding of Britain, was an earnest one from when King James I/VI became King of Scotland and England, styling himself as the King of Britain. He strove hard, but in vain, to bring the people closer together as both the English and the Scottish contrived to see this as an imperial plot by the other (ibid: 132-133). Even so, the idea of uniting the two Kingdoms under the banner of Britain was an old one, which had some level of popularity among the intellectual stratums of both England and Scotland and so the name Great Britain was in common currency at the time James used it. Charles the Second encouraged it further by introducing the female figure of Britannia on coins used throughout the realm in 1665 (ibid: 133-134). So it was that when the two parliaments did unite in 1707 there was a degree of familiarity, perhaps even popularity, with the ambition and the name that would be used (ibid: 134).

The Welsh were fairly easily assimilated along these lines: having long been a colony of England, whilst they retained their own language and institutional structure (Davies, 1996; 1997), they were otherwise assimilated into the main political currents and institutions of England. The fact that the Tudor kings and queens were nominally Welsh helped a great deal with this as it was seen as the fulfilment of the prophecy that one day the line of Arthur, king of the Britons, would sit rightfully on the throne again; Protestantism was then, for the Welsh, seen as the restoration of the true British religion after a hiatus of some years (Kumar, 2003: 138-139). Ireland was, for obvious reasons, the tricky case: being a Catholic country with an imposed rule by a country that was indulging in anti-Catholic hysteria was problematic for greater integrations at cultural levels. Ireland was also seen as being something of a laboratory for policies that England/Britain wished to trial. Consequently, whilst there were Irish members of Britain and the British Empire their relationship was always more ambiguous and tenuous (Colley, 1992: 327).

The process of transitioning to Britain was also helped by the fact that, for most people, they were comfortable with possessing more than one identity. The new British identity did not destroy their old English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish identities; rather it was a new identity that sat alongside their country, region, village and familial identities (ibid: 315). People were in possession of multiple, overlapping identities, neither one of which required the others to be eliminated (Hutchinson, 2004). But it was an identity that was in the process of being created. Despite the idea of Britain being old, older than the concepts of England, Scotland and Wales in truth, and thus had a history and familiarity that could be built on, it was still a new identity that was being built and would take a time to achieve a certain level of

national consciousness (Colley, 1986). How it did this is part of the question that is being addressed here.

So how did the new identity come about? We've already addressed one part of this; the joint religion created a sense of unification at a cultural level. Whilst it was true that there were differences between them, from a longer lens look those differences were more minor and they were certainly more minor when compared with the Catholics. The three other factors, joined together to some extent, were war, economics and imperialism.

For Britain, a sense of wider out-group that they would define themselves against, helping to eliminate the sense of differences between Scots, Welsh and English, came through the twin sources of war and empire. In the case of war there is already a case that this is a means of creating a sense of cohesion within a group. Human altruism, by which is meant a willingness to pay a cost to help someone else without immediate reward, or more specifically parochialism, can be seen as an off-shoot of this. As has been argued by several theorists (Sober & Wilson, 1998; Boyd et al, 2003; Bowles, 2009) group competition was important for evolution of within-group altruism: individuals who had a tendency to be altruistic towards those who were part of their 'group' were more likely to survive, as their group would be better coordinated and stronger than a group made of individuals who had a tendency to cheat others. Cases of conflict sharpen the divide between groups and also, to a certain extent, help identify who is within a group and who is not.

There were also other large-scale factors at work: The Seven Years War (1756-1763) ended Jacobitism as a force and as a source of division between the

Scottish and the English, helping to solidify the new union; the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783) saw the loss of a transatlantic Anglophone connection, consequently producing a much more active English interest in their Celtic neighbours; and finally the wars with revolutionary and Napoleonic France (1793-1802 and 1803-1815) saw an intensification of both propaganda, sharpening divisions and senses of an in-group, as well as forcing the government into recruiting more people into the military, something it had formerly been reluctant to do (Colley, 1986: 100-101). The wars with France in particular were important as it drew on the unifying theme of anti-Catholicism, and memories and myths of previous conflicts with Catholic states (Spain and the Armada in particular) were drawn upon (Kumar, 2003: 161-162). The emphasis on the Catholic element of France, even after it had ceased to be officially Catholic under the republic, was important as a unifying factor for Britain: it was this that enabled, for example Scotland, which had historically had alliances and friendly relations with France, to feel a sense of emotional stake in the outcome and push a closer identification with the idea of Britishness (Colley, 1992: 321). Folk memories of the threats would persist, keeping alive the feeling of needing cohesion against a potential threat (ibid: 323). Propaganda at this time, better distributed thanks to the arrival of mass printing and better mail and communication networks (Colley, 1986: 100-101), also addressed the differences in terms of political and economic structures: Protestant Britain was superior to Catholic France because it was free, independent, tolerant, liberal and open to trade; France was despotic, dogmatic and poor (Kumar, 2003: 164). These elements are, perhaps, culturally important: just as, following the Civil War, Protestantism could slowly fade out to leave the nation as the important focus of loyalty (Greenfeld, 1992: 75-77) so too

could it fade out in this case and leave the cultural identity markers behind. As the environment changed, religion losing its power, these cultural ideas of difference could adapt: turning from being 'Protestant' characteristics to 'national' characteristics.

First, a theoretically important element of this is the impact that militarism and military culture has on a people. Daniele Conversi (2007) argues that militarism can have a homogenizing effect on the nation at least as strong, if not more so, than industrialism did. The nation would adopt various rituals (flags, salutations, even elements of regimentation in education) that were normally associated and used within the military and perform them en masse. There could, therefore, be a cultural homogenization prior to nationalism, with nationalism being helped by, and helping, reinforce that sense of homogenization. Essentially the routines that form within the military institutions, are selected for in terms of the wider population: as elites need to create a sense of homogeneity in the population they adopt, adapt and diffuse these routines and habits into the wider population. This is, to an extent, part of the importance that Gellner (2006) points towards in mass education: it provides a focal point for these routines to be inculcated in the people, with the replicators being transmitted vertically, but also horizontally through people interacting with one another, at home and outside the institutions (Hull, 2001: 34-35; Richerson & Boyd, 2006: 44-48).

Militarism, and increasing militarism as a result of need to fight wars and increasingly mechanized wars on a large scale, further increases a sense of internal homogenization pushing the in-group and out-group divide. Militarism had institutional consequences as well: it led to the rationalization of state administration,

both for war fighting purposes but also for tax extraction purposes (Mann, 1993: 222). This had the effect of pushing discontents in the population away from local matters towards more national matters: as the state power extended further there began to be more link-up between different regional actors and class actors, thus converting certain proto-nationalist sentiments into more nationalist sentiments (ibid: 224-225).

The second factor is the economic factor, specifically the changes created by the industrial revolution: a revolution that was British in character, incorporating all aspects of the Kingdom, not just England (Kumar, 2000: 590). This factor is already an important one, as it would help to promote a shared sense of in-group identity: that is every group could, at some level, point to an area (e.g. shipyards in Scotland, coal fields in the North), or figure, who had contributed but also see the links between them. The Revolution was also not a single 'event' but rather a process that happened over a long period of time (Mann, 1993: 94). The lack of an economic opposition between the old regime and the new rising classes helped to craft a certain sense of shared feeling between the groups (ibid: 102). There were benefits to be had for the Celtic fringe of Britain and working-class groups as well: the ruling classes of Scotland and Wales saw the new British identity as an opportunity to be more involved and move up the social ladder, generally gaining greater parity in influence, money, jobs and titles. Similarly for much of the working-class population there was a belief that new opportunities for work and self-betterment were provided: the English language enabled them to move around geographically and find more work and employment elsewhere (Colley, 1986: 111-112). A British ruling class coming into formation not only helped distribute the idea of Britishness, but it would find a

more receptive audience also in those who saw the new identity as a means to advance themselves (Kumar, 2003: 167). It was this interaction that made the industrial revolution, and its economic advances, form something that was British, rather than identified with anyone part of its particular group.

Advances in communication, as a result of some of the industrial revolutions advances, also helped spread a new sense of connection and identity. The rise of print-capitalism, within certain territorial bounds, helped create a sense of fixity to language, as well as promote a specific form of language as being the 'universal' one. In effect it created a language field in which people could interact and become aware of one another (Anderson, 2006: 44-45). The economic expansion and industrial revolution assisted with this: the creation of new roads, steam trains and mail coaches allowed information to travel further as well as faster (Colley, 1986: 101-102; Kumar, 2003: 168). It also enabled more people to travel from place to place and interact with one another (Colley, 1986: 102). Increasing literacy led to an increase in more newspapers and periodicals. The new communication network that emerged created a potent means for spreading messages around a diffuse network (Mann, 1993: 104-105). The creation of a shared feeling, of a widening in-group, was a consequence of this. However it could have turned out differently. As Walker Connor (1972: 328) points out, increasing communication can lead to ethnic conflict as groups realize their differences from one another, exacerbating inter-ethnic difference and conflict. However the shared language, as well as the oversees imperial adventures and the war-time factor, helped to create a shared sense of being one people, with the greater communication increase increasing cohesion. The point here is that the environmental structure matters, and a background of existing

cohesion in one form of another is necessary for mass communication to have the effect of pulling people together, not the generator of that cohesion in the first place (Smith, 1981: 49). The importance of this for spreading cultural ideas cannot be underestimated: people learn new things through imitation of what they see and hear and respond to (Richerson & Boyd, 2006: 11-13, 44-45). The wider the communication network the wider the scope is for learning.

The third important factor that led to the creation of a British national consciousness was imperialism, specifically the British Empire. This is an important locus, and the point where the phylogenetic viewpoint comes in handy. By looking beyond just the endogenous changes within England/Britain, we can see that colonialism was important to the development of the industrial revolution and the expansion of the economy because of the way it interacted with other entities in the world. As Gurminder Bhambra (2007: 137-138) argues, colonialism was important for Britain to advance economically as cotton, and the techniques to dye it, were imported from India, whilst the Indian cotton industry was closed down, creating a market for Britain to sell into. Similarly the slave trade, and the sugar plantations in the West Indies, saw Britain accumulate a lot of capital and resources which could then be routed into national expansion. This aspect of the industrial revolution should not be ignored, and points to the way that the three factors under discussion, war, imperialism and economy were all linked together in some way. It also knocks against the notion that these entities, i.e. Britain, can be discussed in complete isolation from other events in the world, and the connections between different areas (Subrahmanyam, 1997).

Beyond the economic benefits and what that brought to Britain to enable the industrial revolution, there is another sense in which the empire was important and it is through Krishan Kumar's (2000) concept of 'imperial' or 'missionary' nationalism. Kumar's basic point is that, whilst there is, at least initially, a tension between empire and nation, they are not necessarily always divided. National identity and nationalism are not necessarily the same thing and the two can be separated. So whilst nationalism and empires are opposed, national identity and empire can link up fairly well with one another (Kumar, 2000: 578-579).

The key element of imperial nationalism is "the attachment of a dominant or core ethnic group to a state entity that conceives itself as dedicated to some large cause or purpose, religious, cultural, or political" (ibid: 580). This is important, not just because it provides a binding agent for the group concerned but also because it can build on the prior elements that are already in a particular cultural array. There was, already, an existing imperial mythology and tradition in England, brought in by the Normans (Hastings, 1997: 44-45), that could be 're-discovered' and used (Hutchinson, 2005: 7) and England went on to form the core ethnic group of Britain (ibid: 67). The new structures and institution of the United Kingdom also meant that the Scottish, Welsh and, to a certain extent, Irish also had a greater stake in accepting the British identity and portraying themselves as such: it meant that they could move further up the ladder of society (Colley, 1986). In this case, contrary to what Gellner (2006) proposed in terms of mobility being blocked, the sense of an imperial mission likely also stopped such blocking. As said before, encountering different cultures and ethnic groups helped to make internal differences between English, Scottish and the

Welsh (accents, clothes, centuries of historical anecdotes about battles, wars and suchlike) seem less significant (Colley, 1992).

Another aspect that works in this scenario is also the prevalent feeling of a sense of destiny, or being a chosen group (Hastings, 1999; Smith, 2003). Religion, and in particular for Britain Protestantism, provides a way of mythologizing a past and mythologizing a sense of threat to a particular group, helping to craft the 'us vs them' dynamic (Hastings, 1997: 188-189, 190-191). Religion helped to provide the notion of a group having a chosen and special status as against others; that it had a mission to perform in the world, some task that it was required to do (ibid: 196-197; Greenfeld, 1992). So the imperial nationalism builds on this: it keeps the sense of specialness and sense of being a chosen group with a mission, but changes the nature of the mission. In some ways this was a product of environmental changes: as the British Empire expanded the anti-Catholicism aspect was less needed as a means of integrating disparate people's and groups into the empire, indeed promoting it could be detrimental (Hastings, 1997: 65). New challenges existed for Britain in the form of the US, Germany and Japan, none of which were anti-Protestant, alongside a general trend towards secularization. Consequently the sense of the mission changed: away from spreading Protestantism and fighting Catholics and towards spreading the civilizational mission, spreading modernity and progress to those who did not have it--'the white man's burden' came to the fore (Kumar, 2000: 590-591).

These three factors together—militarism, industrialisation, empire--fostered a sense of national consciousness, building on some the prior formations and altering them as the environment changed. As was noted throughout, many of the important replicators and interactors began life in the medieval period, before changing and

adapting to the differing environmental pressures. Their existence, as variants, was necessary from that earlier time in order for the later transformations to take place. We can see this in the ideas of special destiny and chosen group. Initially only endowed with religious meaning, after the Reformation and subsequent promotion of human agency, combined with the more imperial outlook, the worldviews adapted and changed to enable replication: they went from being religious conceptions to taking on more secular conceptions to do with notions of 'the white man's burden', keeping the sense of special destiny and chosen people but now compatible with non-religious meanings (Malesevic, 2013: 50).

These changes occurred in in small steps, building up cumulatively (Richerson & Boyd, 2006: 50-54), but when the time came the pressure of the build-up would lead, eventually, to a rapid (in historical time) change and adoption of a new set of identities (Gould, 1987). This is why it can, on the face of it, appear that nationalism and national identity was always there in a certain population: the rapidity of the change effaces the previous conceptions.

With the story of England and Britain told, it is now time to move from the pristine case to the secondary one as we discuss the rise of nationalism in Japan.

The Tale of Nihon Gunkoku Shugi: Nationalism in Japan

Nations never build apparently radical forms of government on foundations that aren't there already.

- Margaret Atwood (2012)

In Japan, as elsewhere, the process of establishing a national ethos in a changed and changing social setting was a trial-and-error affair. Ideologies of the imperial Japan produced were neither created ex nihilio nor adopted ready-made. Without a text or a revelation to serve as a canonical source, views of state and society evolved fitfully, often inconsistently, into changing amalgams of past and present, near and foreign.

- Carol Gluck (1985: 4)

Conventionally, the story of Japan's modernization begins with the arrival of Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry and his four 'black ships', so named for the smoke bellowing from their chimneys, sailed into Edo bay on July 8 1843 (Buruma, 2003: 1). Perry carried a letter from President Millard Fillmore, demanding that it be handed to the Emperor of Japan, requesting the opening of the country, to allow US ships to dock at ports for refuelling and trade (Buruma, 2003: 1-2). Perry promised to return, and so he did a year later with eight ships instead of four. His demand was met and Perry had opened Japan (Tipton, 2002: 26). Over the coming years the formerly isolated hermit kingdom would rapidly modernize, the shōgun was overthrown and the Emperor was placed at the head of a new, constitutional government, that would eventually descend into the ultra-nationalism that led to World War II and Japan's eventual defeat.

That, as I say, is the conventional story. The reality is more complicated. Whilst Perry's arrival may have frightened the commoners, who were largely kept in

the dark about foreign affairs, it came as no surprise to Japan's ruling elite, the bakufu. Indeed the shōgun and his advisers knew more about America than the American's did about Japan; they even had detailed maps of the United States and knowledge of their political institutions (Buruma, 2003: 5). This was certainly more than Perry knew about Japan's institutions, as he and his men were unaware that the Emperor was a remote figure in Kyoto, and had been since about 1200, the symbolic and spiritual leader but nothing more. Military and political affairs were handled by the shōgun, resident in Edo (now Tokyo).

Much about the conventional image of Japan is wrong, as we will see. Whilst closed off, in some aspects, it was hardly the isolated and ignorant feudal kingdom that has often been portrayed. The country within was quite dynamic and had been developing numerous proto-industrial features, market mechanisms and other features of modernity during the two-hundred years of peace inaugurated when Tokugawa Ieyasu took power as shōgun in 1600 (though the last of the fighting concluded in 1637) (Walthall, 2006: 85-88).

In this chapter I will examine Japan's modernization from the perspective of Darwinian social evolutionary theory. The main thrust of the argument is that social evolutionary theory can provide a framework of bringing together the various data on Japan's transition and help to understand why the transition occurred in the manner it did. In light of this the focus will be on the development of Japanese nationalism, through the Meiji revolution to the early Showa period. This is inextricably tied up with other aspects of Japan’s development (industrialization, imperialism) and part of the use of the Darwinian social evolutionary perspective will be in showing why they are linked together. The wider aim of this chapter, like the previous chapter on the

development of nationalism in England, will be as a test case and proving ground for the theory of social evolution, for understanding comparative cases in sociology.

The first section comprises a brief history of Japan, giving the necessary background detail for the study; the second will look at Tokugawa Japan and ask why it was, despite many preconditions being in place, nationalism and industrialisation did not emerge in this period; the final section looks at Meiji Japan, and the continuity between elements of the Tokugawa and the new order, and why the environmental constraints led to adaptations of institutions, such as the prominence of the emperor and the fall of the samurai. Both of the latter sections will be from the perspective of social evolutionary theory.

A final note: Japanese names are normally done with the family name first and the given name second (i.e. in Tokugawa Ieyasu, Tokugawa is the family name and Ieyasu is the given name). The chapter will stick to this; with the exception of the bibliography, where appropriate, which for ease of reference will follow the Western convention.

Japan: A Brief History

Japan is comprised of four major islands: Honshū; Shikoku; Kyūshū; and Hokkaidō.

And immediately we encounter a problem here; namely that Hokkaidō was not officially part of Japan until the late 19th century (Lehman, 1982: 117). Previously it had been the Matsume domain, where the Tokugawa bakufu kept a trading outpost but was otherwise recognised as being, culturally and politically, the

territory of the Ainu[71] (Tipton, 2002; 64). There were other contested islands, notably the Ryūkyū Islands to the south, which were conquered in 1609 by Satsuma but were not officially incorporated into Japan until 1879 when they became the Okinawa prefecture (Lehman, 1982: 117-118). Even then, they were still seen as being separate and different from Japan, albeit with the potential to 'become' Japanese (Tipton, 2002: 63-64). Most of the action was concentrated on Honshū, a long strip of land where people were rarely more than 100 miles from the sea (Clements, 2010: 1). Looking at a world map might invite an immediate, and superficial, comparison with England; namely that both are islands next to larger continental neighbours. This is true, but it misses an important detail: the coast of England is thirty kilometres from France, whereas Japan is 200 kilometres from the Korean peninsula (Andressen, 2002: 16). This distance had the effect of meaning that Japan's importing of ideas, cultural practices and technology from the mainland came at a relatively even pace and, more importantly, the elites could be selective of what they took in and adapt them to fit local cultural practices (ibid). These importations themselves would often come through already filtered via Korea, not directly from China (a sticking point for many Japanese nationalists, who would prefer to emphasize the connection with China) (Walthall, 2006: 11).

Already we can see one important future detail here; namely that Japan had a history and culture of importing outside ideas and adapting them to suit their own purposes. An ability to recognize when others have ideas that are perhaps better than

[71] The Ainu are a population living in Hokkaidō. They are different from what we think of as the native Japanese and more closely resemble Europeans. It is hypothesized that the Ainu are the original inhabitants of Japan, coming over from Siberia, with the Japanese being later arrivals from Korea.

the local ones, and have no issue with importing them in, as well as altering them so that they would be less disruptive to the locality, is an important trait that would come in handy later when the West came calling (Arnason, 2002a: 88).

The first state in Japan emerged as the Yamato state in the 7th Century (Anderson, 1974: 435). The Yamato imported ideas on the state and how to organize it from the Tang in China, creating a Confucian style bureaucracy and mixing it with Buddhist philosophy of governance. Power became centred on the court at Nara, but was not centralized, with local lords holding most of the power over their regions. Conflicts between the ruler and the aristocratic bureaucracy would eventually see the court move, in 794, to Heian-kyō, later Kyoto, where it remained until 1868 (Walthall, 2006: 14-17). A split between a central, but not centralized, authority and autonomy of local lords is a recurrent and important one in Japan's institutional history pre-Meiji (Berry, 1986; Ravina, 1995). It was also at this time that the term 'Japan' appears for the first time. Prince Shōtoku, a legendary figure in Japan, albeit one whose reasons for legendariness have changed with national narratives (cf. Ito, 1998), sent a letter to the Emperor Tang in 645 A.D. on behalf of the Emperor. In it he referred to 'Japan', *(nihon)* meaning 'the land where the sun rises' (as opposed to China, 'the land where the sun sets'). This was intended to be insulting, not a geographical description, and was understood as such. But the 'Japan' here referred not to the country, or the people, but rather to the court (Doak, 2007: 37-38). It is here, as well, that we have the origin of the term '*tennō*' which is used for the Japanese Emperor. Meaning 'heavenly monarch', or 'one of heaven' it was first used by Jitō, the wife of the deceased ruler Tenmu. She claimed that Tenmu was a

descendant of the sun goddess, Amaterasu, thus projecting her husband, and now her, rule into mythic creation claiming the emperor as a divine (Walthall, 2006: 15).

As with the chapter on England, it is worth noting there that two particular sets of replicators have arrived on the scene that will gain importance: the concept of 'Japan', as well as the notion of the divinity of the emperor and the linking of that institution with the state. The state, and type of state, will change overtime, with different interactors outcompeting this earlier conception, but the replicator-worldview (Gabora, 2004) of the emperor will continue to have importance.

The Yamato rule came to grief when they allowed their control outside the capital to lapse. Bogged down in internal politics and religious ceremonies, the government became increasingly withdrawn such that the regions were beset with violence and unrest (ibid: ch 2). It is at this stage that another major player in Japanese history first properly emerges onto the scene: the samurai (Anderson, 1974: 436). The origins of the samurai, the word deriving from *saburahi* meaning 'to serve' or 'servant' (Andressen, 2002: 49), as a distinct warrior class are not well known, with a variety of competing theories as to their origins. A compelling view is that they emerged from a set of professional warriors during the Yayoi period (300 BCE – 300 CE), that were never really replaced by the conscript army introduced by the Yamato (Walthall, 2006: 46-48). This tarries with the view that the samurai formed most of their customs and fighting culture through the fights to suppress the Emishi (the 'barbarians' in Honshū), and from whom they adopted many practices (the katanna, with its curved blade, for one), during the earlier period of Yamato rule. The samurai then grew as a power as the court withdrew from the regional affairs (Clements, 2010: 19-23). As the Yamato system broke down the samurai were

brought in to intervene in court affairs on behalf of cliques, which eventually led to a civil war. At the end of it, in 1185, Minamoto Yoritomo was victorious and had himself declared *shōgun*, or 'barbarian supressing general', an appointment by the emperor that was normally temporary but in this case was permanent. Yoritomo, and the succeeding shōguns, now had the right to rule in the emperor's name (ibid: 120). The monarchy was now a diminished figure: it retained prestige, and was used to confer legitimacy on Yoritomo, but its sovereignty was compromised (Walthall, 2006: 49-51). The last traces of its autonomy would disappear when, after the collapse of the Kamakura Shōgunate in the 13th century in part due to the Mongol attacks, the Ashikaga Shōgunate moved into Kyoto and relegated the imperial court to a purely ceremonial role (Anderson, 1974: 437-438). This occurred after emperor Go-Daigo's botched attempt to restore monarchical privilege and consolidate power into the imperial court (Walthall, 2006: 72-74).

It's here that an important feature for later understanding appears; namely the fact that the emperor could not get rid of the shōgun, and the shōgun could not get rid of the emperor. Despite attempts, both by the emperor and then the Ashikaga Shōgunate, to get rid of the other institution and consolidate power in their own hands neither was successful (Arnason, 2002b: 107-109). The two institutions, in effect, needed one another. The shōgun needed the emperor for the conferring of his legitimacy to rule – he only had the power to rule at the behest of the emperor, who conferred the title on him. The emperor, meanwhile, needed the shōgun to use the military to bring order to the country. In effect, despite the fact that the real power rested with the shōgun who made the decisions, the emperor's existence, and the

source of ideological power, placed constraints and parameters on what the shōgun could do in terms of state formation (Arnason, 2002c: 130-131).

The Ashikaga system eventually fell apart when feuding families took to the field in another civil war, the Ōnin War lasting from 1467-1477. After this initiated the Sengoku period, or the Warring States period, which lasted from 1467-1568. This was largely fuelled by local lords acquiring regional power. The local lords, or *daimyō*, were well supported by their samurai – who swore allegiance to them rather than the emperor. In order to protect themselves the *daimyō* would build large castles, which became hubs of commercial activity (Andresson, 2002: 57-60). This was part of the process that would lead to Japan having a comparatively high-degree of urbanization during the Tokugawa time (Pratt, 2009: 87-88). The civil war eventually ended with the arrival of Japan's three unifiers: Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyashu. Nobunaga initially drove the Ashikaga Shōgun out of Kyoto in 1571. After Nobunaga was killed his conquest was completed by his friend, Toyotomi, who used muskets and canons, brought in by the Portugese, to achieve this, largely uniting the country under him by 1590. He maintained, as the Ashikaga before him did, the Imperial house as a religious symbol of legitimacy. Toyotomi died in 1597, following a failed invasion of Korea, and was succeeded by Tokugawa Ieyashu, who defeated his rivals to claim the title of shōgun in 1600. After supressing a failed rebellion from a Shimabara Christian sect, in 1637, he brought peace to the land and Japan was not to suffer another military conflict for 200 years (Walthall, 2006: 85-88; Anderson, 1974: 440-441).

Tokugawa Japan – Why no Nationalism

Tokugawa Japan is frequently cited as a time period wherein Japan was closed off from the outside world: a hermit kingdom. As alluded to above, this is not entirely true. Japan was closed off to a degree, but never completely. The reasons for the closing down was to avoid being subservient in a Sino-centric world, as well as maintain national security against the threat posed by Catholic missionaries, who were successfully bringing Christianity into the country and destabilizing it's social structure (Pratt, 2009: 86-87). Nonetheless, Japan was not completely closed off: trade continued with Korea and with the Dutch, stationed on a man-made island built in Nagasaki bay. Through these channels information and knowledge continued to flow (Brown, 2009: 72; Pratt, 2009: 87). The channel of information being open was, according to Lü (1985: 154), the key difference in why Japan was able to maintain its relative independence and modernize when the West arrived, as opposed to China which became a semi-colony. The diffusion of Western learning allowed Japan to gain knowledge that enabled it to modernize rapidly, and altered its vision of the country and the world, developing a strain of progressive thought, in philosophy and science, and challenge to traditional ideas that did not occur comparably in China until much later (ibid: 155-156).

A first question to address here is what was the actual structure of Tokugawa Japan, and why was that environment not conducive to the development of a national identity? These are important questions to understand as the Tokugawa conditions were important for shaping the modernization process under Meji Japan. The fall of the Tokugawa is comprehensible, but not inevitable (Tipton, 2002: 1).

The shōgun "imposed unity on Japan, without centralism" (Anderson, 1974: 442). This is to do with the way in which the society was structured. The shōgun was the most powerful of the daimyō, and the daimyō were subservient to him. As part of the system of control there was the *Sankin-kōtai* system, wherein the shōgun monopolized control over foreign affairs and required that the shōgun have a system of alternate attendance at his residence. The daimyō were required to leave family members at Edo (now Tokyo) as, effectively hostages, so that the shōgun could maintain control over them. However, the shōgun did not collect revenue from the daimyō; the shōgun only collected his revenue from his own lands, much larger than other daimyō to be sure, but there was no central taxation or revenue collecting powers (Tipton, 2002: 1-3). So, as Anderson points out, Japan had a unity, with an authority, but it was not a centralized system. Indeed the daimyō themselves had a certain amount of autonomy. They raised revenue from their own lands, and were able to implement their own domestic policies. They "held formidable political power. The daimyō maintained independent standing armies, wrote their own legal codes, set and collected their own taxes, controlled and policed their own borders" (Ravina, 1995: 1000). "Power was concentrated…in the collective body of the daimyō" (Berry, 1986: 240).

Indeed, the name given to the regions within Japan reinforced this sense of autonomy. They were referred to as *kokka*, meaning 'state' and not the term *han* (domain) which would have implied the fealty to a higher lord (ibid: 999). *Kokka* itself is an ambiguous term; literally it means 'house of the country' and is used to mean state, but it does not mean the absolute sovereignty that we might associate

with the modern state. The actual term implies something looser, and can refer to both the shōgun and a daimyō, or an abstract political institution (ibid: 1005).

The shōgun himself was also not a power completely on his own. Whilst he did effectively command the country, the position of shōgun was one appointed by the emperor. The shōgun thus relied on the legitimacy given to his position by the emperor, even though the emperor had no effective choice in the matter. But the emperor's status as a symbol was such that no shōgun could do away with the institution and the shōgun and his supporters were loath to assert his supremacy over the emperor in public, even if it was admitted in private (Ravina, 1995: 1002). The shōgun's authority was also created in part by the daimyō. By swearing fealty to the shōgun they thus granted the shōgun his power, and he in turn had their holdings legitimized by the shōgun's authority (ibid: 1008). The shōgunate "existed in ideological interdependence with both the imperial house and rival warlords" (ibid: 1003). It is this dynamic that Arnason (2002b: 110-111) describes that meant that neither the shōgunate nor the imperial court could get rid of each other; the shōgun needed the emperor for the symbolic and ideological legitimacy that he conveyed, and the emperor needed the shōgun in order to maintain order in the land.

The shōgun thus had no monopoly on military force. Their interventions in matters of economics were sporadic and do not indicate a national policy of any form (Berry, 1986: 241). The only arena in which there was a powerful intervention on behalf the shōgun was in the form of peacekeeping; weapons were banned from all those except the samurai, private alliances were forbidden, and the samurai were contained within castles within domains. This had the effect of cutting off the samurai from the land, thus preventing them from forming any attachments to

villagers or the land, or subordinate vassals. The daimyō were denied the right of private redress: the shōgun would monopolize the right to go to war as a means of preserving peace. This was a largely as a result of the chaotic civil war. Peace was a high priority as a means of avoiding returning to such a scenario (ibid: 242-245). Each domain was permitted only one castle, into which all the samurai were required to live and was the residence of the daimyō. The daimyō could not move their forces across borders without the authority of the shōgun (Clements, 2010: 231-232). This was part of the system of control over the daimyō. By not allowing them to move across borders without the shōgun's consent it meant that they would find it hard to build up private alliances that could challenge the shōgunate rule. Equally, by placing everyone in a single castle, it made it easier to have a target to attack should any rebellion happen. Or at least in theory.

A question to address at this stage is thus: why did nationalism not emerge at this particular point in Japanese history?

There are certainly reasons why it could have done. The *Sankin-kōtai* policy, where the daimyō had to alternate attendance at Edo, created a certain sense of national feeling. Daimyō would interact with one another; they were able to discuss national administration and learn successful strategies from one another and implement them at home. In addition getting to Edo necessitated the building of large networks of national roads, down which the daimyō and their entourage would travel. These roads were not, of course, just used by the daimyō. Though movement of people was heavily policed, the movement of ideas, gossip and discussion was harder to control and news would often travel down the roads, linking people together and providing them with a sense of connection to others (Brown, 2009: 76-

77). In order to fund these often expensive transits a national market originated at Osaka, accepting rice in kind for money, increasing national awareness. Through such markets the movement of goods people, ideas, and fashions and so on were facilitated (ibid: 77). Features were thus there for the generation of Benedict Anderson's (2006) 'imagined community'; with networks connecting disparate parts of the country and joining people together with the information.

Other features similar to that of European modernity were present in Japan during this period. In particular Japan, during the Tokugawa period, experienced proto-industrialization (Howell, 1992). Proto-industrialization, as the name implies, is used to describe the development "of rural regions in which a large part of the population lived entirely or to a considerable extent from industrial mass production for inter-regional and international markets" (Kriedte, Medrick, and Schlumbohm, 1981: 6, quoted in Howell, 1992: 269). Howell (1992) describes how in certain regions, focussing on the Matsume domain (the Japanese part of Hokkaidō before Hokkaidō was absorbed) there started a focus of on the development of herring-meat fertilizer from the fisheries, with the techniques and dynamics of the industry changing in response to trade with Honshū (ibid: 271-275). These developments happened largely independently of the West and occurred to varying degrees across many industries and regions within Japan.

Similarly, in farming structures, there was development. Changes in practices towards more intensive farming made large plots inefficient, so individual families worked on smaller plots and sold their surplus to the market. Industries for textiles also emerged and servants were let go and became small-holders. Farmers were able to earn income from sources outside of farming, as the inefficiency of Tokugawa

taxation meant they could keep more of their surplus. The economic changes brought with them social changes. Whilst the social hierarchy still stood, there were noticeable differences. Apart from the main hubs of Edo, Kyoto and Ōsaka towns struggled and stagnated and the samurai, forbidden from holding jobs unbefitting of their status, also struggled to survive on their stipends (Pratt, 2009: 88-89). Merchants benefitted hugely as well. The heavy urbanization of the population, into castle towns, meant that merchants had markets to sell into. In addition the alternate attendance system led to many stations and houses being constructed along the roads in order to house people. The nouveaux riche (or chōnin) brought in different cultural elements and gave support to artists, both writers and theatre makers (Tipton, 2002: 6-8). There was, however, not much incentive to save or invest money: merchants were on one of the lowest rungs of society. They could not be taxed, as that would have meant giving them rights, but because of this the only means the shōgun had to acquire resources from them was to confiscate their assets on some pretext. For this reason, the merchants would spend their money more or less as soon as they had it, on art, food, entertainment, leading to the development of the culture of pleasure (Downer, 2000: 55). We can here, note in passing, that this is an important habit, and thereby replicator (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010), for capitalist society, the need to spend on commercial and consumer goods in order to circulate money, which has made its first appearance.

The merchants increasing wealth, despite their low status, was one of the reasons that eventually drove the samurai to their revolutionary action; seeing merchants with more wealth than them, flaunting it with silks and clothes, whilst the samurai, public servants devoted to protecting the country, had to languish, struggle,

pawn family heirlooms, was infuriating as it seemed to reverse social status and justice (Smith, 1961: 92-93). This, despite the fact that the samurai appropriated many of the cultural forms and entertainments that the populace indulged in, despite shōgun edicts forbidding them from doing so (Tipton, 2002: 9).

Against the conception of the Tokugawa economy as being feudal and stagnant what emerges, instead, is an economy that is in many ways quite dynamic and led to growth in many regions (albeit there is the caveat that the population did not grow by much, which suggests that the proceeds of growth did not necessarily lead to improved living standards) (Howell, 1992: 269-270).

With this in mind, with these cultural features and structural preconditions in place, why did the switch not happen? Why did Japan not natively develop a nationalist movement or industrialize in the way that Western countries were to do?

One aspect is that whilst the elites might have had a shared sense of a collective identity that marked Japan as being distinct from other countries (particularly China), seeing the Japanese as divine and superior to other races, with the bakufu speaking of a Japanese people as early as 1636, at the local level this was manifestly not the case with people having stronger regional identities and seeing themselves as culturally and ethnically distinct (Wilson, 2002: 4). The notion of stronger regional identities at the local level is, in some ways, borne out by an anecdote that John McMaster (1992: 93) relates: after the country was opened by the West there were persistent attacks on foreigners within Japan. The French, in retaliation to the Chōshū region blockading a trading port, launched a small attack against the fief in order to bring them in line. Before doing so they first went to the

neighbouring fief to let them know what was going to happen. Rather than rushing to the aide of Chōshū, as the French feared, the populace instead picked out the best viewpoints on the hillside, picnicked and placed bets on how accurate the French gunners would be. What this appears to demonstrate is that, particularly among the local populace if not necessarily the elite level, there was as yet no strong sense of collective identity that linked the regions together.

The villages themselves were not homogenous entities. The changing economic landscape led to different villages specializing in different products and crops. It also stratified them; leading to the creation of some very wealthy landlords and poor tenants. Increasing levels of peasant protest and violence between the 1600s and 1800s suggests that there were difficulties brought on by the increasing inequality and a breakdown of the cooperative spirit. These events were, however, largely localized and so they did not spread out towards being revolutionary movements against the Shōgunate itself (Tipton, 2002: 10-13). The farmers themselves, despite later Meiji appeals to their virtuous qualities, were widely disparaged and seen as a morally inferior social class and viewed with suspicion (Vlastos, 1998: 81). This conflict between the samurai's warrior class and the peasant farming class is neatly illustrated in Kurosawa Akira's (1954) *The Seven Samurai*, where the dynamics of mutual suspicion are clearly visible between the samurai, who, though looking down on the farmers and viewing them as selfish and craven, are too poor to refuse to help the farmers, who in turn view the samurai as little better than the bandits that are plaguing them, hiding away their wives and daughters so that the samurai won't take them, but need them as a lesser evil to defend against a larger one. This eventually comes to a head when Mifune Toshirō's

character, Kikuchiyo, calls the samurai out on their behaviour and attitude and how that fuels the fear and resentment of the farmers they look down on.

Another factor is the political situation. Lacking a central institution, and with the daimyō being masters of their own region and the shōgun having little control over how they operated within their own regions. The nature of political structure meant that reform was difficult. Attempts to reform the system were made, especially after the Tĕmpō crisis (1830-1844) where Japan was hit by several famines. The perceived inefficiency of the Shōgunal response led to popular revolts and insurrections, with news of the problems and difficulties spreading along the highways that had been constructed. The government launched the Tĕmpō reforms in 1841 as a means of reforming the bakufu and daimyō system in order to generate more revenue and give the government greater ability to respond to crisis. The reforms, however, failed in part due to the nature of the system, where the differing competing interests meant that daimyō could resist and undermine them and the shōgun lacked a means to bring them in line (Jansen, 1985: 3-4). The inertia in government was more of a feature rather than a bug in the system. The weak central government meant that the inertia in the system, between the shōgun and the daimyō, gave the whole thing an equilibrium and a sense of stability (McMaster, 1992: 3). The government's ability to faff around on decisions and not get anything done was legendary.

Effectively what Japan was in, at this stage, was an evolutionary stable state (ESTS) (Sober, 2000: 140-141). Between the emperor, the shōgun and the daimyō, none was able to gain a decisive advantage over the other, and each needed the other in order to maintain their level of support. Consequently the system was stable, but

that very stability meant that it did not advance in a new direction. So whilst Japan had certain features building up that might become nationalism, certain technologies that would bring about capitalism and industrialism, it did not have a means of making a large systematic use of them.

These were, however, important features that would come to feature more prominently after the West's intrusion. With the proto-industrial features (Howell, 1992) there is the introduction of new sets of interactors: a propensity towards organizing industry in a certain way, with the attendant changes in routines and habits that form part of that within the organizations and firms (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004; Lazaric, 2004). Likewise habits of commercial culture and consumerism, as replicators not linked to a particular industry or organization but contained with the people, or a group of people in the case of the merchants as an interactor (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 170) which is so important to capitalism, are already beginning and replicating through a section of the population: the rise of the pleasure quarters and buying of commercial goods, due to the increasing wealth of the merchants, has developed that particular habit that could be co-opted towards capitalism and industrialism.

Lastly, it is also worth pointing out that it is in the latter part of the 1700s that the Kokugaku, or nativist, school in Japan begins. Driven by a desire to capture folk traditions, memories, and sort of native Japan thinking from their influences by the Chinese classics, the schools interest was in studying, and answering, the question of 'what is Japan'? (Ichijo, 2013: 92-93). They argued that the true heart of Japan led to a harmonious existence between the people of Japan, but that this state of bliss and harmony had been lost due to contamination by foreign texts (meaning Chinese). The

way to recover this harmony was to eliminate the foreign influences and return to the authentic traditions of Japan (ibid: 94). Needless to say, here we can see the beginnings of the components of a nationalist tradition: it has the sense of Smith's 'golden age' that needs to be recovered, as well as the sense of a 'chosen people' (Hastings, 1999). Whilst not a nationalist movement, as it was confined to that particular school, it is important because, as with the case of England, it has introduced the worldview (Gabora, 2004) of seeing Japan as a distinct entity, separate from its influences, and also that said influences are inferior to some degree and that those influences have obscured the true sense of Japan.

There are, therefore, lots of reasons why Japan did not have it's own industrial revolution, or nationalist movement of some kind; but equally there are plausible reasons to say that it's entirely possible that it could have done, or was on its way to doing so. As Arnason (2002b: 110-111) points out the Tokugawa system was an effective synthesis of feudal and centralizing elements; Japan's process of state-formation was largely self-contained and effectively had feudal structures in the political and military realm, but more bureaucratic and centralized structures at the social and economic level, a fusion distinct from anything developed in Europe (Arnason, 2002c: 119-121). As has been noted above, there were several attempts at reform under the Tokugawa, and these were largely driven by tensions within the system, both at the level of the samurai, increasingly frustrated at their poverty and indebtedness as opposed to the merchants, as well as at the peasant level, where famines and ineffectiveness of aid led to frequent popular revolts. There were also emerging traditions, ways of thinking and organizing, that could have fuelled and funnelled these in particular directions. The environment was changing and the

government was beginning to make responses to that; at some point it would have invoked a change, whether drastic or more piecemeal.

To some degree, then it's perhaps a shame that these developments never got the time to play out before the West intruded. As it is the Tokugawa did not manage to reform their system and the popular discontent did not spill over into a revolution or a takeover (depending on how one reads Japan's entry into World War II, of course). In consequence the arrival, in 1853 of Commodore Perry, needs to be seen for what it is: A punctuation event (Gould, 1980c).

Nationalism and Modernism in Japan

Japan, on the eve of Perry's arrival, was effectively as Gould (1980c) describes an environment before a punctuation event sends it spinning in a new direction: lots of things building up here and there but all of them wriggling around an equilibrium. No one of them on their own is sufficient to drag the institutions in a new direction and so alter and adapt them to the building changes in the environment. As above, this is not to say that change would not have come about, given enough time. But it likely would not have been the particular changes that happened, given how strongly these were influenced by the felt need to imitate the West's ideas of what 'civilized' countries should look like. The value in the punctuated equilibrium model is that it allows for rapid change in response to chance events, but also that the nature of the punctuation might change things in one direction rather than another.

As Kevin Doak (2007: 42) states:

> By no means did Perry's arrival inject a principle of historical change to a stagnant world, as some historians have claimed. But it did contribute to the dissolution of the old *baku-han* system and its ascriptive social order which had prevented the development of the nationalist society envisioned by nativists and others.

After all, had it been Britain or China who came calling, rather than America, things might well have turned out differently; Japan may have become another British colony, or the emperor might have been dispensed with and the shōgun promoted to King under China's auspices as almost occurred when a complete breakdown in communications led to the farcical scene of Chinese emissary's going to Japan to induct Hideyoshi as King of Japan, whilst Hideyoshi believed that the Chinese were there to accept his sovereignty over Korea (Clements, 2010: 215).

Why, then, did nationalism end up taking the form that it took? Why centre on the emperor, a peripheral and symbolic figure, but not the shōgun who was far more central to the government and the real locus of power in the land?

In the first place, a simple reason may be that it was precisely because the emperor was a remote and symbolic figure that he took the precedence. The human mind is susceptible to mysteries, half-understood or incomplete information, as a result of our capacity for meta-representation; consequently there is a drift towards such mysteries that are memorable and particularly when they come from authoritative sources (Sperber, 1996: 72-74). Purely at the level of language 'one of heaven' (*tennō*) has a great deal more mystery and evocation behind it than does 'barbarian supressing general' (*shōgun*).

In the second place there is the element of culture and politics. Whilst it was not inevitable that the Shōgunate system should fall (Tipton, 2002: 1), even after contact with the West it might have been able to maintain itself, once it did the

shōgun's position was completely compromised. The emperor, on the other hand, was the symbol of Japan's cultural continuity (Buruma, 2003: 1-2). As the supposed descendant of the sun goddess, he was the divine presence in Japan's politics and his continuity of his line was an important point. This was something that would be emphasised early on in the Japanese constitution where it was written that the emperor represented an unbroken line of continuity down the ages, from the first son of Amaterasu into the present (Gluck, 1985: 77). This helped to craft a national image; creating the sense of a transcendental figure at the head of the nation also helped create the sense of a transcendental people and nation from the earliest times. Although the Shōgunate was beginning to acquire imperial trappings of their own, and were a dynasty in their own right (Buruma, 2003: 10), the change was too soon and the shōgun was too concrete a figure, as opposed to the more peripheral emperor, in order to take on the newly transcendental role (Gluck, 1985: 73-74). The emperor's largely symbolic status gave the imperial institution a great advantage in the changing environment.

There was another factor in the emperor's favour: the use, throughout history, of the imperial house as a slate onto which revolutionaries could project their own ideals and ambitions. The dual nature of the government, split between the cultural locus of the imperial lineage and the political and military complex of the Shōgunate (Arnason, 2002b), meant that, "It was possible to rebel against the government, especially if it was done in the name of loyalty to the emperor, without seeming to be unpatriotic" (Buruma, 2003: 10). This, Buruma (ibid) identifies as being a difference with China, where the symbolic and the political was not split; in China it was not

possible to rebel without being condemned and losing some authority.[72] This is duly what occurred.

When Perry arrived in 1853, and then returned in 1854, he provided the spark that would ignite the various bubbling issues within Japan institutionally. The Shōgun was not unaware of what was occurring: the news of China's defeat in the Opium war in 1840 had shocked the establishment. China's defeat indicated not only the waning power of China but also the strength of the foreigners and Japan's own vulnerability to them. A welcome aspect though, already supposed with the introduction of Western knowledge, had been the confirmation that China was not the centre of the universe (Buruma, 2003: 11-12). The Shōgunate institutions, however, caught the government in a bind. In order to maintain the peace, the shōgun wanted to increase the coastal defences so as to be able to repel the foreigners. However, due to the split between the government and the daimyō, to do so would strengthen the daimyō at the local level and potentially tip the balance of power and bring about the dreaded instability. We see here the tension between two sets of interactors: each of the daimyō groups operates as its own interactor, looking for its own interests in competition with the others. The shōgun's interests were not furthered by strengthening individual daimyō, and the system meant that it could be easily unbalanced by changes of power. Consequently, nothing was done (Tipton, 2002: 22-23). Thus, when the West came, the shōgun looked unprepared and weak.

This sense of unpreparedness and weakness was not helped by the shōgun soliciting the daimyō's views on what should be done in response to Perry's

[72] Unless, of course, the rebel managed to win - in which case it was The Will of Heaven and they could legitimately claim to be the new emperor

ultimatum, as the shōgun ceded authority on the question of foreign affairs that had previously been his sole prerogative, opening up the government to accusations and criticisms in other areas as well (ibid: 26). Arguably the most damaging, however, was when the shōgun sent for imperial approval, in 1855, of the Harris treaty that would have seen Japan opening up and allowing America and other foreign powers to trade through ports in Japan. The imperial court, rather than doing what was expected and giving approval to the shōgun's decision, instead rejected the treaty and demanded that the shōgun repel the foreigners (ibid: 26-27). The imperial house now became a symbol for anti-foreigner feeling and also anti-government feeling.

The main pushers of this were the *Shishi* ('men of spirit') a group of low-ranking samurai, formed between 1850-1860, who would terrorize politicians and foreigners, conducting assassinations and targeted strikes. Their slogan was that of *sonnō jōi*, or 'revere the emperor, expel the barbarians'. Between 1862 and 1864 they were responsible for seventy incidents of political assassination (Tipton, 2002: 29-31). This pushing of the expelling of the barbarians, i.e. the West, was largely a result of a lack of understanding of the difference in power. This, again, was something that the imperial houses status as a symbol allowed it to absorb in the way the shōgun could not. By being a symbol the emperor did not have to make decisions, rather supporters could read what they wanted onto his figure. Thus, in an environment of rapid change, the emperor was a much more amenable figure for supporters of resistance to foreigners than was the shōgun.

Politically speaking the shōgun was in an impossible position. The treaties they were forced to sign with the West were hideously one-sided. Westerners gained access to Japan's markets, for no guarantees in return; there was the 'most favoured

nation clause', such that any privileges granted to one treaty holder were granted to all the others; and, most irritatingly, there was the extra-judicial clause, Westerners who committed crimes in Japan were to be tried by their own courts and legal system, not Japan's. The economic impact was almost immediate, creating massive inflationary problems. The shōgun faced demands from the daimyō to get rid of the foreigners, and also demands from the foreign powers to clamp down on the terrorism from the domains (Jansen, 1985: 7-8). Both responses were, of course, impossible. The political structure of the Tokugawa regime, with the daimyō having significant autonomy, meant the shōgun did not have the means to reign in their excesses or compel them to follow the Shōgunal demands. Likewise the shōgun, of course, did not have the power to expel the foreign powers. In this context, effectively, the Emperor interactor was more able to achieve differential replication of the particular worldview it carried precisely because it was more vague and able to be written onto; the adaptability of the Emperor and emperor institution as an institution was what set it apart, within the environmental context of change and desire to respond to the West, and made it more successful as opposed to the shōgun and shōgunal institutions which were more hamstrung, and consequently less adaptable.

Attempts were made to reform the governance structure, led mostly by Chōshū and Satsuma, two outlying tozama domains, with the idea of giving the daimyō a larger say in government. The individual regions, however, largely continued to form their own policy - Chōshū in particular attempted to expel foreigners on its own in 1863, an attempt that ended in a heavy defeat when the Western powers bombarded the domain. This led to a shift in policy, away from

sonnō jōi, to *pukoku kyōhei*, translated as 'enrich the country, strengthen the army'. The ideal was now to learn from the West, taking their technologies and knowledge, in order to match and resist them. In this Chōshū led the way, breaking with the tradition of having a distinct warrior class by recruiting commoners into rifle companies (Tipton, 2002: 31-33).

The bakufu continued to attempt reforms, but they were too late. Satsuma and Chōshū had already formed an alliance with the imperial court and, on the 3rd of January 1868, the court announced the restoration of Imperial Rule and demanded that the then shōgun, Yoshinobu, resign his titles and territories. The shōgun fought the Satsuma and Chōshū forces, but was defeated and with that Imperial rule was restored and the shōgunal system came to an end in 1869. The new emperor was crowned the Meiji and the shōgun's former allies rallied to the new imperial centre (Walthall, 2006: 132-134; Jansen, 1985: 11-13).[73]

With the new government in place Japan set out to modernize. The Restoration itself had not been an attempt to create a centralized or nationalist state; such decisions were not taken until after the Restoration. The reason for settling on this was due to two factors: a need to have a government with authority over the territory which could renegotiate the unequal treaties, and a need to find a system and principle which could unite the disparate domestic domains (Doak, 2009: 530-531). The international and the national environment thus shaped the options that were available to the Meiji reformers and so shaped the choices that they could make, in

[73] The new emperor, of course, was no more a ruler than the emperor had been under the shōgun. He was still a largely symbolic, albeit active, presence. This had precedence in Japanese history, where the designated ruler was often really just the mouthpiece for his advisers who worked behind the scenes. So it proved in this case.

terms of what would be adaptable to the environment (Spruyt, 1994a; 1994b). In this they took a model-based approach, or followed the 'prestige bias', that is they imitated the successful in the hope of replicating that success (Richerson & Boyd, 2006: 124-126). In this case what elites in Japan set out to imitate was Western nationalism and industrialization, in the hope that by replicating these features they would be seen as civilized and thus able to command the respect of the Westerners. But, of course, in such scenarios the party doing the imitating cannot know precisely which features were responsible for the success and which were not (ibid). In such scenarios they often imitate everything wholesale in an attempt to replicate that success. Ernest Gellner provides a generalized outline of this occurrence:

> Social traits of the dominators which may have been totally irrelevant to a situation benefited from a free ride […] So they [i.e. the non-Westerners] rolled up their trousers in defiance of the West and of their own officers. However, this does not mean that tight trousers are an absolutely essential constituent of human progress (1993: 160).

In the case of Japan, however, it was not rolling up of trousers, but rather cutting hair, adopting Western military uniforms, wearing of suits, teaching of Western art (an interesting one, as impressionism was inspired by Japanese art), Western architecture being used. Western styles and dances became a craze in cities in the 1870s and 1880s. Even the emperor was required to change and had to adopt the style of Western monarchs (Tipton, 2002: 44-47). However, this was not all just a case of adopting whatever was going, to try and imitate their way to success. Japan was picking up on these features and promoting them in order to prove that they were a civilized country, and so hope to avoid the fate of China - being dominated by the Western powers - as well as reversing the unequal treaties that continued to blight them (Buruma, 2003: 24). Part of the reason for the rapid adoption of nationalism

and creation of the notion of national unity was precisely because it would make it easier to accept Westernization and industrialization for the populace (Breuilly, 1993: 243).

Of course, it was not simply the case that Japan imitated the West. The West after all is not a homogenous bloc and nor is modernization. Whenever there is an environmental change it produces a host of new variations that begin to get selected by that change (Spruyt, 1994a: 24). Ideologies, ways of conceptualizing society, are dynamic and plural in fields of ideas - Japan was no different (Gluck, 1985: 7). After the Meiji Restoration a variety of different ideologies came into existence and, although the one centring on the emperor eventually became the dominant one, the others did not necessarily recede (ibid: 39-40). This is especially true in the context of modernity. Although the oligarchy in Japan wanted to take their models from the West there remained the question of which model to adopt? And for what area, legal, military, education? Indeed the models that they took often changed down the years and with different ones applied to different areas (ibid: 19-20). Part of the reason for this was that the elites themselves did not have a worked out definition of what they meant by modernity - other than it was some vague clump of ideas from the West (Tipton, 2009: 189-190).

But, in these cases, it is worth bearing in mind a difference between the biological concept of natural selection and the social and cultural version; namely the role of intentionality (Spruyt, 1994a: 24) and the ways in which intentionality happens within a set of constraints. Actors, in these situations, do not select everything and direct everything with a completely free hand; the environment provides them with constraints in what they can choose to do. And, importantly,

there are also unintended consequences that can result from their actions. All change is the product of the interaction between variation, change and selection in social interactions (Runciman, 2009: 5-6). It is doubtful, after all, that the samurai class who led the rebellion to overthrow the shōgun expected to find themselves and their influence as a whole massively reduced and with most of them forced to take up a living doing peasant work or as merchants and artisans (Harootunian, 1959, 1960). The decision was made to centre the nation-making myths on the figure of the emperor, over the constitution or government (Gluck, 1985: 72).

This is important to note: the Japanese were not passive receivers of the West, but were social actors acting with agency (Zhoa, 2013; Ichijo, 2013: 99-100). The Meiji government sent out a group to learn from the West, with the Iwakura Mission running from 1871-1873 touring the USA and Western Europe to learn what might be useful for Japan. Western experts were hired to advise the government. They picked out different elements that they thought might be more useful for Japan, adopting a German constitutional model, the British model for the navy and the French model for the army (Ichijo, 2013: 100). This was a case of biased transmission, as they discriminately selected among the features of Westernization that they could usefully apply to Japan, adapting them to fit the circumstances of the political and cultural environment (Richerson & Boyd, 2006: 68-71; Tipton, 2002: 55). Another way of putting this is that particular routines and habits are observed in different areas, that are then imported back. But they can't, of course, be imported exactly the way they were in the original environment: different cultures respond differently to different routines and habits. There is then a mutation process, whereby

through action and adjustment, the routines and habits are replicated in a different way that suits the new environment (Becker & Lazaric, 2004).

For this reason a German constitutional model was eventually settled on; this maintained the emperor as the locus of sovereignty and so with the constitution being his 'gift' to the Japanese people. The military institutions then pledged their loyalty to the emperor, and not the government (Tipton, 2002: 56-59). This fit with what the oligarchs were trying to achieve; of downplaying politics which they saw as divisive and opposed to the actual smooth running of government, which would interfere both with the modernizing project and with the creation of a sense of a unified community (Gluck, 1985: 59-60). The emperor was useful to this project; many activists and writers saw him as the locus of cultural continuity, representing Japan's traditions down through the ages. Consequently he was seen as the figure who could, symbolically, unify the moral and political realms (Doak, 2007: 84-86). He was the embodiment of the Japanese lineage (Hull, 1988)

The West's arrival did not create nationalism, but it did craft the concept of boundaries and defined Japan as an entity sharing a common threat. This was the point at which scholars began to promote the notion of a common land with a single ruler (ibid: 40-41). Although Japan had had conflicts with other states before – China and Korea – since it was closed off it had not. Japan, unlike England, was too far away from the mainland to have a continual sense of opposition and threat. Consequently it was at the internal domain level identities that were built up. One of the reasons why the Tokugawa time did not produce a nationalist movement was because of these strong domain identities. There were, so to speak, too many '*ethnie*' identities (Smith, 1981), with each one being its own interactor operating in the same

environment, none of which dominated or could dominate the others such that a nationalist movement could emerge.

The West's arrival, as stated, was a punctuation event that provided the catalyst for the formation of a larger national identity. The turn to nationalism was a product of selective imitation, that of wanting to copy a successful model both as a means of modernizing and also avoiding the fate of China (Tōyama, 1985). It was also at this stage that nationalist feeling began to filter down into the local population. Nationalism does not build on nothing and nations do not spring *ex nihilio*, nationalism takes elements of the past and moulds them to fit the present and help craft a shared sense of identity (Smith, 2013: 8). This was the importance of the nativist tradition. Mootori Norinaga's ideas of Japan having a nativist culture, norms and tradition that separated it from the prevailing Confucian philosophy were beginning to take hold of the social imagination, particularly among the samurai and the merchants. These ideas were not a nationalist program, rather where a historicist theory of identity, but laid the foundations for later nationalist programmes. In particular the theory was easy to turn from a theory of cultural distinctiveness to a nationalist ideology, particularly after their encounter with the foreign powers (Doak, 2007: 39-40). In the new environment, where having a nation was an important component of international affairs and being civilized meant being able to demonstrate a history and unique culture, the worldview supplied by the nativist tradition provided an answer, with the environment selecting for this particular set of replicators (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010). The ideas were also attractive, in the sense of linking with prior beliefs, and helped to provide a narrative of continuity that could be easily grasped (Sperber, 1996). It also, as with proto-industrialization,

provided a basis on which the new Meiji government could build an identity and develop a nationalist feeling within the country.

This emphasis on difference was particularly apparent when Japan began their own colonization adventures. When embarking on an expedition to Taiwan in 1874, again in imitation of the West where Japan saw imperialism and modernization as intimately bound together, their efforts were directed to creating an image of the Taiwanese natives as being much more savage than the Japanese; images depicting the event replicated the style of Western pictures showing encounters between their countries and the 'savages' (Eskildsen, 2002). Here again we can see the selection pressure operating towards a particular set of replicators. As Gabora (2004: 136) points out, art can help replicate a particular cultural worldview, as the art and art style is located within a particular way of seeing the world, through culture. In this case those of particular art styles that are used to create the impression of one group being superior to another, in imitation of the Western style and usage, and also replicate the Western worldview on how to view, linked in with nationalism and imperialism. Reports of cannibalism and other outlandish customs were reported back. This served a dual purpose: it conformed to Western images of what a civilized nation should look like, Japan emphasizing the difference between them and other surrounding countries, to help push the idea both in Japan and the world that Japan was a civilized nation. Later, this would be used as part of the justification for the building of the Japanese Empire, taking on the similar role as Europe had used with 'the white man's burden' or the 'mission civilisatrice' (Malesevic, 2013: 50); Japan used it to promote the idea that they would lift the Asia region up and free them from Western domination (Eskildsen, 2002).

The nativist movement was important in opening up the Japanese commoners to the idea of a national political discourse. This was to cause tension in the 1870s and 1880s over the question of who should be allowed to participate in the national discourse and to what extent. The nativist networks helped to bring information to the people and make them politically active (Howell, 2000: 89-90). Nativist rhetoric was used to establish imperial institutions but were soon abandoned when it became clear that they were not appropriate for the task of creating a modern nation. Rituals were taken from the West to create the modern monarchical figure of the emperor, but with some supposedly native Japanese traditions appended on to it (ibid: 91-92).

Another movement that emerged was the Freedom and Popular Rights movement; another local and nationalist movement it was large in size, encompassing some 200,000 members (Doak, 2009: 531). As the name implies they wished to pressure the government into giving greater freedom and rights to the citizenry of Japan and giving them more active involvement in affairs, giving power to the people and culture with a constitution and popular legislation (ibid: 531-532). The movement, an expression of an alternative way of conceiving government in Japan, was largely defeated by the state co-opting their proposals and watering them down: the state set up prefectural assemblies in 1875 and in 1881 it was announced that the emperor would 'gift' a constitution to the people, which duly happened in 1889. The movement was also undermined by local politics, where many used it as a platform to secure their power in villages. The changing economy also led to greater state interference at a local level (Howell, 2000: 100-105).

Rather than a straightforward move from feudal Tokugawa to modern Meiji state that is sometimes assumed (for instance in Breuilly, 1992), what actually

occurred was a springing up of different ideas and variations within the changing environment, in response to the sudden change of circumstances (Gould, 1980c). Why was it the case that the selection process eventually filtered away the other options and settled on the *tennō-sei* (emperor ideology) (Gluck, 1985: 4-5)? The first element is power: the state had the most political and economic power in the field, consequently it was able to push the emperor and divine and sacred authority. Power is disseminated through institutions, in how cultural ideas spread and take hold and consequently change people's habits and beliefs (Hodgson, 2009). In this case the oligarchs, who wished to use the emperor as the image of modernity, built on his status as a symbol of culture to have the changes to modernity accepted by the populace (Gluck, 1985: 100).

> In general, the late 1880s and 1890s saw the emperor become the manifestation of the elements associated with national progress as the Meiji elite defined it and the symbol of national unity, not of a political and legal, but of a patriotic and civic kind (ibid: 78).

This can be seen in two elements: that of education policy, and the use of the emperor in public events. Education was seen as the primary means by which a sense of national identity could be developed in the people. Compulsory schooling began in 1872, but in the 1880s the government placed moral education, traditional cultural values and modern nationalism at the heart of the curriculum. Fees were abolished in 1899 and within a decade attendance had risen to close to 100%. The Imperial Rescript on Education was recited by the school children every morning, implanting the idea that they were subjects of the emperor from a distinct cultural background (Tipton, 2002: 59-61). The emperor was initially made to be a presence to the people through a series of tours of the country that he undertook – being a peripheral and symbolic figure they had little knowledge of him. He was to be seen as the personal

manifestation of political unity and, over the course of the 1870s and 1880s, he made six circuits of the country, appearing in different towns and villages. After that, however, he was hidden away from the public, so as to claim that he was above politics and so keep him out of any political disputes that might arise (Gluck, 1985: 73-78). Again, we can see that this is following the pattern identified in Gellner (2006) of the use of mass education towards pushing a particular view point and spreading a high culture through the population.

His image, therefore, replaced his person; his portrait was placed in schools and houses across the land so that he was seen by many and had a ubiquitous presence. The home ministry controlled the image of the emperor and how he would appear to the people (ibid: 78-81). Thus the power of the state wielded the cultural image of the emperor, using it to promote their own image of national unity and identity. Thanks to his symbolic status the emperor was adaptable to any cultural and social changes. For instance, in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 the emperor was depicted as a commanding officer, making sacrifices of his own, conducting reviews, being at military bases and going to Pyongyang to declare the victory. He was centrally placed in the press, his image being used to generate a shared sense of national responsibility and feeling. In the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, however, the emperor took on the role of statesman – he conducted negotiations, led conferences and announced victories, wrote poems (or someone did for him) on the sorrow but necessity of war and, in the aftermath, he visited the Ise shrine housing his ancestors (ibid: 88-90). The difference in conflict and change in cultural and social environment (from Japan as a rising nation to one that had arrived), necessitated a change in the role the emperor performed and his image.

Secondly, the state was able to absorb many of the other group's demands. The Popular Rights Movement had elements of their proposals taken on board. These, however, were adapted to suit the state's needs and its need of having the emperor as the centre of the moral and legal conception of the state. Of course, it cannot be said how far the ideologies actually penetrated into the population; for most people it was one of many social currents, and possibly not the most personally important one (ibid: 14). National outpouring tended to increase at times of hot nationalism (Billig, 1992), such as the wars, but it can't necessarily be said how much of it was there in the absence of such fever.

This is why the emperor as a cultural symbol is important. The imperial intuition was the most adaptable to the environment. The emperorship had the necessary characteristics: it was symbolic, held resonance for the population and could claim to have a transcendence reaching back into the past, helping to push nationalist line and imagery. It did not matter that most of the traditions and images of the emperor were invented, or altered from the past (Vlastos, 1998: 10-11). This is to be expected; old myths and ideas change in response to the environment to help them propagate, attaching to other intuitional and social structures (Richerson & Boyd, 2006; Sperber, 1996).

The demands for national integration took priority over everything else and all other individual concerns came a distant second. The government instituted various symbols and rituals and abolished status distinctions to create the image of a homogenous nation, who were subjects of the emperor (Howell, 2000: 108-110). The challenge for the Meiji state was that, to create a new national identity, it would need to "eradicate the vestiges of the institutions of the status system" (ibid: 109). It is,

perhaps, instructive to look at the fate of the samurai class in order to see how environmental change could rapidly change directions.[74]

Despite the Meiji Restoration being a largely samurai-on-samurai affair (Smith, 1961), with the main populace baffled onlookers who didn't think it would change much of anything, within a few years the samurai would be finished as a distinct class. The Satsuma rebellion, led by Saigō Takamori, was the last spluttering gasp of the samurai as they attempted to maintain their position of influence. The government had decided against Satsuma and Saigō's preferred 'feudalism plus' model for the state and had instead gone with the national model. The reason for this was to more effectively replicate the West and their power, and create a unitary territory (Howell, 2000: 96-100). And the reason for this in turn was that the samurai as a whole had lost out heavily as a result of the reforms: in order to create a sense of nationality, and in particular a modern army, the domains were abolished and replaced with prefectures in 1871; the restriction on the right to bear arms was taken away and the samurai lost their stipends, with them being commuted to government bonds; and the hereditary class system was abolished (Tipton, 2002: 41-44). Effectively, as an unintended consequence of their own reformist movement, the samurai were made obsolete: Japan no longer had a use for a specialized warrior class, not when promoting the economy and strengthening the army were seen as being of such vital importance (Sonoda, 1990: 106). The samurai in launching their restoration altered the social and cultural environment; but they, as a class, were unable to adapt to the new environment – socially their role was too rigidly placed within the old order that had just been deposed (Runciman, 2009). Consequently the

[74] Yes, I hadn't forgotten about them.

samurai dissolved, with the government helping many into other jobs as a means of rehabilitating them and preventing further rebellions (Harootunian, 1960).

La révolution, comme Saturne, se dévore successivement tous ses enfants[75] – a phrase that proved true both for the samurai and, eventually, for the Meiji government – pushed into war and destroyed by the very identity and nationalism they sought to bring out in the population.

[75] "the Revolution, like Saturn, will successively devour all its children" – Pierre Victurnien Vergniaud

The Comparative Case: England, Japan and Social Evolution

This chapter provides the theoretical conclusions for the thesis. The intent is to draw together the theoretical concepts outlined in the first section, and detailed through the examination of social evolution as against other theories of social change, and to apply this more fully to the two case-studies that have just been described. The case-studies' themes will be drawn out and analysed in light of the Darwinian social evolutionary framework that has been developed. Before setting out the structure of the chapter there will be a brief review of the argument thus far, as well as a statement on why the two cases were chosen.

To recap: Darwinian social evolutionary theory works with the same premises as Darwin's theory of natural selection. It treats social populations as being Darwinian populations (Godfrey-Smith, 2009), which is to say a population where there is a competition for a limited number of resources, between different entities, and where there are the processes of variation, inheritance and selection (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006a; 2010: 26). Selection as a force acts on replicators, which are entities that pass on information, either directly through replication or through diffusion, that enables the information to be carried down the generation; contained within interactors, entities that interact with the environment in such way as to make replication differential (Hull, 2001; Hull et al, 2001). The environment is the local environment that the entities occur in and it is what the selection process is done in reference to. The selection process itself is non-optimising: it selects the most efficient solution, given the available variants, not the best possible (Sober, 2000).

So why were England, and latterly Britain, and Japan chosen as the two cases for this thesis? There are a few reasons that make them interesting to compare. Both were islands, bordered by a stronger and culturally influential mainland neighbour. Both had native traditions that were culturally influenced, and altered, by that neighbour. Both sought overseas colonial empires. Both had a political battle between a monarchical institution and a political institution. And yet, within this, there are differences, sometimes subtle differences, in each case that led to differing outcomes in terms of development of ideology, in particular of the nationalist ideology. Another reason for the choice was out of a desire for a case-study where there was an example of nationalism emerging in a 'pristine' manner, and an example where it emerged as a secondary case. Britain in this case represents a study where nationalism emerged independently, and Japan an example where it was through imitation.

As has been stated before (Chapter 5), the question of nationalism in this study is not particularly focused on the questions of 'when' and 'what'. The reason for this is that the question is a virtually impossible one to answer, as the two questions are tied together. In order to answer when there must necessarily be an answer to the question of what. How the nation is defined determines, to a certain extent, the answer of when the nation is. The question of 'when' is therefore dependant on the question of 'what' (Ichijo, 2002: 54). For this reason, the purpose here is to address the question of nationalism from the perspective of 'why'? Whilst the question of why is also bound up with questions of what and when (ibid: 72), the Darwinian social evolutionary perspective can manoeuvre around them, as it is not so concerned with answering whether they are modern or pre-modern phenomenon. Its

concern is with the features that nation-state had, did nationalism possess, that made it so successful at spreading at the particular time and within the particular context that it did. Did it in fact have any of these qualities at all, or was it just a spandrel (Gould & Lewontin, 1979)? These are questions the Darwinian social evolutionary perspective can address, and, through this chapter, I will hope to answer at least some of them.

The chapter is structured into two sections. The first section splits into thematic parts, which address different aspects of the case-studies. These are, 1) the effect of war and generalized threat to the development of nationalism and the nation-state; 2) variation, how different cultural variants (Richerson and Boyd, 2006) are generated and how the environment can place different selection pressures on them; and 3) lineages (Hull, 2001), the important continuities that carry from an earlier state to a new to keep a sense of identity. The second section then address more directly the question of why nationalism. Both sections address the questions through the Darwinian social evolutionary framework developed through the thesis.

Theoretical Conclusions: The Cases in Comparative Perspective

War and the Formation of Identities

War, bound up with nationalism, has played a major role in the development of modern states (Hutchinson, 2017: 1). The link between making war and making states is not a particularly new one. Charles Tilly (1985) effectively saw the state as being a large-scale protection racket, with increased state-centralization being a way to develop more effective war-making. The importance here is the effect that war-

making and preparation for war has on the formation of identity, in this case national identity. War is only one part of the process of the formation of nation-states, and can even be destructive towards nationalism (Hutchinson, 2017: 3-4). However, the effect on identity formation, particularly in creating a sense of an in-group and an out-group, an 'us' and 'them', is important (Runciman, 2009: 68-69; Colley, 1994). It does not especially matter how much people really believe in these particular distinctions, or how well they correspond to reality: what matters is how one set of ideas comes to displace another set, and that they can motivate groups towards actions (Runciman, 2009: 93-95).

The creation of a us-and-them distinction, is something that has operated for a long time in human history and evolution. Several theorists, including Darwin, have argued that inter-group competition helps to promote within-group cooperation (Sober & Wilson, 1994; 1998; Bowles, 2009; Boyd et al, 2006). Groups that were more altruistic to one another, whilst susceptible to being undermined by free-riders, were more cohesive and more likely to win out in competition with groups that were less altruistic. Add in the nature of strong reciprocity, where free-riders are punished even if the punisher has to pay a cost, and it adds to the cohesion of the group (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Gachter, 2002).[76] Choi and Bowles (2007) have specifically argued that warfare among early hunter-gatherers helped select for humans behaving altruistically towards in-group members. Altruism between those identified as an in-group has been built through the same process that creates a parochialism and sense of difference with an out-group that can be easily activated

[76] We can note that this also resembles the condemnation that arises towards those who are seen as not contributing enough to the war effort, or seen as not being sufficiently patriotic; at an extreme accusations of being a traitor can be thrown out.

into xenophobia and stereotyping. Both of these processes are common when propaganda begins to ratchet up in war-time (Hutchinson, 2017: 26).

Of course, the fact that this effect exists throughout human history and did not produce nationalism should enter the note of caution that war, or any form of intergroup competition, does not naturally make national identity. The in-group/out-group effect helps to solidify an existing identity, or push a burgeoning identity structure forward. It helps in the process of forming nations, and can even be crucial, but it cannot create them from nothing. War, war-making and war-building would have this effect on tribes, kingdoms or any other existing state. This is why it is important to place war and its effect within its *environmental context*, in the Darwinian social evolutionary sense. What is needed is also as sense of the proper environment being talked about. To that end, Brandon (1998: 183-184) distinguishes between three types of environment: the external environment, consisting of all the elements that are external to the evolving population; the ecological environment, the features of the external environment that effect the demographic performance of an entity; and the selective environment, the elements of the external environment or population structure that affect differential fitness of particular types or entities. In this section, the focus is on the latter two formulations. This also fits with the formulation of phylogeny, looking at the way different entities interact and develop together through that interaction (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 56).

The effect of war on the ecological and selective environment is borne out in the treatment of the two case-studies; the differing contexts led towards their differing pathways of development, in Britain with the constant threat of, and participation in, war and in Japan with the absence of a clear outside threat.

In the case of Britain, there were three kingdoms represented on the island: England, Scotland and Wales, each of which had their own sense of being a people, and their own sense of unique cultures, customs and laws (Davies, 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997). In these cases the distinction was not as large as was sometimes supposed, but it was perceived as being the case and such subjective perceptions and feelings are as important as objective distinctions. Nationalism is, after all, also a feeling (Connor, 1990; 1993). The sense of a common descent and shared sense of being a people need not actually represent reality or fact (Connor, 1993: 382); what matters is that the feeling is there. There were, of course, some cross-border elements of importance: Wales was conquered early on and shared the same king as England (and later the Tudors would sit on the throne and be of Welsh descent); likewise Scotland and England would later share a king. And there was the all-important factor of Protestantism that gave a sense of shared identity, or at least a thread of commonality.

For Japan things were similar, but different: there was some sense of being a shared people and a sense of cultural togetherness. This was assisted by the fact that the territorial borders were largely settled and defined and, after the failure of Toyotomi's attempt to conquer Korea, there were no wars being fought, thus there were no other areas of territory that might create a sense of conceptual confusion. The language was relatively homogenous and there was also the shared religious belief system of Shinto, which saw the emperor as being a divine figure and central to the cultural organization of the country. The people were largely homogenous, though there were the indigenous Ainu largely sheltered up in Hokkaidō which at this point was distinct, and migrant groups, particularly the Koreans, but they were of

a sufficiently small number to not present any threat or challenge to the state (Lehman, 1982). At the elite level, at least, there was a shared sense of being a common people, and indeed a divine people, with a collective sense of identity (Wilson, 2002: 4).

In both cases what is being seen here are *ethnies*, that is "a social group whose members share a sense of common origins, claim a common and distinctive history and destiny, with a connection to a homeland, one or more elements of a shared culture, and feel a sense of collective uniqueness and solidarity, at least among the elites" (Smith, 1981: 66; Smith, 2010: 13).[77] The distinction between a nation and an *ethnie* can sometimes be difficult to place but, again, it is worth pointing out that these changes are *processes*. Just as it can be hard to posit the exact moment when a new species emerges it can be hard to posit when an *ethnie* turns into a nation: nonetheless the distinction between a new species and an old, and a nation and an *ethnie* can be seen, at least after the fact.

In the case of Britain, then, there were three *ethnies* but each had certain features that cut across their respective borders. In the case of Japan it is slightly more complicated: whilst there was a shared sense of collective identity at an elite level, so it is possible to posit that there was a Japanese *ethnie*, there was a lot of variance at the local level, where populations had a much stronger connection to their

[77] Note that this quote is a mash-up between Smith's definitions: the original, from 1981 reads "a social group whose members share a sense of common origins, claim a common and distinctive history and destiny, possess one or more distinctive characteristics, and feel a sense of collective uniqueness and solidarity"; the second, from 2010 reads, "a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of a shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among elites". The reason for placing these two together is that I don't think that a named community is necessarily important, but think that an important distinction between a nation and an *ethnie* is precisely that one is a mass phenomenon and other need not be.

regional identities than they did any larger identity and indeed regarded themselves as being culturally and ethnically distinct from other Japanese (Wilson, 2002: 4), which complicates the picture. And it is this divide between regional and local identities and wider identities that stands out. The emperor provided a unifying cultural and symbolic element and the shōgun was the head of the whole country, and so provided some form of unifying state structure. Both, however, did not interfere directly in regional affairs, except for, in the shōgun's case, purposes of suppressing potential dissent or revolution. Consequently regional identities had a stronger pull and sense of distinction (Arnason, 2002c).

We can here see that there is an ecological environmental difference of some import, though also with a little similarity. The similarity is that both had an element that bound the different regions, or *ethnies*, together in some way, in the kingdoms that would form Britain it was Christianity; in Japan it was the figure of the Emperor. However, the kingdoms in Britain had a certain homogeneity in themselves, whereas Japan had regional identities pulling in all different directions. This creates something of a paradoxical state of affairs: whilst it would seem normal to think that, in this case, Scotland, England and Wales were on a path to developing their own sense of nationality, they actually came together to create one new nationality in Britain. Japan, by contrast, neither generated a set of regional identities that eventually formed their own national identity, nor did it develop a collective national identity over all the regional identities, before the intrusion of the West. A part of this may be down to Japan having a cultural structure, in the Emperor, that enclosed all the regions--so there was neither the possibility for them breaking away, but nor was this able to translate into a national identity without the necessary centralization,

which the shogun did not have the power to perform. The selective environment pressed for the reproduction of the different identities within a structure, rather than towards a new structure of identities (Gabora, 2004).

An important factor in the ecological environment, that helps to explain the different developmental paths of Britain and Japan, comes down to this: conflict, or a sense of threat, in one form or another.

As Smith (1981: 74-78) points out war, and the processes of war making (propaganda, funding, mobilisation of people and resources etc.), is often an important way of crystalizing, or defining, an ethnic community. It does not create the myths and traditions, but it does take various myths and traditions and put them together, and so create a sense of connection between local identities to a wider identity and between the elite and non-elite levels within a given territory. It can also alter institutional structures, leading to a selection process taking place that picks a certain form of state structure as being more viable than another one. The state, in this context, can be seen as an interactor (Hull, 1988; 2001) whose interactions with the environment, other states and interactors, causes mutations to replicators and subsequent changes to the interactor. Particular wars can generate innovations, at once technological, cultural and social, that can elicit changes and become embedded (Hutchinson, 2017: 36). These process could go hand in hand, with increasing sense of one group against another being generated through propaganda and stereotyping, creating strong feelings within a populace. Technological advance then makes it easier to spread such messages and state centralization makes it easier to diffuse a sense of ethnic consciousness, in line with existing cultural affinities (Hutchinson, 2005: 21-23).

War and increased militarism also provides a set of routines and habits that are necessary for crafting a sense of unity among the armed forces, binding them together. This is essentially Conversi's (2007) point, when he makes the argument that militarism preceded nationalism and industrialism. In searching for routines and habits, rituals for everyday nationalism (Billig, 1992), that the elites could use to generate a closer sense of identity, the rituals within the military were picked up as one set. In the new environment where there was a need for a stronger group identity, these routines were selected for.

Wars, or generalized environments of threat, create a need for the state to rationalize its bureaucracy more and centralize more. The state needs to be able to collect the funds necessary as well as summon up sufficient numbers of people to fight. In the case of much of Western Europe sovereign territorial states 'triumphed' as an organizing principle largely due to this: they were better able to rationalize their economics, channel information flows and create a centralized system of law. By ruling over all the territory they were also able to punish defectors and cut down on free-riding uniformly, thus helping their rule (Spruyt, 1994a: 161-166). This was in contrast to city-states which, being more loosely organized and lacking a central authority, were more corruptible and less able to rule effectively over their territories and outlying villages (ibid: 173-178). The greater centralization of the sovereign territorial state also made them better able to fight wars (Tilly, 1992).

The sovereign territorial state is functioning as an interactor, and there is a selection of this interactor which leads to a selection for the replicators within it. The routines and practices (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010; Runciman, 2009), at institutional and organizational level, that lead to sovereign territorial states being able to be more

competitive in interaction with the environment lead to their differential replication. Essentially, the interactor is more successful at competing, through war and economics, than other interactors, leading social actors to begin to imitate the structures of the sovereign territorial state, in the hope of obtaining the same benefits (Spruyt, 1994a: 187-188). However, because each entity exists within its own context, historical, social and cultural, and because much of the information that forms the replicators is screened-off (Brandon, 1998) and not visible to outsiders, there is a wide scope for mutation of routines and practices, both due to conscious adaptation and change from social actors, and also through errors and differing interpretations (Becker & Lazaric, 2004; Lazaric, 2000).

The ecological environment and the selective environment are at work in tandem. The ecological environment, of war and a sense of threat, is effecting the demographic performance of the entity, in this case the state, with those states that are more adapted doing better in interaction with the environment; this is then working on the selective environment, leading to a differential fitness, and consequently replication, of the different replicators that are forming the state as an interactor. Those replicators that are not so useful, such as those that go against greater centralization or rationalization, are selected out in favour of those that are in favour. This works through a practical means of agency: those actors who carry the ideas, worldviews (Gabora, 2004), that are conducive to this would get promoted and given positions of authority and decision making, whereas those who did not would lose out and have to adopt those ideas, through diffusion (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 105), in order to maintain their careers.

Although England did not have monarchial absolutism, the government and state did expand and centralize more as means of becoming more efficient for acquiring resources necessary to finance and fight wars (Sharpe, 1987: 99-101). This expansion would then continue when various threats of war, with the Jacobins, France, the United States, France again, led to a greater need to expand and centralize the powers of the state, whilst also incorporating other elements of Britain, as the newly formed United Kingdom (Colley, 1986).

This was also the time, in the conflicts with Revolutionary France, when recruitment for the military came from the lower levels, pushing up the increasing sense of togetherness as war became less the preserve of a specific class (Colley, 1994). There had previously been earlier times when more people were integrated into the military outfit; the introduction of the longbow, at the end of the 13th Century, had been a technical change that had seen more commoners become part of the military rather than just knights (Keeney, 1947). But, absent a strong push for a wider identity and a lack of state penetration in society (Mann, 1993) there was no adaptation pressure for a national identity. It was only later when the selective environment changed towards a need for greater inclusion of people within the war effort, that there was greater pressure for a more inclusive identity. This works along the lines that Neander (1995) and Nanay (2005) argue, where cumulative selection is creating the possibility for a particular adaptation being created further down the line. In this case, the increasing selection for wider and more encompassing identities, allied with the elites need to involve wider sections of the population, pushes towards nationalism.

Contrast this state of affairs with Japan. Whilst Japan was not as closed off as is often supposed, with information flows still carrying through the country (Brown, 2009; Pratt, 2009), it was certainly more closed off than England, and later Britain, was. The information flow was also largely only at an elite level, which may or may not have contributed to the fact that the elites felt closer together rather than the general populace. After Tokugawa Ieyashu's triumph and defeat of his last internal enemies Japan had a period of 200 years of peace that would not be interrupted until Commodore Perry came barrelling into the country. There was, thus, no need for the state to centralize itself further: the objective was to keep a peace within the country. Consequently the local populace were forbidden from carrying or using weapons, that being the sole preserve of the samurai warrior class, and there was strict enforcement on movements between domains, with the samurai not allowed to own land or keep ties to it, instead being present in the large castles and urban centres that were built (Berry, 1986: 242-245; Clements, 2010: 231-232).

The Japanese state was also not funded by a general tax take: rather the shōgun's own lands funded himself and each domain funded their own territory; the shōgun had the largest lands but he was a first among equals, not a king or a dominating presence (Tipton, 2002: 1-3). So internally the daimyō had a wide degree of autonomy in the running of their own domains, but had a strict enforcement that prevented them from making war or being in conflict with their rivals. Likewise the Tokugawa state had no interest in conflicts abroad and it was largely too distant to get involved in the conflicts in China and Korea, and too distant to really be a target for outside invasion, particularly not after China began its policy of looking inward rather than exploring out (Levathes, 1997). As a result of this the Japanese state did

not have the same pressures to rationalize the system and centralize it further, having instead something of a cultural unity of structures but no centralized authority (Anderson, 1974: 442), or at least no central authority with absolute power over the regional authorities, as the shōgun had to negotiate with the daimyō in order to achieve their goals.

The state is serving the function of an interactor (Hull, 2001). The state is interacting with the geopolitical environment, but the different environments are leading to different selective pressures and producing different results. In the case of England, and later Britain, there is a constant pressure from the outside, which is to say there is constant intergroup competition. This is selecting for greater within group cooperation (Sober & Wilson, 1994; 1998; Bowles, 2009). Nationalism, then, is an ideology that emerges in response to this, as a way of bringing disparate elements of society together, creating the sense of a shared identity and feeling (Gellner, 2006), as well as, as Mann (1993) argues, a means of containing class-conflict, by creating a higher order identity and sense of allegiance. In this case, political power and ideological power are functioning together, with an added dose of military aggression providing a sense of urgency and threat that facilitates the diffusion and selection for the wider sense of national identity, spread through schooling and print (Anderson, 2006).

In these cases the states are both interacting with their environment, but the different environments are leading to different selective pressures, thus producing different results. In the case of England and later Britain there is a need for the state to become more centralized: a more centralized state would be more successful at directing its energy and using its resources (Spruyt, 1994a). This was prompted by

the need to fight larger scale wars, in the American Revolution, and then later against the French in the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (Colley, 1986). The state centralization also went along with, as will be seen in the next section, an ideological legitimation which began by building on the anti-Catholic sentiment of Protestantism, and later dispersed into a generalized national identity. Consequently the centralized state structures begin to get selected through the environmental pressure--slowly, through cumulative steps (Richerson & Boyd, 2006: 50-54), the various elements of localism that prevented a stronger centralized military and centralized state began to get selected out in favour of a stronger state (Sharpe, 1987).

Japan by contrast was in a different environmental circumstance and so had different selection pressures acting on the state. The importance was of keeping the internal peace, so the political and social actors had no need to change things. And, indeed, when they did try and change things in response to internal pressures the very structures of the institutional environment worked against them, with other actors having sufficient power to be able to resist (Jansen, 1985: 3-4). Because the emphasis was on maintaining this balance, there was neither the possibility for the regions to develop stronger independent identities, in the way that Scoltand, England and Wales did; but neither was there a possibility for the development of a stronger national identity that brought the regions together, as this would have been too intrusive to the daimyō.

Absent a strong outside force, there was no group selection. Essentially, because Japan was not facing a threat from the outside there was no outside group for it to be competing against: in those circumstances selection does not favour

generalized group altruism (Sober & Wilson, 1994: 598). With each of the daimyō regions having a lot of authority, there was no selection for a more generalized group identity, even in conditions where print and roads were joining the people up more. Selection favoured stronger local identities, because the competition was between the regions, but the emphasis on maintaining peace meant that there was no selective pressure in favour of breaking away from the cultural state of Japan and developing their own way. The selective environment was against it. It was only with the West's intrusion that there was, suddenly, another group that they were competing against, which meant that, under the changed ecological environment and thereby changed the selective environmental pressures, with group selection favouring a stronger group identity, and altruism between members.

Whilst within the country there were variants being produced, such as proto-industrialism (Howell, 1992), there was no selection pressure that pushed them in a particular direction (Sober, 2000: 37). So whilst they continued to be replicated, they did not diffuse throughout the country. Remember, whilst selection is an adaptive process it is not an optimizing process: whilst proto-industrialism morphing into full-blown industrialism, or Japan centralizing the state more in order to eliminate inefficiencies and tensions within the governing structure, would have perhaps been optimal it would not have been efficient given the structure of the environment (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010).

Variation and the generation of ideas and institutions

Nations are, to use John Hutchinson's term 'zones of conflict' (2005). This, of course, applies beyond nations and is true for any form of social organization.[78] What Hutchinson means by this is that they are fields where different ideas are competing with one another, where different agents, both individuals and groups, have different projects that they are trying to promote, in an arena where there are limited resources for any one project. This is a social evolutionary and selection process. It is also the case that this is how new ideas are generated: as old projects are revived and reworked to fit modern times, old myths restored with new emphasis and new memories dug up and given greater importance in a new environmental field. Selection, when seen as successor selection, does not necessarily mean that the other entities in the population are eliminated: they can still exist, with just the other variety being more successful (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 99). So it is with myths; whilst one may dominate and replicate differentially, the others can still be stored, either in memory or in writing, and await rediscovery in a more favourable environment. We can see this with the nativist school in Japan during the Tokugawa times: Norinaga and his disciples collected the folk traditions, that had been stored in memory, and collected them in writing; when the environment changed, such that there was pressure for the creation of a national identity and evidence of a long-standing tradition native to Japan, the variant was then selected for and replicated differentially.

[78] With the possible exception of totalitarian states, but even there there's likely to be discussions at upper levels of the society.

There is a further point to consider, in terms of transmission of ideas. Information is shared through brains and people pick up their ideas through imitation and social learning, interacting with others and other information points (Richerson & Boyd, 2006: 61-64). The transmission of information comes as a result of elements of power and prestige: people and institutions that are well regarded, have a lot of access to people's lives, have greater social, political and economic power are more likely to be able to spread their ideas than are others. The ideas themselves thus do not necessarily spread because they are good or bad, or some quality in them, but rather because they are attached to a particular institution (Runciman, 2005: 95-98). This may sound like a statement of the obvious, but there is also another important point contained within it: that the spread of ideas can influence the cultural environment just as much as the cultural environment can influence which particular ideas become popular or not. Certain ideas can spread in a discursive environment and alter the discursive environment because of the power they have within a particular field, but it does not necessarily make the ideas 'true'.

This was the effect, and the absence of effect, that imperialism and colonialism had. Empires and nation-states are often pitched as being opposing forces and are usually understood that way (Malesevic, 2017a; Kumar, 2010). However, as Malesevic (2017b: 147) points out, the practical reality of empires and nation-states meant they were often a lot closer: empires could often have an ethnic core (Darwin, 2013), privileging one group over another, and nation-states would rarely be as homogenous as they often assert. Japan is normally considered to be very homogenous, in history as well as the present, yet this requires an airbrushing of the significant Korean community that has always been present (Walthall, 2006). Kumar

(2010: 124-126) argues that empires and nation-states are also similar in structure: nations often contain different groups within them, and these groups were pulled into the system through conquest, as happened with empires. Britain is an example of this: Wales, Scotland and Ireland were, effectively, co-opted into an English empire. Nation-states can be seen as "empires in miniature" (ibid: 119).

More than that, though, empires can be nation-states *en large*: in the sense of having an ethnic core and a mission. Imperialists can be true believers, and believe that they carry a specific message or mission into the world, in much the same way that nationalists can do (ibid: 128-133). "Imperialism is then seen not so much as a perversion as a more or less natural extension of power-seeking nationalism" (ibid: 132). Nation-states and empires are not the same thing, but they are similar: consequently they are alternative strategies that can be pursued by elites (ibid: 134-135). The transformation from empires to nation-states, or potentially vice versa, is thus not a product of some teleological trajectory, but are rather different but compatible forms of social organization that can change under the right historical circumstances (Malesevic, 2017b: 149-150). Right historical circumstances here means, effectively, different environmental pressures, which brings different selection choices (Spruyt, 1994a).

For Britain imperial expansion changed the locus of the cultural, ecological, environment. No longer was the focus on the differences between Scotland, Wales and England, but rather on differences between the British and the Indians, Malaysians, Chinese etc. An Other was created by these exploits (Colley, 1994; Said, 1970). All of this contributes to creating the sense of a mission and of a defined group as distinct from others (Kumar, 2000). In this context ideas about difference,

purpose and a special destiny can spread, as well as changing the environment for those ideas--where before big differences would be seen between, for example, Scotland and England, there was now less of a sense of that difference in contrast to the Other. This is a demonstration of the principle that selection helps to create new varieties, by making certain possibilities more likely than others (Neander, 1995; Nanay, 2005; Godfrey-Smith, 2009: 50). Once there was a selection for a wider-space of identities and defined boundaries, as against Others, it was possible for that to lead towards nationalism. The ideas of chosen people, and golden ages, existed from the religious concepts; the process of mutation saw these being interpreted (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 34-35) to fit the environmental context of empire; then mutation changed again to fit the context of nation-states. In all cases selection in particular environmental conditions made the sequence more likely.

This was the context for the selection for the concept of Britain. It was more adaptable in an environment where there was a known greater contrast, and the spread helped promote the self-identification of an in-group (Runciman, 2005: 117). The selective pressure for this came from two directions: both from the Celtic fringe, who saw promotion of a British identity as being a means towards greater advancement and self-improvement (Colley, 1986: 112) and, from the direction of the state, a greater sense of shared identity would make it easier to promote such things as rationalized taxation systems and signing up for the army, both of which were essential for the state's purpose of war-fighting and imperial adventures overseas (Kumar, 2003: 145; Mann, 1993: 227). This is also where looking at the development of the population of entities and the interconnections, becomes important as well. As noted, the industrial revolution, one of the elements that

pushed the notion of a British identity forward, was enabled by colonialism (Bhambra, 2011; Washbrook, 1988). The revenue, resources and knowledge generated by imperial takeover in India, as well as through the slave trade and production of cotton, enabled the industrial revolution. Combined with the sense of difference, as well as the creation of propaganda justifying imperialism (through the 'white man's burden') it created the sense of difference that altered the selective environment in Britain, making the pressure for a wider British identity encompassing the different kingdoms more viable and able to replicate differentially. This wider perspective, brought through phylogenetic and population thinking, helps make more sense of the success of the particular identity.

It also helps make sense of the contrast with Japan. The Japanese state did not have this change of discursive environment, leading to a spread of new ideas. Japan's distance from the mainland, and minimal interaction with the outside world, meant that the state had a strong influence on the kind of ideas that could come in and the impact that they could have. They could be selective in what was taken on and, as fears of the West increased at an elite level, what was taken on was generally speaking the science and knowledge of the world (Brown, 2009: 72; Lu, 1985). This had an effect on the kinds of ideas being generated. As John Hutchinson (2005: 23-25) points out, trade and migration have the effect of bringing groups into contact with others, thus sharing ideas. These ideas are cultural variants (Richerson and Boyd, 2006: 63). Different cultural variants compete, but also combine with one another, and are disseminated through imitation, if they are seen to be successful (ibid: 73-76).

Nations, or indeed any political-social institution, are zones of conflict, in Hutchinson's phrase, where the conflict between different ideas generates debates and re-assessments about a group identity (Hutchinson, 2005: 4-5). However, these debates take place within particular selective environments, that gives them meaning and also provides a particular set of pressures that leads to a consequent selection of a particular set of ideas over another. Thus the control over the flow of ideas, hindered the development of cultural and ethnic notions that might have seen the development of an idea of nationalism within Tokugawa Japan. There was no sense of great difference although there were the Korean communities within Japan they were not large enough to present a general sense of being a different ethnic or cultural group: plus there was the same regional influence of Confucianism that emanated from China. The Ainu were to the North on Hokkaidō but there was little interest in conquering and colonialization.

As noted above, Norinaga was collected information to build the idea of a nativist culture, but they did not have much popularity until the West arrived and created an Other and altered the discursive environment (Doak, 2007: 39-40). This is a case of biased transmission: a case where a particular idea is preferentially adopted because it seemed to be connected to success in a particular field of endeavour. This is the case with Japan, where the intrusion of the west changed the selective environment towards a pressure to imitate what the West was doing, in order to stave off a potential colonisation, with this ranging from the more overt instances of imperialism to subtler elements, such as finding a 'uniqueness' to suggest a national people. Thus there were selection pressures for the finding uniqueness and a sense of difference.

Japan's imperial adventures can be seen in light of this: Japan sought to colonize others and, in doing so, render them inferior so as to place itself as a superior group, as well as demonstrating that they met the West's criteria as a 'civilized' country. The early colonization of Taiwan and Korea saw propaganda being released and messages communicated that strikingly resemble those justifications of colonialism in the West: that of the colonizer being more enlightened and bringing that enlightenment to the savage people's (Eskildesen, 2002, Richerson & Boyd, 2006: 68-71). It proved useful in helping provide a contrast to bind the in-group together. The slight difference was that Japan would also claim that its colonization was for the good of Asians--defending them against the West, again a response to environmental need. Japan's imperial mission was similar to the West as well, as a civilizing mission, but it had a different emphasis: whereas the West, generally speaking, justified its colonialism on the grounds of educating 'savages' Japan's justification was for educating but also defending and liberating the Asian nations from the domination of West. This fit better with an environment where the West was already colonizing and is evidenced by the fact that many colonized groups looked to Japan as a model to follow, as an example of a nation that was resisting the West.

This is part of the context for looking at communications and literacy. Japan had roads that information travelled along as a result of the policy of daimyō having to be present in the capital every six months, and greater degrees of social communication, as information passed along the roads and through the building-up of the urban areas (Brown, 2009: 76-77; Tipton, 2002: 6-8). In these cases, however, it did not lead to a greater degree of national consciousness, unlike in the case of

Britain where the increased levels of printing and communication did prompt the formation of a sense of national consciousness (Colley, 1986: 101-102; Kumar, 2003: 168). This helps to illustrate Smith's point that, on their own, language and communication are not causal factors in the generation of a national identity:

> [I]ncreased social communication and language are relatively neutral vis-à-vis the generation of nationalist movements and consciousness […] they may increase ethnic cohesion and the desire for national autonomy in a population; but equally they may divide that population and exacerbate conflicts. Social communications tend to amplify pre-existing trends and situations rather than generate them in the first place (1981: 49).

Or, more precisely, the effect of a particular increase in communications and narrative depends on the cultural environment in which it is embedded. In the case of Britain, with the threat of war and colonialism the communication network pushed forward information that selected for a stronger conception of 'nationality' as against other forms of identity, particularly as the state ramped up propaganda in times of war; in the case of Japan there was no framework, for the mass of the populace, that directed the information to one set of identity or another. Though the establishment heard word of, for example, China's defeat in the Opium War (Buruma, 2003: 11-12), little of this filtered through to the general populace and what did would not prompt a strengthening of a shared identity. As with much else it was a case of drift, with background noise, not really tending in one direction or another, and with the emphasis on maintaining peace in the state being of a high priority there was move to change things by the establishment (Tipton, 2002: 22-23). Consequently it went nowhere.

This is what would be expected on a Darwinian social evolutionary reading of the situation: with no selection pressures occurring there will simply be the

generation of different forms of variety with not one nor the other coming to dominate a particular environment. When selection operates it does so as a mechanism that promotes certain ideas and strains as they are adaptive to the environment and promote solutions, not necessarily optimal, to a particular problem (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2008: 57-58). Selection is often a principal, in action, which reduces variety in a given environment, even as its effects may produce more variety (Lewontin, 1974: 68-69). The problem in the context of Britain was how to increase people's effort in wartime, their willingness to pay taxes and support the army and the effort abroad: in general the answer was to promote a greater degree of homogeneity, especially through the use of anti-Catholic propaganda. Nationalism, however, and the increasing national consciousness was the unintended consequence of this, the case of the selection process picking out an efficient solution, for greater cohesiveness, rather than what to the ruling classes may have appeared the more optimal solution, that of keeping the current structures with a more willing population. This, as the powers-that-be feared, brought with it demands for greater participation and democracy (Colley, 1986: 113-114), that were only just staved off through a variety of compromises most particularly in raising property to being the highest determinant of involvement—allowing the petite bourgeoisie in but keeping much of the working class out, at least temporarily (Mann, 1993: 125).

Similar processes happened in Japan. Despite the reservations of the state about nationalism and national mobilisation and their determination to keep it out, the state was unable to prevent the rise of national feeling or contain it; indeed a number of intellectuals and people in Japan saw ethnic nationalism as an oppositional movement to the state, as a way of keeping it out of their lives and

checking its power (Doak, 1996: 101). But, again, it is an unintended consequence of what the Japanese elites were trying to achieve: promoting a sense of group identity that could be contrasted with others, in order to rationalize state centralization. The latter-day Tokugawa attempt failed because it couldn't reconcile the essential contradictions in its system, between the feudal structures and the centralizing structures (Arnason, 2002b: 110-111). Culturally and institutionally the Japanese state took on the efficient route: the environmental pressure demanded it, not only in that the dominant nations of the world were all sovereign territorial, or national, states (Spruyt, 1994a), so it made sense to imitate the successful (Richerson & Boyd, 2006: 113-114), but also in that there was a very real threat of being invaded, or being subjugated, in a similar manner as China. In order to prove that Japan was a 'civilized' country and so not one that was available for colonization it rapidly imitated most of the structures and cultural ideas of the West, fitting them as best it could to their own 'traditions' in order to preserve the sense of difference. But it did not imitate discriminately, or at least not initially, so everything from clothing, hair styles, to imperialism were imitated, as there was no one element that could be pointed to as the key determinant (Richerson & Boyd, 2006: 124-126).

These processes generated a lot of variety on ideas of how the country should be governed, through movements like, at the extremes, the Satsuma Rebellion and, more moderately, the People's Rights Movement. The state was able to adapt to these ideas, adopting some with compromises and cracking down on others, thus enabling it to maintain its stance as the dominant force, but also taking on changes that made future changes possible and more likely (Howell, 2000). In both cases what is occurring is in a sense a vertical transmission of social learning and imitation

(i.e. from the state to the populace) and also a horizontal transmission (i.e. from the populace to the populace) (Hull, 2001: 34-35). In both cases the state is attempting to promote patriotism, allegiance to the state, but the by-product of it is a promotion of nationalism, as the ideas being taken on board get imitated and transmitted from person to person and come to acquire new elements to them through that transmission, with no central authority being able to keep a definite control on those ideas (Runciman, 2009).

Lineages

The last element to speak about is lineages. Lineages form part of Hull's (1988) conceptual understanding of the evolutionary process, alongside interactors and replicators. For Hull (1988: 409) a lineage is "an entity that persists indefinitely through time either in the same or an altered state as a result of replication" (Hull, 1988: 409). Lineages in the case of both Japan and England, latter Britain, can be seen as the state, as well as cultural elements which were often linked in with it. In the case of England, for example, the state that Alfred the Great created, alongside its cultural notions linked to Christianity and a people of England, were successful in surviving the Norman Conquest. Indeed it was the Normans who adapted to the political environment of England more so than it was the other way around. Some of the practices changed, for instance French became the language spoken by the nobility, but this was an example of multilayering of myths (Hutchinson, 2005: 25). Various myths can be brought into being and keep a continuity and, under the right sort of environmental conditions, selection pressure can bring a revival of an older

myth that suits a new purpose (ibid: 26-31). Thus we see the replication of a particular set of ideas, forming a worldview (Gabora, 2004) and cultural variants (Richerson and Boyd, 2006), that are kept alive and whose origins can be traced. In this sense, whilst the England of the past is a very different beast to the England of the present, we can say there has been a continuity and a lineage between them.

Protestantism forms another lineage for Britain, whilst the Emperor figures as one for Japan. In both cases these are not necessarily the dominant elements of the society and focus of the group, especially in the case of the Emperor, but they both provide a cultural element that helps bind the group together, whilst also, crucially, being vague enough to be open towards changes (Sperber, 1996). Smith (1981: 65) outlines the idea that an important feature for *ethnies* and later nations is that they have specific myths that are striking or well-known, making them more likely to survive and endure. To an extent I think this misunderstands what gives a myth its strength, which is its adaptability to new scenarios that allows it to persist. This can be illustrated with stories, or children's stories: many of those that continue to be told (for example variants of Aesop's fables or fairy tales[79]) are told precisely because they have a certain timeless quality, that is the lessons inscribed within them continue to be applicable, or we might say adaptable to new environments and situations[80].

[79] Though fairy tales can be an interesting one in this scenario, as the original Grimm stories, with their usually bloodier and more depressing endings, are less well-known than the Disney versions, which tend to be happier and more upbeat—but the central lessons often remain the same.

[80] Aesop's fable of the grasshopper and the ants is an interesting example of this (if you'll indulge): the core message is essentially the same, that of the benefit of working hard and saving up rather than spending all your time playing and having fun. The Pixar version of this tale, in *A Bug's Life*, features an interesting, dare I say Marxist, twist on it: namely the co-director, Andrew Stanton, noticed that the grasshopper, being bigger and stronger, could just take the food from the ants and still enjoy doing nothing. Thus here we get a different moral from the same tale—that if you're

In this case, Protestantism for Britain provided an identity structure for the three kingdoms that formed Britain, both in terms of the shared religious identity and also anti-Catholicism. But it was not a dominant aspect—that is it was not wedded to the British political or economic sphere. Thus when the environment shifted, away from a need for anti-Catholicism (Mann, 1993: 124) religion could be relegated to the private sphere (Greenfeld, 1992: 70) but the group binding element could be maintained and the lesson, of there being a special destiny, converted into the imperial strain, with selection operating to weed out much of the religious and millennial message attached to it and converting it into more of a political and cultural message, about freedom and commerce (Kumar, 2003: 164-165). The lineage persisted, but the worldview, the routines, habits and practices and the interactor that constituted it, mutated and changed in response to environmental changes and selection pressures acting upon it (Hull, 1988: 409-410).

The case of the Emperor was similar in many respects: the institution was a largely cultural symbol that could be manipulated by elites, to turn it into representing whatever it was needed to represent. But there was still a definite connection between its various forms: that of the institution being the symbol of the people, a representation of the divine, and later a symbol of modernity (Gluck, 1985). The Emperor's role as a symbol changed throughout, depending on what the environmental considerations required of the institution (in the Tokugawa time the Emperor was a figure of legitimacy for the shōgun's rule; at the time of revolution he

bigger and stronger you can simply take what you want. Of course, at the end of the story, the ants all rise up and work as a unit to defeat the grasshoppers, seizing the means of production and living a happy communal life free from oppression. So there you go, the House of Mouse producing and distributing socialist propaganda and did it all without Fox News noticing.

was a symbol of legitimacy for the rebels, of the old way as against the military rule of the shōgun; in the Meiji restoration and beyond he was a symbol of modernity, of importing the Western traditions).

The adaptability of the emperor institution is the reason for its survival and the reason for its use: its role is replicated but changed as a result of the selection pressures being placed on it. In all cases the core element is in being a figure of legitimacy and also a binding agent for the people: the use of the Emperor helped solidify the in-group identity, whilst it also enabled changes to be brought in without it being seen as a strike against culture or tradition. This status as an image of continuity, and a lineage, can also be seen in the post-war settlement. Whilst the Emperor was required to renounce his divinity, the Emperor was still kept in place precisely because it was a symbol of continuity and legitimacy: the Emperor leant legitimacy to the American occupation as well as providing a sense of stability. Ironically, it also continued the tradition of the Emperor being a figure manipulated to represent whatever the particular elites in charge at the time needed (Buruma, 2003: 116). Thus the symbol interacted with the environmental conditions, selecting certain variants over others, and so preserving the lineage.

Nationalism, Social Evolution and Social Change

So: why nationalism?

Nationalism did not emerge as part of a teleological logic, it was not destined to be, either by history, or as the natural successor to empires (Malesevic, 2017b: 147; Mayr, 1992). As Spruyt (1994a) has demonstrated, there were many possible

alternative models to the nation-state within Europe: the city-states in the land that would become Italy and the city-leagues in Prussia. Both of these models could have been selected. They were not because of the nature of the geopolitical environment, and the functioning of each as an interactor: territorially sovereign states were better at organizing themselves economically, they had clearer lines of authority which made making agreements clearer and safer, and this enabled them to be better at raising finances, striking agreements with other, similar states, and fighting wars. The sovereign state as interactor outcompeted the alternative forms, and meant that social actors imitated and adapted the political formation as a means of protecting themselves. Once the sovereign territorial state had been selected, it then opened up the possibility for the creation of an identity structure that would go along with it, encompassing all the people in the territory (Neander, 1995; Nanay, 2005; Spruyt, 1994a; 1994b). The nation-state model became the norm that other states had to adjust to in order to be considered part of the world order. This was substantially the case with Meiji Japan, which imitated the European state-structure wholesale (Hutchinson, 2017: 21). This wasn't inevitable, there were internal debates in latter-end Tokugawa Japan and Meiji Japan about which direction exactly to take, but ultimately the environmental pressure told in favour of imperialism and nationalism.

My contention is that nationalism is a phenomenon selected because of its potential for providing an ideological cohesion to a group, to a large group, but one that is also flexible and that can fit different circumstances. Malesevic (2017b: 152-153) is correct, I believe, when he notes that social organizations require ideological legitimacy and this ideological legitimacy will normally be structured in a way that fits with the particular social organization it is legitimating (e.g. divine right of kings

works for monarchies; dynamic wealth generators works for capitalism). The ideology develops in fits and starts, adjusting to the different pressures acting on it, until an efficient one comes into being that happens to work. Nationalism happened to be the ideology that fitted the bill, providing a means to create a shared identity that would also enable further state-centralization and increasing power, militarily and otherwise. It is not built out of nothing though: there are transitions as occurred with empires, where there were transitional elements that were brought into nation-states (a sense of mission) as well as religious identities (chosen people). "Ideological power does not emerge from nothing but is rather articulated and developed gradually along the contours of pre-existing ideas and practices" (ibid: 9). This is a Darwinian social evolutionary understanding—a form of selection process, with those better suited to a particular environment being successful .

Nationalism's very strength lies in the fact that it does not have any particular programmatic platform to associate with (it fits fine with democracy, authoritarianism, capitalism, socialism etc.). It also fits with certain tendencies that people have, in our forming of in-groups and out-groups and punishing defectors. These are features that are also common to similarly dominating ideologies, such as religion: the tailing away of religion as a strong political influence, in the West at any rate, coincides with a rise in nationalism, and that may not be entirely coincidental.

While Greenfeld (1996) is right to point out that there are problems with just saying that nationalism is a secular religion, the similarity is there and worth keeping in mind. Both play on parts of the psychological structure of people, both can be adapted to fit with various political and economic regimes, though nationalism is perhaps more flexible still and hence, perhaps, why it came to displace religion as a

prime moralizing agent about the way of the world. There were alternatives available, class formation for example, or some sort of dual-legitimacy regime where there was selection among elites but the mass population was kept out: all failed for one reason or another but in part because nationalism, being a form of ideology that does not prescribe any one particular political or economic formation, was a cry that could be adopted for some many purposes: be it war, the voting franchise, better rights for women etc. It was, so to speak, generalizable to lots of scenarios.

This is also a process that does not end, but is continually developing. There is always a shaping and reshaping of ideology, national identity etc. in response to the environment. Take our two cases post-1945. The Japanese government, having initially gone along with, and been strong promoters of, the pacifist constitution that he USA imposed, is now looking to change the constitution and allow an army, rather than just a self-defence force (McCurry, 2016). The reason? Geopolitical environmental pressure: namely the waning power of the United States and the rising power of China. There's now a selection for a more defensive, military mind-set and national identity will adjust to fit with this: selection pressures will tend to select the cultural variant that's more amenable to the new reality. Perhaps the memory of Japan fighting off Kublai Khan's invasion will be due for a revival?

Britain by contrast is continually attempting to revive its imagery as an imperial power, via the commonwealth. Brexit is, to some degree, built on the imperial mythology and nostalgia, suggesting that Britain is held back by the EU and that by breaking away it can obtain some of its greatness again (Bhambra, 2017; von Tunzelman, 2018). Quite how this will play out, when it eventually runs into reality, is an open question. It is also a demonstration of the notion that change does not

imply progress, in Darwinian terms: whilst Brexit is comprehensible in Darwinian terms, as a choice perceived as the most adaptive to the particular cultural and political environment in Britain that is largely anti-immigrant and hagiographic of the past imperial glories, it would be hard to argue that it is progressive.[81]

Does this mean that I view nationalism as something of a by-product? A matter of convenience, or an instrumental choice? Yes, largely. This doesn't mean that I doubt the emotions or passions that nationalism can generate, or the importance of nationalism as a provider of ideological legitimacy for the political structure. Spandrels, after all, are by-products of other designs, but they can still have effects and they are structurally important (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). But I do agree with Gellner in thinking that the passions generated are incidental to nationalism's success. People get passionate about many things, that's just part of human psychology. Football clubs, TV shows, academic theories are all just a sample of the things that people have had vicious, passionate and sometimes violent disputes over.

Once something exists, there will be passion for it. Once its opposition exists, there will be fights for it. One can win, one can lose, they could come together and form something new, or there could be a long stalemate until something else comes along. And then the drive will kick off again.[82]

[81] An argument I hope to develop in more depth in a paper that is currently being researched.
[82] Think video game consoles: once there was a plethora of them when the technology came along—then there was Nintendo, which managed to formalize the console and dominate the market with its invention of the game cartridge. Then came Sega, which improved on those features and the two did battle. Then Sony and the PlayStation came in with a new technological innovation, the CD disk, and Sega lost out and it was Nintendo vs PlayStation. Then Xbox came along, with updated graphic drives, and the three have been battling it out ever since, with continual predictions of doom swirling around Nintendo.

What about the more general considerations of Darwinian social evolution and social change?

The purpose of this thesis has been to demonstrate two things: firstly that Darwinina social evolutionary theory works as a theory of social change, in the form of a meta-framework (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010), and that this can both incorporate elements of other theories of social change, and also go beyond them. In the case of these three chapters, I hope to have illustrated how this can work at a practical, empirical level, and how Darwinian social evolution can add to our understanding of familiar cases and bring fresh light to them.

Runciman (2009: 124) makes the point that it is important to not only understand change, but also the absence of change. Britain and Japan work as cases to help this along: both share a lot of similar features but in one there is a definite internal change that leads to the arrival of the institutional form that dominates today; whereas in the other a lot of the key features for that change were there, but they never developed in that direction. Social evolution helps to explain why this was so, but also why certain forms became adopted when they did rather than others. In both cases the prescription is the same: there is a need to focus on the institutional and cultural environment to understand why certain ideas could proliferate as opposed to others—what features of those ideas and that environment enabled them to spread, or for a particular intuitional configuration to dominate, at a particular time and not others. This is not a 'progressive' tale; in all cases the truth, or morality, of a particular doctrine does not matter, it is simply based on the relative and local conditions in a particular place at a particular time (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2008: 57).

Is this a case of re-description in a new language? Yes to an extent, but I don't think this makes it unimportant. Often by re-describing we can see things that were otherwise missed. Comparatively, it is often held that Japan stands out as being a tough test case for Western theories of change and state-development, as it does not always fit easily with most theories of social change and state-development (Tipton, 2002: 146). In this analysis I hope I have shown that this is not necessarily the case. Each narrative is unique, but we can use a general framework for understanding them (Hearn, 2014: 183; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010). Darwinian social evolution enables us to understand both the endogenous development of a particular country and system, but also its development in relation to others through population thinking (Mayr, 1975; Boyd & Richerson, 1992). With this comparative study, I hope I have pointed towards how this can be done, and where it can be developed further in the future.

Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate and outline the use of a reconceptualised social evolutionary theory, along more Darwinian lines, to understand how and why societies change. This argument was largely made at a theoretical level, with two main aspects:

The first aspect was focused on outlining the reconceptualised understanding of social evolutionary theory and then following on by engaging with other theories of social change through the lens of that theory. After first reviewing what Darwinism is, in a general sense, I distinguished Darwinian social evolution from older conceptions of social evolution, as they exist in sociology. Following this I outlined what a Darwinian understanding of social evolution would look like, engaging with theorists of social evolution in Runciman (2009), Hodgson and Knudsen (2010), Sperber (1996), Hull (1988), Richerson and Boyd (2006) and Spruyt (1994a). The reconceptualised version of social evolution understands it as a process where variations are generated, at institutional, cultural and societal levels, with environmental conditions, societal, cultural, political and geographical, leading to certain variations being selected over others.

Having outlined the revised conception of social evolutionary theory I proceeded to engage directly with four other theories of social change. In the case of Immanuel Wallerstein, my argument was that world-systems theory, whilst valuable in providing a model that looked beyond the sovereign state as the sole unit of analysis and reminding that external constraints and factors were also important, suffered due to the teleological argument and economic reductionism at the heart of

it. Reducing most of the factors of influence down to economics missed some important ways in which other, independent, factors could influence change and the teleological logic leant too much power of foresight to agents and did not allow for the sometimes unintentional ways that change could occur. Wallerstein's argument was too ontogenic, focusing on endogenous changes within the system, without paying attention to the way that entities interact and connect with one another and how this produces changes. Darwinian social evolutionary theory, I argued, could provide a way around this: the logic of the theory can accommodate unintended changes as well as taking on board the idea that different factors may be of greater determining influence than economics, as this is dependent on what is adaptive, for agents, institutions etc. within a particular environment.

Following Wallserstein, I examined Michael Hechter's arguments for rational-choice theory. I believe that the premises behind rational-choice theory make sense and are useful, however they are not sufficient on their own as an explanatory mechanism. Darwinian social evolutionary theory, being a 'generalized' framework (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006a) moves beyond rational-choice theory, being better at explaining how people come to possess the motives that they have, and locating these within particular contexts for their actions. It also provided a better explanation for the origins of states and order within them. In this sense Darwinian social evolutionary theory has a greater theoretical reach of explanation.

Michael Mann's exploration of the four sources of power explores the way in which these powers are not separate from each other, but rather link-up and combine together at different times and places. Drawing on Zhao (2013), I argued that Darwinian social evolutionary theory can benefit from Mann's distinction and

discussion of the four sources of power, but it puts it in a frame that can better understand the rationale for the choices that social actors make, and the way groups actions in concord with the networks of power lead to the differential replication of particular ideas, practices and structures, through the selection of particular interactors (understood as organizations, groups or states (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 170)).

Ernest Gellner's theory is a powerful one that offers a view of social change that is, in many ways, persuasive. In the context of this thesis his argument that nationalism is an exclusively modern phenomenon that starts to arise with industrialism and mass education is an important one. The twin problems that I identify with the argument are its functionalism, where his argument becomes a bit circular, and its downplaying the importance of the long-term historical perspective for understanding a particular social formation. On both counts social evolutionary theory helps to resolve these problems. Whilst functionalism is a part of Darwinian social evolutionary theory the theory's concepts of the environment, selection and variation help to avoid some the worst problems of functionalism's occasional circular logic. It can also incorporate more easily the intentions of agents, and their unintended consequences. I also engaged with the criticisms of Meadwell (2012, 2014, 2015), arguing that Darwinian social evolutionary perspective provides a better account for the rise of nationalism and nation-states, and is able to accommodate the fact that such states existed prior to the industrial revolution. The difference, then, is that, contrary to Gellner, nationalism is not necessary for industrial society, but was just the most adapted of the available variants.

Secondly, I looked at two case-studies on the rise of nationalism in England, later Britain, and Japan. These two cases were chosen out of a desire to have a case-study that would look at an example of 'pristine' nationalism and compare it with an example of 'secondary' (Hearn, 2006: 101) nationalism. I used the Darwinian social evolutionary perspective when describing the cases, placing both in the context of their prior history and noting the factors that were important for shaping the two countries and pushing them on their respective roads towards nationalism. In the final, synthesis, chapter I examined the two cases together from the Darwinian social evolutionary perspective and identified three main concepts to explain their divergences: war, variation and lineages. It was argued that England/Britain, being closer to Europe, was more involved in trade of ideas but also conflicts. This helped to produce a sense of an in-group and an out-group, which could be coupled with religious identification, to push a sense of nationalism. There was also a greater generation of variety of political institutions brought about by conflicts between the state and the monarchy. Finally, in lineage terms, the state provided a measure of continuity, as did religious identification, to help create a sense of the different kingdoms of Britain being one nation. In the conflict-ridden environment, where promoting shared defence was necessary, it was adaptive to have a shared identity, but not necessarily a religious one, particularly after imperial expansion began. In both cases I pointed to the importance of particular replicators emerging at particular times, why the persisted and how they came to prominence when particular environments changed. In taking the phylogenetic perspective, I also noted what features developed endogenously, but also how they were influenced by the interactions between entities (in Britain, how warfare and colonialism enabled the

development of the industrial revolution and national identity; in Japan how the West intrusion altered their proto-industrial features and brought to prominence the nativist movement).

This thesis set out to address the question of what contribution a revised conception of social evolutionary thinking could have towards understanding social change. In light of this, its contributions to research are two-fold. Through the theoretical examination it both explores, and offers a synthesis of existing theories of Darwinian social evolution, showing how they can be compatible and complement each other whilst also offering refinements of them. The value of this was demonstrated by contrasting the revised conception of social evolution against other theories of social change, exploring how the revised conception can address these questions whilst also answering questions raised by the other theories.

Secondly, the new theory has explored the emergence of nationalism, in its case-studies of Britain and Japan, demonstrating the usefulness of the theory towards understanding social change and illuminating empirical cases. In bringing the new theory to the study of nationalism it suggests possibilities for resolving questions in the field, such as the theoretical issue of whether nations are modern or primordial (the suggested answer being that both elements are necessary and have to be placed within the context of what was advantageous in a particular environmental setting). This avenue is also open for further exploration of the theory in relation to empirical cases, both specifically related to nationalism and in other cases.

Where does this research go from here?

There are a few areas for further exploration that were not covered in the thesis. During the writing process for the thesis I was struck by two theoretical problems that were not covered in as much depth as some others and strike me as areas worthy of further exploration.

The first area concerns the relation between social evolution and power. What exactly is power within a social evolutionary analysis? I have some preliminary thoughts on this. Power is linked with adaptation, but it's more than just 'those who have power are more able to adapt', although that's likely part of it. My tentative view is that the expression of power is linked to its environmental context. Exerting power over someone would look different in a mediaeval kingdom, to how it would in a capitalist society. Likewise having the power to do something is going to change depending on where in society an agent ends up. These may all be fairly basic and obvious thoughts, but I am interested in exploring them further. In particular I'm intrigued by Clarissa Haywards (2000: 31) conception of power as being "the capacity to act *upon*, or in ways that affect, the boundaries that constrain and enable social action" [emphasis in original]. I think there's potential for a Darwinian social evolutionary perspective to be brought into this analysis.

The second area, one that I came across in the process of revising the thesis post-viva, is in the challenge to traditional questions of social change in sociology, namely the emphasis on the concept of modernity and its conception as a specifically European phenomenon, provided by post-colonialism (Bhambra, 2007; 2011; Washbrook, 1988; Subrahmanyam, 1997). In general they argue against airbrushing out of the connections that existed between countries, and the treatment of the idea that imperialism and colonialism were incidental matters to the development of

capitalism and the industrial revolution rather than vital components, and the treatment of non-European regions as being passive receivers of modernity from Europe. I believe that Darwinian social evolutionary theory can provide a frame into which these arguments can be incorporated, through its understanding of population thinking, variety and the interaction of entities in their local environments. I have, at points, in the thesis incorporated elements of this into my argument, but a fuller discussion and engagement is necessary.

Away from theoretical matters, I think there is perhaps a fruitful analysis that could be conducted using social evolutionary theory at a more micro-level. Whilst macro-level changes are investigated somewhat indirectly, there is the possibility for more direct investigations of social evolutionary changes at a mirco-level. Above I used the example of video game console wars as an evolutionary process. Whilst something of a throw-away explanatory remark, it does illustrate the possibility that these concepts could be applied in a direct analysis on an ethnographic level. For example, ethnographic studies of an institution (e.g. a corporation) could be done, using the concepts, to examine what leads to certain decisions and choices being made rather than others. What environmental factors exist that lead to certain routes and options being selected rather than others? This is a point raised by Hodgson and Knudsen (2010: 235) when they argue for more empirical studies. Hearn (2017) is an example of this at the micro-level.

As a final reflection on social evolutionary theory, I would say that I don't see it as being the be all and end all of sociological theory of social change. It is possible, and I think likely, that the theory will in the future be superseded by another theory that will better explain why societies change and why they take the forms that

they do, and possibly also integrate the disparate strands of sociology together better. One day someone, or some someones, will come up with a theory, or put the finishing touches on a burgeoning set of ideas and claim credit for it all, that resolves the contradictions and problems and become the Darwin of the social sciences, their name emblazoned on textbooks until the end of time.

But until then, I think Darwin makes a pretty good Darwin of the social sciences.

References

Note: Some of the references have [Kindle]; this is because they are e-books from the Amazon Kindle service. Two things to know about this; not all Kindle books have page numbers, but some do. The page numbering system for the Kindle works like this: the first word of the 'screen' is marked as the page number. This can, however, throw up some weird results (I.e. if the first word of the screen is the last word of page 2 in the print book, it will still register as page 2 even though most of the screen is page 3). For this reason, for page references provided by the Kindle edition, if the quote, or reference does not appear on the page provided, it is worth checking the next page on as it will probably be located there.

Anderson, B. (2006) *Imagined Communities*. 2nd Edition. London: Verso.

Anderson, P. (1974) *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. London: New Left Books.

Anderson, P. (1990) 'A Culture in Contraflow - I', *New Left Review,* vol. 180, March-April, pp. 41-80.

Andressen, C. (2002) *A Short History of Japan: From Samurai to Sony*. Crows Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin.

Arnason, J. P. (2002a) 'Is Japan a Civilization *Sui Generis*?', *The Peripheral Centre: Essays on Japanese History and Civilization*. Melbourne: Trans-Pacific Press.

Arnason, J. P. (2002b) 'State Formation in Japan and the West', in *The Peripheral Centre: Essays on Japanese History and Civilization*. Melbourne: Trans-Pacific Press.

Arnason, J. P. (2002c) 'Elias in Japan: State formation, Military Elites and Organized Violence', in *The Peripheral Centre: Essays on Japanese History and Civilization*. Melbourne: Trans-Pacific Press.

Atwood, M. (2012) 'Haunted by *The Handmaid's Tale*', *Guardian*, January 20 [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/jan/20/handmaids-tale-margaret-atwood

Axelrod, R. (1984) *The Evolution of Cooperation*. London: Penguin.

Bannister, R. C. (1979) *Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (1992) *The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Becker, M. and Lazaric, N. (2003) 'The Influence of Knowledge in the Replication of Routines', Available at: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00457124

Becquemont, D. (2011) ‘Social Darwinism: From Reality to Myth and From Myth to Reality’, *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences*, Vol. 42, pp. 12-19.

Berry, M. E. (1986) 'Public Peace and Private Attachment: The Goals and Conduct of Power in Early Modern Japan', *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 237-271.

Bhambra, G. K. (2007a) *Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bhambra, G. K. (2007b) ‘Sociology and Postcolonialism: Another ‘Missing’ Revolution?’, *Sociology*, Vol. 41, No. 5, pp. 871-884.

Bhambra, G. K. (2011) ‘Talking Among Themselves? Weberian and Marxian Historical Sociologies as Dialogues without ‘Others’’, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 667-681.

Bhambra, G. K. (2017) *Everything you Know About Brexit is Wrong*. [Online video] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dkBnkBT_x-M&t=1s

Blackmore, S. (2000) *The Meme Machine*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Blackmore, S. (2001) 'Evolution and Memes: The Human Brain as a Selective Imitation Device' [Online] Available at: http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Articles/cas01.html

Blackmore, S. (2006) ‘Why we Need Memetics’, *Behavioral and Brain Sciences,* Vol. 29, 349-350.

Blute, M. (2007) ‘The Evolution of Replication’, *Biological Theory*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 10-22

Bourdieu, P. (1985) ‘The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups’, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 14, No. 6, pp. 723-744.

Boyd, J., Carroll, J. and Gotschall, J. (2010) *Evolution, Literature, and Film: A Reader*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (1985) *Culture and the Evolutionary Process*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (1989) 'Social Learning as an Adaptation', in (2005) *The Origin and Evolution of Cultures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (1992) 'How Microevolutionary Processes Give Rise to History', in (2005) *The Origin and Evolution of Cultures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (1996) 'Why Culture is Common but Cultural Evolution is Rare', in (2005) *The Origin and Evolution of Cultures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (2000) 'Meme Theory Oversimplifies Cultural Change'. Scientific American, October, pp. 54-55.

Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (2006) *Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S. and Richerson, P. J. (2003) 'The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment', *PNAS*, Vol. 100, No. 6, pp. 3531-3535

Bowles, S. (2009) 'Did Warfare Among Ancestral Hunter-Gatherers Affect the Evolution of Human Social Behaviors?', *Science*, Vol. 324, pp. 1293-1298.

Brandon, R. N. (1998) 'The Levels of Selection: A Hierarchy of Interactors', in D. L. Hull and M. Ruse (eds.) *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brandon, R. N. (1999) 'The Units of Selection Revisited: The Modules of Selection', *Biology and Philosophy*, Vol. 14, pp. 167-180

Brenner, R. (1976) 'Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe', *Past & Present,* No. 70, February, pp. 30-75.

Brenner, R. (1977) 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism', *New Left Review,* Vol. 104, pp. 25-92.

Breuilly, J. (1993) *Nationalism and the State*. 2nd Edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Breuilly, J. (2005) 'Dating the Nation: How Old is an Old Nation?', in A. Ichijo and G. Uzelac (eds.) *When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism*. London and New York: Routledge.

Breuilly, J. (2006) 'Introduction', in E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Brown, A. (1999) *The Darwin Wars: How Stupid Genes Became Selfish Gods*. London: Simon & Schuster.

Brown, P. C. (2009) 'Unification, Consolidation, and Tokugawa Rule', in W. M. Tsuitsui (ed.) *A Companion to Japanese History*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Burke, P. (1980) *Sociology and History*. Berkshire: Open University Press.

Buruma, I. (2003) *Inventing Japan: From Empire to Economic Miracle, 1853-1964.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.

Calow, P. (1983) *Evolutionary Principles*. Glasgow: Blackie & Son.

Carniero, R. L. (1970) 'A Theory of The Origin of the State', *Science*, Vol. 169, No. 3947, pp. 733-738

Castro, L. and Toro, M. A. (2004) 'The Evolution of Culture: From Primate Social Learning to Human Culture' *PNAS*, Vol. 101, No. 27, pp. 10235-1240

Choi, J-K. and Bowles, S. (2007) ‘The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War’, *Science*, Vol. 318, No. 5850, pp. 636-640.

Clatterbuck, H., Sober, E. & Lewontin, R. (2013) ‘Selection Never Dominates Drift (nor vice versa)’, *Biological Philosophy*, Vol. 28, pp. 577-592.

Clements, J. (2010) *A Brief History of the Samurai: The Way of Japan's Elite Warriors.* [Kindle] London: Constable & Robinson.

Cohen, G. A. (1978) *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Cohen, G. A. (1982) 'Functional Explanation, Consequence Explanation, and Marxism', *Inquiry,* Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 27-56.

Collins, R. (1986) *Weberian Sociological Theory.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Collins, R. (2006) 'Mann's Transformation of the Classic Sociological Traditions', in *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann,* J. A. Hall & R. Schroeder (eds.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Colls, R. (2007) ‘*The Making of English National Identity*, or *Krishan’s Kasino*’, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 191-195.

Connor, W. (1972) ‘Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?’, *World Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 319-355.

Connor, W. (1990) ‘When is a Nation?’ in J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith (eds.) (1994) *Oxford Readers: Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Connor, W. (1994) ‘From Tribe to Nation’, in *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Conversi, D. (2007) ‘Homogenisation, Nationalism and War: Should we Still Read Ernest Gellner?’, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 371-394.

Darwin, C. (1859) *The Origin of Species*, in P. Appleman (ed.) (2001) *Darwin: A Norton Critical Edition*. 3rd Edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Darwin, C. (2009[1859]) *The Origin of Species and the Voyage of the Beagle*. London: Vintage.

Davies, R. R. (1994) ‘The People’s of Britain and Ireland 1100-1400. I. Identities’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 4, pp. 1-20.

Davies, R. R. (1995) ‘The People’s of Britain and Ireland 1100-1400. II. Names, Boundaries and Regnal Solidarities’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 5, pp. 1-20.

Davies, R. R. (1996) ‘The People’s of Britain and Ireland 1100-1400. III. Laws and Customs’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 6, pp. 1-23.

Davies, R. R. (1997) 'The People's of Britain and Ireland 1100-1400. IV. Language and Historical Mythology', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 7, pp. 1-24.

Dawkins, R. (1988) *The Blind Watchmaker*. London: Penguin.

Dawkins, R. (1989[1976]) *The Selfish Gene*. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dennett, D. C. (1991) *Consciousness Explained*. London: Penguin.

Dennett, D. C. (1995) *Darwin's Dangerous Idea*. London: Penguin.

Diamond, J. (1987) 'The Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race', *Discover Magazine*, May, pp. 64-66.

Diamond, J. (2005[1997]) *Guns, Germs and Steel: A Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000 Years.* London: Vintage.

Dickens, P. (2000) *Social Darwinism: Linking Evolutionary Thought to Social Theory*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Doak, K. M. (1996) 'Ethnic Nationalism and Romanticism in Early Twentieth-Century Japan', *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 77-103.

Doak, K. M. (2007) *A History of Modern Japan: Placing the People*. Boston: Brill.

Doak, K. M. (2009) 'National Identity and Nationalism' in W. M. Tsuitsui (ed.) *A Companion to Japanese History*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Doctorow, C. (2011) 'Why has CCTV Failed to Deter Criminals?', *The Guardian* [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/aug/17/why-cctv-does-not-deter-crime

Eagleton, T. (1996) *The Illusions of Postmodernism.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Edmond, B. (2005) 'The Revealed Poverty of the Gene-Meme Analogy – Why Memetics per se has Failed to Produce Substantive Results', *Journal of Memetics – Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission*, Vol. 9 [Online] Available at: http://cfpm.org/jom-emit/2005/vol9/edmonds_b.html

Elster, J. (1979) *Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Elster, J. (1982) 'Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory: The Case for Methodological Individualism', *Theory and Society*, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 453-482.

Elster, J. (1983a) *Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Elster, J. (1983b) *Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Elster, J. (1986) *An Introduction to Karl Marx*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Elster, J. (2007) *Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eskildsen, R. (2002) 'Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan's 1874 Expedition to Taiwan', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 107, No. 2, pp. 388-418.

Farrell, H. (2010a) 'McLemee on Hall and Gellner', *Crooked Timber* [Online] Available at: http://crookedtimber.org/2010/07/23/mclemee-on-hall-on-gellner/.

Farrell, H. (2010b) 'Marxists and Rational Choice', *Crooked Timber* [Online] Available at: http://crookedtimber.org/2010/08/30/marxists-and-rational-choice/

Farrell, H. and Shalizi, C. (unpublished) 'Evolutionary Theory and the Dynamics of Institutional Change' [Online] Available at: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6595/Farrell-Shalizi_4.3.pdf

Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. (2003) 'The Nature of Human Altruism', *Nature,* Vol. 425, pp. 785-791.

Fehrn, E. and Gachter, S. (2002) 'Altruistic Punishment in Humans', *Nature,* Vol. 415, pp. 137-140.

Fletcher, J. A. and Zwick, M. (2006) 'Unifying the Theories of Inclusive Fitness and Reciprocal Altruism', *The American Naturalist*, Vol. 168, No. 2, pp. 252-262

Flynn, D. O. and Giraldez, A. (1995) 'Born with a "Silver Spoon": The Origin of World Trade in 1571', *Journal of World History*, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 201-221.

Fortey, R. (1998) 'Shock Lobsters', *London Review of Books*, Vol. 20, No. 19 [Online] Available at: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v20/n19/richard-fortey/shock-lobsters

Foot, S. (1996) 'The Making of Angelcynn: English Identity Before the Norman Conquest', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 6, pp. 25-49.

Frank, A. G. (1969) *Capitalism and Underdevelpment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil*. Revised Edition. New York & London: Monthly Review Press.

Fukuyama, F. (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man*. London: Penguin.

Gabora, L. (2004) 'Ideas are not Replicators but Minds are', *Biology and Philosophy*, Vol. 19, pp. 127-143

Gellner, E. (1964) *Thought and Change*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Gellner, E. (1988) *Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History*. London: Paladin.

Gellner, E. (1993) ‘The Mightier Pen: The Double Standards of Inside-out Colonialism’, in E. Gellner (1994) *Encounters with Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Gellner, E. (1996a) ‘Reply to my Critics’, in J. A. Hall and I. Jarvie (eds.) *The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Gellner, E. (1996b) 'Do Nations Have Navels', *Nations and Nationalism,* Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 366-370.

Gellner, E. (1997) *Nationalism*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Gellner, E. (1998) *Language and Solitude: Wittegenstein, Malinowski and the Hapsburg Dilemma*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gellner, E. (2005[1959]) *Words and Things: A Critical Account of Linguistic Philosophy and a Study in Ideology*. London: Routledge Classics.

Gellner, E. (2006[1983]) *Nations and Nationalism*. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Gintis, H. (2000) ‘Beyond *Homo Economicus*: Evidence from Experimental Economics’, *Ecological Economics*, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 311-322.

Gluck, C. (1985) *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (2000) ‘The Replicator in Retrospect’, *Biology and Philosophy*, Vol. 15, pp. 403-423.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (2009) *Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goldstone, J. A. (2006) 'A Historical, not Comparative, Method: Breakthroughs and Limitations in the Theory and Methodology of Michael Mann's Analysis of Power', in J. A. Hall & R. Schroeder (eds.) *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gould, S. J. (1980a) 'Shades of Lamarck', in *The Panda's Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History*. London: Penguin.

Gould, S. J. (1980b) ‘Return of the Hopeful Monster’, in *The Panda’s Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History*. London: Penguin.

Gould, S. J. (1980c) ‘The Episodic Nature of Evolutionary Change’, in *The Panda’s Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History*. London: Penguin.

Gould, S. J. (1996) *Life's Grandeur: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin*. London: Jonathan Cape.[83]

Gould, S. J. (2007) 'The Darwinian Gentleman at Marx's Funeral: Resolving Evolution's Oddest Coupling', in P. McGarr and S. Rose (eds.) *The Richness of Life: The Essential Stephen Jay Gould*. London: Vintage Books.

Gould, S. J. and Lewontin, R. C. (1979) 'The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm', *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London*, Vol. 205, pp. 581-598.

Gould, S. J. and Vrba, E. S. (1982) 'Exaptation – A Missing Term in the Science of Form', in D. L. Hull and M. Ruse (eds.) (1998) *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Greenfeld, L. (1992) *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Greenfeld, L. (1996) 'The Modern Religion?' *Critical Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 169-191.

Grosby, (1995) 'Territoriality: The Transcendental, Primordial Feature of Modern Societies', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 143-162.

Grosby, (2003) 'Religion, Ethnicity and Nationalism: The Uncertain Perennialism of Adrian Hastings', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 7-13.

Hall, J. A. (1985) *Power and Liberties: The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West.* London: Pelican.

Hall, J. A. (ed.) (1998) *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hall, J. A. (2010) *Ernest Gellner: An Intellectual Biography*. London: Verso.

Hall, J. A. and Jarvie, I. (eds.) (1996) *The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Harootunian, H. (1959) 'The Progress of Japan and the Samurai Class, 1868-1882', *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 255-266.

Harootunian, H. (1960) 'The Economic Rehabilitation of the Samurai in the Early Meiji Period', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 433-444.

Hastings, A. (1997) *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[83] Note: the American version of the book was entitled *Full House*. Gould changed the title because he was worried that British people would not get the reference to the poker hand. Apart from the preface explaining this (and the rules of baseball) the two books are the same.

Hastings, A. (1999) ‘Special People’s’, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 381-396.

Hawkins, M. (1997) *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860-1945: Nature as Model and Nature as Threat.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hayward, C. R. (2000) *De-Facing Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hearn, J. (2006) *Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Palgrave MacMillian.

Hearn, J. (2012) *Theorizing Power.* London: Palgrave MacMillian.

Hearn, J. (2014) 'On the Social Evolution of Power To/Over', *Journal of Political Power*, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 175-191.

Hearn, J. (2017) *Salvage Ethnography in the Financial Sector: The Path to Economic Crisis in Scotland*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hechter, M. (1975) *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966*. London: Routledge.

Hechter, M. (1978) ‘Group Formation and the Cultural Division of Labor’, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 84, No. 2, pp. 293-318.

Hechter, M. (1984) ‘When Actors Comply: Monitoring Costs and the Production of Social Order’, *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 161-183.

Hechter, M. (1987a) ‘Nationalism as Group Solidarity’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 415-426.

Hechter, M. (1987b) *Principles of Group Solidarity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hechter, M. (1995) ‘Explaining Nationalist Violence’, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 53-68.

Hechter, M. (2000a) *Containing Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hechter, M. (2000b) 'Nationalism and Rationality', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 3-19.

Hechter, M., Friedman, D. and Kanazawa, S. (1992) ‘The Attainment of Social Order in Heterogeneous Societies’, in M. Hechter and C. Horne (eds.) (2003) *Theories of Social Change: A Reader*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Hechter, M. and Kanazawa, S. (1993) ‘Group Solidarity and Social Order in Japan’, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 455-493.

Hechter, M. and Kanazawa, S. (1997) ‘Sociological Rational Choice Theory’, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 23, pp. 191-214.

Hobbes, T. (1998[1651]) *Leviathan.* Oxford: Oxford World's Classics.

Hodgson, G. M. (2000) 'The Concept of Emergence in Social Science: Its History and Importance', *Emergence*, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 65-77.

Hodgson, G. M. (2005) 'Generalizing Darwinism to Social Evolution: Some Early Attempts', *Journal of Economic Issues*, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 899-914.

Hodgson, G. M. (2009) 'Agency, Institutions, and Darwinism in Evolutionary Economic Geography', *Economic Geography*, Vol. 85, No. 2, pp. 167-173.

Hogdson, G. M. (2015) 'A Trojan Horse for Sociology? Preferences versus Evolution and Morality', *Review of Behavioral Economics*, Vol. 2, No. 1-2, pp. 93-112

Hodgson, G. M. and Knudsen, T. (2004) 'The Firm as an Interactor: Firms as Vehicles for Habits and Routines', *Journal of Evolutionary Economics*, Vol. 14, pp. 281-307

Hodgson, G. M. and Knudsen, T. (2006a) 'Why we need a Generalized Darwinism, and why Generalized Darwinism is not Enough', *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, Vol. 61, pp. 1-19.

Hodgson G. M. and Knudsen, T. (2006b) 'The Nature and Units of Social Selection', *Journal of Evolutionary Economics*, Vol. 16, pp. 477-489.

Hodgson, G. M. and Knudsen, T. (2008) 'In Search of General Evolutionary Principles: Why Darwinism is too Important to be Left to the Biologists', *Journal of Bioeconomics*, Vol. 10, pp. 51-69.

Hodgson, G. M. and Knudsen, T. (2010) *Darwin's Conjecture: The Search for General Principles of Social and Economic Evolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hofstadter, R. (1944) *Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1860-1915.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Hopkins, T. K. (1982) 'Notes on Class Analysis and the World-System', in Hopkins, T. K., Wallerstein I., Bach, R., Chase-Dunn, C. and Mulcherjee, R. (eds.) *World-Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology*. London; Sage Publications.

Howell, D. L. (1992) 'Proto-Industrial Origins of Japanese Capitalism', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 51, No. 2, pp. 269-286.

Howell, D. L. (2000) 'Visions of the Future in Meiji Japan', in M. Goldman and A. Gordon (eds.) *Historical Perspectives on Contemporary Asia*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hull, D. L. (1988) *Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Hull, D. L. (1994) ‘Taking Vehicles Seriously’, *Brain and Behavioral Science*, Vol. 17, pp. 627-628.

Hull, D. L. (2001) *Science and Selection: Essays on Biological Evolution and the Philosophy of Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hutchinson, J. (2005) *Nations as Zones of Conflict*. London: Sage Publications.

Hutchinson, J. (2017) *Nationalism and War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ichijo, A. (2002) ‘The Scope of Theories of Nationalism: Comments on the Scottish and Japanese Experiences’, *Geopolitics*, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 53-74

Ichijo, A. (2013) *Nationalism and Multiple Modernities: Europe and Beyond*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ignatieff, M. (1995) ‘The Myth of Citizenship’, in R. Beiner (ed.) *Theorizing Citizenship*. New York: SUNY Press.

Ito, K. (1998) 'The Invention of *Wa* and the Transformation of the Image of Prince Shotoku in Modern Japan', in S. Vlastos (ed.) *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Janowitz, Morris (1977) ‘A Sociological Perspective on Wallerstein’, *American Jouranl of Sociology*, vol. 82, no. 5, pp. 1090-1097.

Jansen, M. B. (1985) ‘Meiji Ishin: The Political Context’ in N. Michio and M. Urrutia (eds.) *Meiji Ishin: Restoration and Revolution*. New York: The United Nations University.

Kaufmann, W. A. (1951) ‘The Hegel Myth and its Method’, in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 60, No. 4, pp. 459-486.

Keen, S. (2001) *Debunking Economics: The Naked Emperor of the Social Sciences*. London: Zed Books.

Keeney, B. (1947) ‘Military Service and the Development of Nationalism in England, 1272-1327’, *Speculum*, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 534-549.

Kiser, E. and Hechter, M. (1991) ‘The Role of General Theory in Comparative-Historical Sociology’, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 97, No. 1, pp. 1-30.

Kiser, E. and Hechter, M. (1998) ‘The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics’, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 104, No. 3, pp. 785-816.

Knudsen, T. (2004) ‘General Selection Theory and Economic Evolution: The Price Equation and the Replicator/Interactor Distinction’, *Journal of Economic Methodology*, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 147-173

Krimbas, C. B. (2004) ‘On Fitness’, *Biology and Philosophy*, Vol. 19, pp. 185-203

Krugman, P. and Venables, A. J. (1995) 'Globalization and the Inequality of Nations', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 110, No. 4, pp. 857-880.

Kumar, K. (2003) *The Making of English National Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kumar, K. (2005) 'When was the English Nation', in A. Ichijo and G. Uzelac (eds.) *When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism*. London and New York: Routledge.

Kumar, K. (2010) 'Nation-States as Empires, Empires as Nation-States: Two Principles, One Practice?', *Theory and Society*, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 119-143.

Kurosawa, A. (1954) (dir.) *The Seven Samurai*. [DVD] *BFI Classics*.

Langlands, R. (1999) 'Britishness or Englishness? The Historical Problem of National Identity in Britain', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 53-69.

Lazaric, N. (2000) 'The Role of Routines, Rules and Habits in Collective Learning: Some Epistemological and Ontological Considerations', *European Journal of Economic and Social Systems*, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 157-171

Lehman, J-P. (1982) 'The Cultural Roots of Modern Japan', in J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smtih (eds.) (1996) *Ethnicity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lewens, T. (2007) *Darwin*. London: Routledge.

Lewens, T. (2012a) 'Cultural Evolution: Integration and Skepticism', in H. Kincaid (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lewens, T. (2012b) 'The Darwinian View of Culture', *Biological Philosophy*, Vol. 27, pp. 745-753.

Lü, W-H. (1985) 'Western Learning and the Meiji Ishin', in N. Michio and M. Urrutia (eds.) *Meiji Ishin: Restoration and Revolution*. New York: The United Nations University.

Malesevic, S. (2017a) 'Empires and Nation-States: Beyond the Dichotomy', *Thesis Eleven*, Vol. 139, No. 1, pp. 3-10.

Malesevic, S. (2017b) 'The Foundations of State-Hood: Nations and Empires in the Longue Duree', Vol. 139, No. 2, pp. 145-161.

Malesevic, S. and Haugaard, M. (eds.) (2007) *Ernest Gellner and Contemporary Social Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (1984) 'The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results', *European Journal of Sociology,* vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 185-213.

Mann, M. (1986) *The Sources of Social Power, Volume I: A History of Power From the Beginning to A.D. 1760.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (1987) 'Letter to the Editor on "The Old Question"', *London Review of Books,* Vol. 9, No. 6, March [Online] Available at:

Mann, M. (1992) 'The Emergence of Modern European Nationalism', in J. A. Hall and I. C. Jarvie (eds.) *Transition to Modernity: Essays on Power, Wealth and Belief*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (1993) *The Sources of Social Power, Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (2003) *Incoherent Empire.* London: Verso.

Mann, M. (2004) *Fascists.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (2005) *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (2006) 'The Sources of Social Power Revisited: A Response to Criticism', in J. A. Hall and R. Schroeder (eds.) *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (2010) 'Explaining the World as a System: Can it be Done?' *British Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 61, Supplement S1, pp. 177-182.

Mann, M. (2012) *The Sources of Social Power, Volume III: Global Empires and Revolutions, 1890-1945.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (2013) *The Sources of Social Power, Volume IV: Globalizations, 1945-2011.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (2016) 'Have Human Societies Evolved? Evidence From History and Pre-History', *Theory and Society*, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 203-237.

Marx, K. (1977[1848]) 'Speech on Free Trade', in D. McLellan (ed.) *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marx, K. (1977[1852]) *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,* in D. McLellan (ed.) *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marx, K. and Engles, F. (1848) *The Communist Manifesto,* in D. McLellan (ed.) (1977) *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Maynard Smith, J. (1966) *The Theory of Evolution*. 2nd Edition. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Mayr, E. (1975) 'Typological versus Population Thinking', in E. Sober (ed.) (2006) *Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology*. 3rd Edition. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Mayr, E. (1992) 'The Idea of Teleology', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 117-135.

McCrone, D. (1998) *The Sociology of Nationalism: Tomorrow's Ancestors.* London: Routledge.

McLellan, D. (1977) *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Meadwell, H. (2012) 'Nationalism chez Gellner', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 563-582.

Meadwell, H. (2014) 'Gellner Redux?', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 18-36.

Milliband, R. (1969) *The State in Capitalist Society.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Miller, J. (1993) *Mikhail Gorbachev and the End of Soviet Power*. London: St. Martin's Press.

McMaster, J. (1992) *Sabotaging the Shogun: Western Diplomats Open Japan, 1859-69*. New York: Vantage Press.

McNamara, A. (2011) 'Can we Measure Memes?', *Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience*, Vol. 3, pp. 1-7.

Musil, J. (1996) 'The Prague Roots of Ernest Gellner's Thinking', in J. A. Hall and I. Jarvie (eds.) *The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Nagai, M. (1954) 'Herbert Spencer in Early Meiji Japan', *The Far Easter Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 55-64.

Nairn, T. (1998) 'The Curse of Rurality: Limits of Modernisation Theory', in J. A. Hall (ed.) *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nanay, B. (2002) 'The Return of the Replicator: What is Philosophically Significant in a General Account of Replication and Selection?', *Biology and Philosophy*, Vol. 17, pp. 109-121.

Nanay, B. (2005) 'Can Cumulative Selection Explain Adaptation?', *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 72, No. 5, pp. 1099-1112.

Nanay, B. (2010) 'Natural Selection and the Limitations of Environmental Resources', *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences*, Vol. 41, pp. 418-419.

Neander, K. (1995) 'Explaining Complex Adaptations: A Reply to Sober's 'Reply to Neander'', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 583-587.

Noble, T. (2000) *Social Theory and Social Change*. New York: Palgrave.

Nozick, R. (1974) *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Okasha, S. (2003) 'Does the Concept of "Clade Selection" Make Sense?', *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 70, No. 4, pp. 739-751.

O'Leary, B. (1998) 'Ernest Gellner's Diagnoses of Nationalism: A Critical Overview, or, What Is Living and What is Dead in Ernest Gellner's Philosophy of Nationalism?', in J. A. Hall (ed.) *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Özkirimli, U. (2010) *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. 2nd Edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillian.

Özkirimli, U. (2003) 'The Nation as an Artichoke? A Critique of Ethnosymbolist Interpretations of Nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 339-355.

Perry, M. (2002) *Marxism and History*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillian.

Plato (2007) *The Republic*. Trans. H. D. P. Lee and D. Lee. London: Penguin.

Poggi, G. (2006) 'Political Power Un-Manned: A Defence of the Holy Trinity from Mann's Military Attack', in J. A. Hall and R. Schroeder (eds.) *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Popper, K. R. (2011[1945]) *The Open Society and its Enemies*. London: Routledge Classics.

Pratt, E. E. (2009) 'Social and Economic Change in Tokugawa Japan', in W. M. Tsuitsui (ed.) *A Companion to Japanese History*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Queller, D. C. (1985) 'Kinship, Reciprocity and Synergism in the Evolution of Social Behaviour', *Nature*, Vol. 318, Nov. 28, pp. 366-367.

Ravina, M. (1995) 'State-Building and Political Economy in Early-Modern Japan', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 997-1022.

Reeve, H. K. and Sherman, P. W. (1993) 'An Operational, Non Historical Definition of Adaptation', in M. Ridley (ed.) (2004) *Evolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reynolds, S. (2007) 'Medievalist Reflections on *The Making of English National Identity*', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 182-186.

Richards, R. J. (1988) 'The Moral Foundations of the Idea of Evolutionary Progress: Darwin, Spencer, and the Neo-Darwinians', in M. Ruse and D. L. Hull (1998) *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2006) *Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Roberts, M. (1996) *Analytical Marxism: A Critique*. London: Verso.

Roemer, J. (1986) ''Rational Choice' Marxism: Some Issues of Method and Substance', in J. Roemer (ed.) *Analytical Marxism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Runciman, D. (2003) 'The Concept of the State: The Sovereignty of a Fiction', in Q. Skinner & B. Strath (eds.) *States and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Runciman, W. G. (1986) 'On the Tendency of Human Societies to Form Varieties', *Proceedings of the British Academy* [Online] Available at: http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/proc/files/72p149.pdf

Runciman, W. G. (1987) 'The Old Question: Review of *The Sources of Social Power Volume I*', vol. 9, no. 4, February 19 [Online] Available at:

Runciman, W. G. (1995) 'The 'Triumph' of Capitalism as a Topic in the Theory of Social Selection', *New Left Review*, Vol. 210, March-April, pp. 33-47.

Runciman, W. G. (1998a) *The Social Animal*. [Kindle] London: HarperCollins.

Runciman, W. G. (1998b) 'The Selectionist Paradigm and its Implications for Sociology', *Sociology*, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 163-188.

Runciman, W. G. (1989) 'Evolution in Sociology', in A. Grafen (ed.) *Evolution and its Influence*. Oxford: Claredon Press.

Runciman, W. G. (2004) 'The Diffusion of Christianity in the Third Century AD as a Case-Study in the Theory of Cultural Selection', *European Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 3-21.

Runciman, W. G. (2009) *The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ruse, M. (1982) 'Evolutionary Ethics: A Phoenix Arisen', *Zygon,* Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 95-112.

Ruse, M. (1993) 'Evolution and Progress', in D. L. Hull and M. Ruse (eds.) *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sahlins, M. D. and Service, E. R. (1960) *Evolution and Culture*. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.

Schofield, M. (2007) 'The Noble Lie', in G. R. F. Ferrari (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sen, A. K. (1977) 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 317-344.

Sharpe, J. A. (1987) *Early Modern England: A Social History, 1550-1760.* London: Edward Arnold.

Shimao, E. (1981) 'Darwinism in Japan, 1877-1927', *Annals of Science*, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 93-102.

Singer, P. (2000) *Marx: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Skockpol, Theda (1977) ‘Wallerstein’s World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique’, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 82, no. 5, pp. 1075-1090.

Smith, A. D. (1981) *The Ethnic Revival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, A. D. (1989) 'The Origins of Nations', *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 340-367.

Smith, A. D. (1996a) 'Nations and Their Pasts', *Nations and Nationalism,* Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 358-365.

Smith, A. D. (1996b) 'Memory and Modernity: Reflections on Ernest Gellner's Theory of Nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism,* Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 371-388.

Smith, A. D. (2007) ‘The Master Ornithologist’, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 186-191.

Smith, A. D. (2010) *Nationalism*. 2nd Edition. London: Polity Press.

Smith, A. D. (2013) *The Nation Made Real: Art and National Identity in Western Europe, 1600-1850*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, A. D. (2015) ‘Biblical Beliefs in the Shaping of the Modern Nation’, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 403-422.

Smith, T. C. (1961) ‘Japan’s Aristocratic Revolution’, in J. Livingston, J. Moore & F. Oldfather (eds.) (1976) *The Japan Reader Volume 1: Imperial Japan, 1800-1945*. London: Penguin Books.

Smolin, L. (1992) 'Did the Universe Evolve?', *Classical Quantum Gravity*, Vol. 9, pp. 173-191.

Smolin, L. (2004) 'Cosmological Natural Selection as the Explanation for the Complexity of the Universe'. *Physica A*, Vol. 340, pp. 705-713.

Sober, E. (1995) ‘Natural Selection and Distributive Explanation: A Reply to Neander’, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 46, pp. 384-397.

Sober, E. (2000) *Philosophy of Biology*. 2nd Edition. Colorado: West View Press.

Sober, E. and Wilson, D. S. (1994) ‘Reintroducing Group Selection to the Human Behavioral Sciences’, *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, Vol. 17, pp. 585-654

Sober, E. and Wilson, D. S. (1998) *Unto Others: Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Sonoda, H. (1990) ‘The Decline of the Japanese Warrior Class, 1840-1880’, *Japanese Review*, No. 1, pp. 73-111.

Sperber, D. (1996) *Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Spruyt, H. (1994a) *The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Spruyt, H. (1994b) 'Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order', *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 527-557.

Sterelny, K. (2001) *Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest*. Cambridge: Icon Books.

Sterelny, K., Smith, K. C. and Dickison, M. (1996) 'The Extended Replicator', *Biology and Philosophy*, Vol. 11, pp. 377-403

Stiglitz, J. (2002) *Globalization and its Discontents*. London: Penguin.

Strayner, J. R. (1970) *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Sweezy, P. (1972) 'Toward a Critique of Economics', in *Modern Capitalism and Other Essays*. London: Monthly Review Press.

Tharoor, S. (2015) *Dr Shashi Tharoor MP - Britain Does Owe Reparations*. [Online video] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f7CW7S0zxv4

Tilly, C. (1985) 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds.) *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, C. (1992) *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Tipton, E. K. (2002) *Modern Japan: A Social and Political History*. London: Routledge.

Tipton, E. K. (2009) 'Intellectual Life, Culture, and the Challenge of Modernity', in W. M. Tsuitsui (ed.) *A Companion to Japanese History*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Tōyama, S. (1985) 'Independence and Modernization in the Nineteenth Century', in N. Michio and M. Urrutia (eds.) *Meiji Ishin: Restoration and Revolution*. New York: The United Nations University.

Trigger, B. G. (2009) *Sociocultural Evolution: Calculation and Contingency*. London: John-Wiley and Sons.

Unoura, H. (1999) 'Samurai Darwinism: Hiroyuki Katô and the Reception of Darwin's Theory in Modern Japan from the 1880s to the 1900s', *History and Anthropology*, Vol. 11, No. 2-3, pp. 235-255.

van den Berghe (1987) *The Ethnic Phenomenon*. London: Praeger.

van den Berghe (1995) 'Does Race Matter?' *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 357-368.

von Tunzelman, A. (2012) *Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire*. [Kindle] London: Simon & Schuster.

von Tunzelman, A. (2018) 'The Empire Haunts Britain', *New York Times* [online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/opinion/windrush-generation-scandal-commonwealth.html

Vlastos, S. (1998) 'Agrarianism without Tradition: The Radical Critique of Prewar Japanese Modernity', in S. Vlastos (ed.) *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan*. Berkley: University of California Press.

Wade, R. (2003) *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asia Industrialization*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Wallerstein, I. (1972) 'Three Paths to National Development in Sixteenth Century Europe', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 95-101.

Wallerstein, I. (1974) 'The Rise and Future Demise of the Capitalist World-System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 387-415.

Wallerstein, I. (1976) 'A World-System Perspective on the Social Sciences', *The British Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 343-352.

Wallerstein, I. (1983) 'The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World-Economy', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology,* Vol. 24, No. 1-2, pp. 100-108.

Wallerstein, I. (1996) *Historical Capitalism with Capitalist Civilization*. London: Verso.

Wallerstein, I. (2000) 'Globalization or the Age of Transition?: A Long-Term View of the Trajectory of the World System', *International Sociology*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 249-265.

Wallerstein, I. (2004) *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction.* London: Duke University Press.

Wallerstein, I. (2011[1974]) *The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Walthall, A. (2006) *Japan: A Cultural, Social and Political History*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Washbrook, D. A. (1988) 'Progress and Problems: South Asian Economic and Social History c.1720-1860', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 57-96.

Weber, M. (1924) ‘Sociology and Biology’, in W. G. Runciman (ed.) *Max Weber: Selections in Translation* (1978) Trans. E. Mattthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

West-Eberhard, M. J. (1992) 'Adaptation: Current Usages', in D. L. Hull and M. Ruse (eds.) *The Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Williams, G. C. (1966) ‘Adaptation and Natural Selection’, in M. Ridley (ed.) (2004) *Evolution*. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wilson, D. S. (1975) ‘A Theory of Group Selection’, *PNAS*, Vol. 72, No. 1, pp. 143-146.

Wilson, S. (2002) ‘Rethinking Nation and Nationalism in Japan’, in S. Wilson (ed.) *Nation and Nationalism in Japan*. London: Routledge Curzon.

Wittgenstein, L. (2009[1953]) *Philosophical Investigations*. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Wormald, P. (1994) ‘*Engla Lond*: the Making of an Allegiance’, *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 1-24.

Wright, E. O., Levine, A. and Sober, E. (1992) *Reconstructing Marxism: Essays on Explanation and the Theory of History*. London: Verso.

Zolberg, A. R. (1981) ‘Review: Origins of the Modern World System: A Missing Link’, *World Politics*, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 253-281.

Zurek, W. H. (2009) 'Quantum Darwinism', *Nature Physics*, Vol. 5, pp. 181-188.